Files
picoclaw/web/backend/api/auth.go
T
sky5454 06023c79fa feat(launcher): standard HTTP login/setup/logout flow for dashboard, frontend and backend impl. and fix windows pid lock for ws (#2339)
* feat(launcher): replace token-in-logs auth with standard HTTP login flow

## Problem

Previously users had to find the one-time token from console logs or
log files to access the dashboard - a non-standard, error-prone workflow
with no clear path for changing credentials.

## Solution: standard HTTP API login with bcrypt-backed password store

### Auth flow (new)
1. First run: browser opens, session guard detects uninitialized state,
   redirects to /launcher-setup
2. User sets a password (min 8 chars) via POST /api/auth/setup {password, confirm},
   bcrypt(cost=12) hash stored in ~/.picoclaw/launcher-auth.db (SQLite)
3. Subsequent logins: POST /api/auth/login {password}, HttpOnly cookie
   picoclaw_launcher_auth (HMAC-SHA256 signed, 7-day expiry)
4. 401 on any API call, frontend redirects to /launcher-login
5. Logout: POST /api/auth/logout, cookie cleared, redirect to login

### Backend changes
- web/backend/api/auth.go: renamed Token to Password; added handleSetup;
  launcherAuthStatusResponse now includes Initialized bool; PasswordStore
  interface wires bcrypt store into handlers
- web/backend/dashboardauth/: new package - Store with New(dir) / Open(path);
  SetPassword (bcrypt cost=12), VerifyPassword, IsInitialized
  - sql.go: all DB-layer constants (DBFilename, sqliteDriver, bcryptCost,
    four SQL query strings) - compile-time constants, zero runtime overhead
- web/backend/middleware/launcher_dashboard_auth.go: /launcher-setup and
  /api/auth/setup added to public paths
- web/backend/main.go:
  - dashboardauth.New(picoHome) replaces manual path construction
  - maskSecret(): suffix only revealed when >=5 chars hidden (length >= 12),
    preventing 8-char minimum passwords from leaking their tail
- web/backend/main_test.go: TestMaskSecret updated with boundary cases

### Forward-compatibility: pkg/credential integration

If the dashboard password is later reused as the enc:// passphrase,
the bcrypt hash in launcher-auth.db becomes an offline oracle.
Recommended mitigation (not yet implemented): derive two independent
subkeys via HKDF before use:

  bcrypt(HKDF(password, info="picoclaw-dashboard-login-v1"))  stored in DB
  HKDF(password, info="picoclaw-credential-enc-v1")           passed to PassphraseProvider

This isolates the two domains: cracking the bcrypt hash yields only the
login subkey, which is computationally independent of the enc:// subkey.

* fix(auth): replace wastedassign ok := false with var ok bool

* refactor(tray): remove copy-token clipboard feature

Dashboard login now uses standard web auth (bcrypt + session cookie).
The system tray 'Copy dashboard token' menu item is no longer needed.

- Delete tray_offers_copy.go and tray_offers_copy_stub.go
- Remove mCopyTok menu item and clipboard handler from systray.go
- Remove launcherDashboardTokenForClipboard var from main.go
- Remove MenuCopyToken/MenuCopyTokenHint keys from i18n.go

* feat(launcher-ui): standard HTTP login/setup/logout flow for dashboard

Replaces the previous "find token in logs" workflow with a proper
browser-based authentication UI backed by the new /api/auth/* endpoints.

### New pages
- /launcher-setup: first-run password initialization form (password +
  confirm, min 8 chars); calls POST /api/auth/setup; redirects to login
  on success
- /launcher-login: standard password login form; calls POST /api/auth/login;
  sets HttpOnly session cookie on success

### Session guard (src/routes/__root.tsx)
A useEffect on every non-auth page load calls GET /api/auth/status:
- initialized=false  -> redirect to /launcher-setup
- authenticated=false -> redirect to /launcher-login
This ensures the setup/login UI is shown even when the ?token= URL
mechanism auto-logs in (first-run case).

