Files
picoclaw/pkg/isolation/platform_windows.go
T
BeaconCat f334ac6d01 fix: treat PID=1 as stale in PID file singleton check, fix govet shadow, add .gitattributes (#2642)
- pid: When a container stops and leaves behind a PID file with PID 1
  on a shared volume, the host's init process (PID 1) passes the
  isProcessRunning check, blocking new gateway starts. Treat recorded
  PID 1 as always stale in both WritePidFile and ReadPidFileWithCheck.
  Added unit tests covering the PID=1 container leftover scenario.

- isolation: Fix govet shadow warning on platform_windows.go line 105
  where := shadows the outer err variable. Changed to = assignment.

- gitattributes: Enforce LF line endings for shell scripts to prevent
  CRLF issues when checking out on Windows (breaks Docker entrypoint).

Co-authored-by: BeaconCat <BeaconCat@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-24 15:26:34 +08:00

218 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

//go:build windows
package isolation
import (
"fmt"
"os/exec"
"sync"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/logger"
)
const disableMaxPrivilege = 0x1
// windowsProcessResources holds native handles that must live for the lifetime
// of an isolated child process.
type windowsProcessResources struct {
job windows.Handle
token windows.Token
}
var (
windowsProcessResourcesByPID sync.Map
windowsPendingResources sync.Map
advapi32 = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("advapi32.dll")
procCreateRestrictedToken = advapi32.NewProc("CreateRestrictedToken")
)
func applyPlatformIsolation(cmd *exec.Cmd, isolation config.IsolationConfig, root string) error {
if !isolation.Enabled || cmd == nil {
return nil
}
if cmd.SysProcAttr == nil {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{}
}
rules := BuildWindowsAccessRules(root, isolation.ExposePaths)
logger.InfoCF("isolation", "windows isolation process constraints",
map[string]any{
"root": root,
"command": cmd.Path,
"rules": formatWindowsAccessRules(rules),
"note": "Windows currently enforces restricted token, low integrity, and job object limits; expose_paths filesystem remapping is rejected during preflight",
})
// Create the restricted token before the process starts so CreateProcess uses
// the reduced privilege set from the first instruction.
restrictedToken, err := createRestrictedPrimaryToken()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create restricted primary token: %w", err)
}
cmd.SysProcAttr.CreationFlags |= windows.CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP | windows.CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB
cmd.SysProcAttr.Token = syscall.Token(restrictedToken)
windowsPendingResources.Store(cmd, windowsProcessResources{token: restrictedToken})
return nil
}
func postStartPlatformIsolation(cmd *exec.Cmd, isolation config.IsolationConfig, root string) error {
if !isolation.Enabled || cmd == nil || cmd.Process == nil {
return nil
}
resourcesAny, _ := windowsPendingResources.LoadAndDelete(cmd)
resources, _ := resourcesAny.(windowsProcessResources)
// Job objects can only be attached after the process exists, so the Windows
// backend finishes isolation in this post-start hook.
job, err := windows.CreateJobObject(nil, nil)
if err != nil {
if resources.token != 0 {
_ = resources.token.Close()
}
return fmt.Errorf("create windows job object: %w", err)
}
info := windows.JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION{}
info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags = windows.JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE
if _, err = windows.SetInformationJobObject(
job,
windows.JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&info)),
uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(info)),
); err != nil {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(job)
if resources.token != 0 {
_ = resources.token.Close()
}
return fmt.Errorf("set windows job object info: %w", err)
}
proc, err := windows.OpenProcess(
windows.PROCESS_SET_QUOTA|windows.PROCESS_TERMINATE|windows.PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION|windows.SYNCHRONIZE,
false,
uint32(cmd.Process.Pid),
)
if err != nil {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(job)
if resources.token != 0 {
_ = resources.token.Close()
}
return fmt.Errorf("open process for job assignment: %w", err)
}
if err = windows.AssignProcessToJobObject(job, proc); err != nil {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(proc)
_ = windows.CloseHandle(job)
if resources.token != 0 {
_ = resources.token.Close()
}
return fmt.Errorf("assign process to job object: %w", err)
}
if resources.token != 0 {
_ = resources.token.Close()
}
resources.job = job
windowsProcessResourcesByPID.Store(cmd.Process.Pid, resources)
go reapWindowsProcessResources(cmd.Process.Pid, proc, job)
return nil
}
func cleanupPendingPlatformResources(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
if cmd == nil {
return
}
resourcesAny, ok := windowsPendingResources.LoadAndDelete(cmd)
if !ok {
return
}
resources, _ := resourcesAny.(windowsProcessResources)
if resources.token != 0 {
_ = resources.token.Close()
}
}
func reapWindowsProcessResources(pid int, proc windows.Handle, job windows.Handle) {
_, _ = windows.WaitForSingleObject(proc, windows.INFINITE)
_ = windows.CloseHandle(proc)
_ = windows.CloseHandle(job)
windowsProcessResourcesByPID.Delete(pid)
}
// createRestrictedPrimaryToken duplicates the current process token, removes
// maximum privileges, and lowers integrity before it is assigned to a child.
func createRestrictedPrimaryToken() (windows.Token, error) {
var current windows.Token
if err := windows.OpenProcessToken(
windows.CurrentProcess(),
windows.TOKEN_DUPLICATE|windows.TOKEN_ASSIGN_PRIMARY|windows.TOKEN_QUERY|windows.TOKEN_ADJUST_DEFAULT,
&current,
); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
defer current.Close()
var restricted windows.Token
r1, _, e1 := procCreateRestrictedToken.Call(
uintptr(current),
uintptr(disableMaxPrivilege),
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&restricted)),
)
if r1 == 0 {
if e1 != nil && e1 != syscall.Errno(0) {
return 0, e1
}
return 0, syscall.EINVAL
}
if err := setTokenLowIntegrity(restricted); err != nil {
_ = restricted.Close()
return 0, err
}
return restricted, nil
}
// setTokenLowIntegrity lowers the token integrity level so writes to higher
// integrity locations are blocked by the OS.
func setTokenLowIntegrity(token windows.Token) error {
lowSID, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinLowLabelSid)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create low integrity sid: %w", err)
}
tml := windows.Tokenmandatorylabel{
Label: windows.SIDAndAttributes{
Sid: lowSID,
Attributes: windows.SE_GROUP_INTEGRITY,
},
}
if err := windows.SetTokenInformation(
token,
windows.TokenIntegrityLevel,
(*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&tml)),
tml.Size(),
); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("set token low integrity: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// formatWindowsAccessRules reshapes the internal rules for structured logging.
func formatWindowsAccessRules(rules []AccessRule) []map[string]string {
formatted := make([]map[string]string, 0, len(rules))
for _, rule := range rules {
formatted = append(formatted, map[string]string{
"path": rule.Path,
"mode": rule.Mode,
})
}
return formatted
}