* feat(credential): add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard keygen - pkg/credential: new package with AES-256-GCM enc:// credential format, HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (passphrase + optional SSH key binding), ErrPassphraseRequired / ErrDecryptionFailed sentinel errors, and PassphraseProvider hook for runtime passphrase injection - pkg/credential/store: lock-free SecureStore via atomic.Pointer[string]; passphrase never written to disk or os.Environ - pkg/credential/keygen: ed25519 SSH key generation helper used by onboard - pkg/config: replace os.Getenv(PassphraseEnvVar) with credential.PassphraseProvider() at all three call sites so that LoadConfig and SaveConfig use whatever passphrase source is active - cmd/picoclaw/onboard: prompt for passphrase with echo-off, generate picoclaw-specific SSH key, re-encrypt existing config on re-onboard - docs/credential_encryption.md: design doc for the enc:// format * fix(credential): address Copilot review comments on PR #1521 - credential.go: decouple ErrPassphraseRequired from env var name; message is now 'enc:// passphrase required' since PassphraseProvider may come from any source, not just os.Environ - credential.go: Resolver resolves symlinks via EvalSymlinks before the isWithinDir containment check, preventing symlink-based path traversal for file:// credential references - store.go: tighten comment to describe only what SecureStore guarantees (in-memory only); remove claims about how callers transport the value - store_test.go: replace the meaningless GetReturnsCopy test (Go strings are immutable, equality across two calls proves nothing) with TestSecureStore_ConcurrentSetGet that exercises atomic.Pointer under 10-goroutine concurrent Set/Get load - config_test.go: update error-message assertion to match new sentinel text - docs/credential_encryption.md: remove reference to non-existent 'picoclaw encrypt' subcommand; describe the onboard flow instead * fix(config): encryptPlaintextAPIKeys: struct-based encryption, fail-fast, remove raw []byte * fix(credential): require SSH private key for encryption/decryption, remove passphrase-only mode * lint: fix credential keygen lint, fix test keygen * onboard: make encryption opt-in via --enc flag Encryption (passphrase prompt + SSH key generation) is now only triggered when the user passes --enc to 'picoclaw onboard'. Without the flag, onboard skips the credential-encryption setup and writes a plain config + workspace templates directly. - Add --enc BoolFlag in NewOnboardCommand() - Pass encrypt bool into onboard() - Guard passphrase prompt, SSH key generation, and related env-var setup behind the encrypt branch - Adjust 'Next steps' output so the passphrase reminder only appears when --enc was used
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Credential Encryption
PicoClaw supports encrypting api_key values in model_list configuration entries.
Encrypted keys are stored as enc://<base64> strings and decrypted automatically at startup.
Quick Start
1. Set your passphrase
export PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE="your-passphrase"
2. Encrypt an API key
Run picoclaw onboard — it prompts for your passphrase and generates the SSH key,
then automatically re-encrypts any plaintext api_key entries in your config on
the next SaveConfig call. The resulting enc:// value will look like:
enc://AAAA...base64...
3. Paste the output into your config
{
"model_list": [
{
"model_name": "gpt-4o",
"api_key": "enc://AAAA...base64...",
"base_url": "https://api.openai.com/v1"
}
]
}
Supported api_key Formats
| Format | Example | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Plaintext | sk-abc123 |
Used as-is |
| File reference | file://openai.key |
Content read from the same directory as the config file |
| Encrypted | enc://<base64> |
Decrypted at startup using PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE |
| Empty | "" |
Passed through unchanged (used with auth_method: oauth) |
Cryptographic Design
Key Derivation
Encryption uses HKDF-SHA256 with an optional SSH private key as a second factor.
Without SSH key (passphrase only):
ikm = SHA256(passphrase)
aes_key = HKDF-SHA256(ikm, salt, info="picoclaw-credential-v1", 32 bytes)
With SSH key (recommended):
sshHash = SHA256(ssh_private_key_file_bytes)
ikm = HMAC-SHA256(key=sshHash, message=passphrase)
aes_key = HKDF-SHA256(ikm, salt, info="picoclaw-credential-v1", 32 bytes)
Encryption
AES-256-GCM(key=aes_key, nonce=random[12], plaintext=api_key)
Wire Format
enc://<base64( salt[16] + nonce[12] + ciphertext )>
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
salt |
16 bytes | Random per encryption; fed into HKDF |
nonce |
12 bytes | Random per encryption; AES-GCM IV |
ciphertext |
variable | AES-256-GCM ciphertext + 16-byte authentication tag |
The GCM authentication tag is appended to the ciphertext automatically. Any tampering causes decryption to fail with an error rather than returning corrupt plaintext.
Performance
| Operation | Time (ARM Cortex-A) |
|---|---|
| Key derivation (HKDF) | < 1 ms |
| AES-256-GCM decrypt | < 1 ms |
| Total startup overhead | < 2 ms per key |
Two-Factor Security with SSH Key
When a SSH private key is provided, breaking the encryption requires both:
- The passphrase (
PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE) - The SSH private key file
This means a leaked config file alone is not sufficient to recover the API key, even if the passphrase is weak. The SSH key contributes 256 bits of entropy (Ed25519) regardless of passphrase strength.
Threat Model
| Attacker Has | Can Decrypt? |
|---|---|
| Config file only | No — needs passphrase + SSH key |
| SSH key only | No — needs passphrase |
| Passphrase only | No — needs SSH key |
| Config file + SSH key + passphrase | Yes — full compromise |
Environment Variables
| Variable | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE |
Yes (for enc://) |
Passphrase used for key derivation |
PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH |
No | Path to SSH private key. Set to "" to disable auto-detection and use passphrase-only mode |
SSH Key Auto-Detection
If PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH is not set, PicoClaw looks for the picoclaw-specific key:
~/.ssh/picoclaw_ed25519.key
This dedicated file avoids conflicts with the user's existing SSH keys.
Run picoclaw onboard to generate it automatically.
os.UserHomeDir() is used for cross-platform home directory resolution (reads USERPROFILE on Windows, HOME on Unix/macOS).
To explicitly disable SSH key usage and use passphrase-only mode:
export PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH=""
Migration
Because the only secret material is PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE and the SSH private key file, migration is straightforward:
- Copy the config file to the new machine.
- Set
PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASEto the same value. - Copy the SSH private key file to the same path (or set
PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATHto its new location).
No re-encryption is needed.
Security Considerations
- Passphrase strength matters in passphrase-only mode. Without an SSH key, a weak passphrase can be brute-forced offline. Use
PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH=""only in environments where no SSH key is available and the passphrase is sufficiently strong (≥ 32 random characters). - The SSH key is read-only at runtime. PicoClaw never writes to or modifies the SSH key file.
- Plaintext keys remain supported. Existing configs without
enc://are unaffected. - The
enc://format is versioned via the HKDFinfofield (picoclaw-credential-v1), allowing future algorithm upgrades without breaking existing encrypted values.