### Logout button (src/components/app-header.tsx)
IconLogout button added to the header with a confirm AlertDialog;
calls POST /api/auth/logout then redirects to /launcher-login.

### API layer
- src/api/launcher-auth.ts: LauncherAuthStatus gains initialized bool;
  postLauncherDashboardSetup() added; LauncherAuthTokenHelp removed
- src/api/http.ts: 401 guard uses isLauncherAuthPathname() (covers both
  /launcher-login and /launcher-setup) to prevent redirect loops
- src/lib/launcher-login-path.ts: isLauncherSetupPathname() and
  isLauncherAuthPathname() added

### Routing
- src/routeTree.gen.ts: /launcher-setup route registered throughout
- src/routes/launcher-login.tsx: tokenHelp UI removed; useEffect added
  to redirect to setup when initialized=false

### i18n
- en.json / zh.json: launcherSetup block added; launcherLogin keys
  updated to use passwordLabel/passwordPlaceholder

* fix(lint): ts lint fixed 1

* fix(auth): detail auth error handle

* fix(login):  frontend web auth error handle

* fix(frontend): auth error handler 5xx
2026-04-08 21:43:51 +08:00

287 lines
9.1 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"context"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/web/backend/middleware"
)
// PasswordStore is the interface for bcrypt-backed dashboard password persistence.
// Implemented by dashboardauth.Store; a nil value falls back to the legacy
// static-token comparison.
type PasswordStore interface {
IsInitialized(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
SetPassword(ctx context.Context, plain string) error
VerifyPassword(ctx context.Context, plain string) (bool, error)
}
// LauncherAuthRouteOpts configures dashboard auth handlers.
type LauncherAuthRouteOpts struct {
// DashboardToken is the fallback plaintext token used when PasswordStore is
// nil or not yet initialized (env-var / config-file source, and ?token= auto-login).
DashboardToken string
SessionCookie string
SecureCookie func(*http.Request) bool
// PasswordStore enables bcrypt-backed password persistence. When non-nil and
// initialized, web-form login verifies against the stored hash instead of
// the plaintext DashboardToken.
PasswordStore PasswordStore
// StoreError holds the error returned when opening the password store. When
// non-nil and PasswordStore is nil, the auth endpoints surface a recovery
// message instead of an opaque 501/503.
StoreError error
}
type launcherAuthLoginBody struct {
Password string `json:"password"`
}
type launcherAuthSetupBody struct {
Password string `json:"password"`
Confirm string `json:"confirm"`
}
type launcherAuthStatusResponse struct {
Authenticated bool `json:"authenticated"`
Initialized bool `json:"initialized"`
}
// RegisterLauncherAuthRoutes registers /api/auth/login|logout|status|setup.
func RegisterLauncherAuthRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux, opts LauncherAuthRouteOpts) {
secure := opts.SecureCookie
if secure == nil {
secure = middleware.DefaultLauncherDashboardSecureCookie
}
h := &launcherAuthHandlers{
token: opts.DashboardToken,
sessionCookie: opts.SessionCookie,
secureCookie: secure,
store: opts.PasswordStore,
storeErr: opts.StoreError,
loginLimit: newLoginRateLimiter(),
}
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/login", h.handleLogin)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/logout", h.handleLogout)
mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/auth/status", h.handleStatus)
mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/setup", h.handleSetup)
}
type launcherAuthHandlers struct {
token string
sessionCookie string
secureCookie func(*http.Request) bool
store PasswordStore
storeErr error // set when the store failed to open; drives recovery messages
loginLimit *loginRateLimiter
}
// isStoreInitialized safely queries the store.
// Returns (false, nil) when no store is configured (storeErr also nil).
// Returns (false, err) on store errors — callers must treat this as a 5xx, not as
// "uninitialized", to keep auth fail-closed.
// Exception: handleLogin swallows storeErr and falls back to token auth so
// that a corrupt DB does not lock out all access.
func (h *launcherAuthHandlers) isStoreInitialized(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
if h.store == nil {
if h.storeErr != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf(
"password store unavailable (%w); "+
"to recover, stop the application, delete the database file and restart ",
h.storeErr)
}
return false, nil
}
return h.store.IsInitialized(ctx)
}
func (h *launcherAuthHandlers) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
var body launcherAuthLoginBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20)).Decode(&body); err != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"invalid JSON"}`))
return
}
ip := clientIPForLimiter(r)
if !h.loginLimit.allow(ip) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"too many login attempts"}`))
return
}
in := strings.TrimSpace(body.Password)
var ok bool
initialized, initErr := h.isStoreInitialized(r.Context())
if initErr != nil {
if h.storeErr != nil {
// Store failed to open at startup — token login remains available.
initialized = false
} else {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
writeErrorf(w, "%v", initErr)
return
}
}
if initialized {
// Bcrypt path: verify against the stored hash.
var err error
ok, err = h.store.VerifyPassword(r.Context(), in)
if err != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
writeErrorf(w, "password verification failed: %v", err)
return
}
} else {
// Fallback: constant-time compare against the plaintext token.
ok = len(in) == len(h.token) &&
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(in), []byte(h.token)) == 1
}
if !ok {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"invalid password"}`))
return
}
middleware.SetLauncherDashboardSessionCookie(w, r, h.sessionCookie, h.secureCookie)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}
func (h *launcherAuthHandlers) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"method not allowed"}`))
return
}
ct := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("Content-Type")))
if !strings.HasPrefix(ct, "application/json") {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"Content-Type must be application/json"}`))
return
}
dec := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, logoutBodyMaxBytes))
if err := dec.Decode(&struct{}{}); err != nil && err != io.EOF {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"invalid JSON body"}`))
return
}
if err := dec.Decode(&struct{}{}); err != io.EOF {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"invalid JSON body"}`))
return
}
middleware.ClearLauncherDashboardSessionCookie(w, r, h.secureCookie)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}
func (h *launcherAuthHandlers) handleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
authed := false
if c, err := r.Cookie(middleware.LauncherDashboardCookieName); err == nil {
authed = subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(c.Value), []byte(h.sessionCookie)) == 1
}
initialized, initErr := h.isStoreInitialized(r.Context())
if initErr != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
writeErrorf(w, "%v", initErr)
return
}
resp := launcherAuthStatusResponse{
Authenticated: authed,
Initialized: initialized,
}
enc, err := json.Marshal(resp)
if err != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
writeErrorf(w, "marshal response failed: %v", err)
return
}
_, _ = w.Write(enc)
}
// handleSetup sets or changes the dashboard password.
//
// Rules:
// - If the store has no password yet, the endpoint is open (no session required).
// - If a password is already set, the caller must hold a valid session cookie.
func (h *launcherAuthHandlers) handleSetup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if h.store == nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotImplemented)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"password store not configured"}`))
return
}
initialized, initErr := h.isStoreInitialized(r.Context())
if initErr != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
writeErrorf(w, "%v", initErr)
return
}
// If already initialized, require an active session (change-password flow).
if initialized {
authed := false
if c, err := r.Cookie(middleware.LauncherDashboardCookieName); err == nil {
authed = subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(c.Value), []byte(h.sessionCookie)) == 1
}
if !authed {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"must be authenticated to change password"}`))
return
}
}
var body launcherAuthSetupBody
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20)).Decode(&body); err != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"invalid JSON"}`))
return
}
pw := strings.TrimSpace(body.Password)
if pw == "" {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"password must not be empty"}`))
return
}
if pw != strings.TrimSpace(body.Confirm) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"passwords do not match"}`))
return
}
if len([]rune(pw)) < 8 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"password must be at least 8 characters"}`))
return
}
if err := h.store.SetPassword(r.Context(), pw); err != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
writeErrorf(w, "failed to save password: %v", err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}
// writeErrorf writes a JSON error response with a formatted message.
// json.Marshal is used to safely escape the message string.
func writeErrorf(w http.ResponseWriter, format string, args ...any) {
msg, _ := json.Marshal(fmt.Sprintf(format, args...))
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":` + string(msg) + `}`))
}