package tools

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"os"
	"os/exec"
	"path/filepath"
	"regexp"
	"runtime"
	"strings"
	"sync"
	"time"

	"github.com/creack/pty"

	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/constants"
	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/isolation"
	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/logger"
)

var (
	globalSessionManager = NewSessionManager()
	sessionManagerMu     sync.RWMutex
)

func getSessionManager() *SessionManager {
	sessionManagerMu.RLock()
	defer sessionManagerMu.RUnlock()
	return globalSessionManager
}

type ExecTool struct {
	workingDir          string
	timeout             time.Duration
	denyPatterns        []*regexp.Regexp
	allowPatterns       []*regexp.Regexp
	customAllowPatterns []*regexp.Regexp
	allowedPathPatterns []*regexp.Regexp
	restrictToWorkspace bool
	allowRemote         bool
	sessionManager      *SessionManager
}

var (
	defaultDenyPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
		regexp.MustCompile(`\brm\s+-[rf]{1,2}\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bdel\s+/[fq]\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\brmdir\s+/s\b`),
		// Match disk wiping commands (must be followed by space/args)
		regexp.MustCompile(
			`(^|[^-\w])\b(format|mkfs|diskpart)\b\s`,
		),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bdd\s+if=`),
		// Block writes to block devices (all common naming schemes).
		regexp.MustCompile(
			`>\s*/dev/(sd[a-z]|hd[a-z]|vd[a-z]|xvd[a-z]|nvme\d|mmcblk\d|loop\d|dm-\d|md\d|sr\d|nbd\d)`,
		),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\b(shutdown|reboot|poweroff)\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`:\(\)\s*\{.*\};\s*:`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\([^)]+\)`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\{[^}]+\}`),
		regexp.MustCompile("`[^`]+`"),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\|\s*sh\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\|\s*bash\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`;\s*rm\s+-[rf]`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`&&\s*rm\s+-[rf]`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\|\|\s*rm\s+-[rf]`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`<<\s*EOF`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\(\s*cat\s+`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\(\s*curl\s+`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\(\s*wget\s+`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\(\s*which\s+`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bsudo\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bchmod\s+[0-7]{3,4}\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bchown\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bpkill\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bkillall\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bkill\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bcurl\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash)`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bwget\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash)`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bnpm\s+install\s+-g\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bpip\s+install\s+--user\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bapt\s+(install|remove|purge)\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\byum\s+(install|remove)\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bdnf\s+(install|remove)\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bdocker\s+run\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bdocker\s+exec\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bgit\s+push\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bgit\s+force\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bssh\b.*@`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\beval\b`),
		regexp.MustCompile(`\bsource\s+.*\.sh\b`),
	}

	// windowsDenyPatterns contains PowerShell-specific deny patterns that only
	// apply on Windows, where commands are executed via powershell -Command.
	windowsDenyPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
		// [Text.Encoding] used to construct command strings at runtime.
		// Matches [Text.Encoding] and [System.Text.Encoding] variants.
		regexp.MustCompile(`\[(?:\w+\.)?text\.encoding\]`),
		// PowerShell -EncodedCommand flag (base64-encoded command) and all short forms.
		// Matches: -e, -ec, -enc, -en, -EncodedCommand (all with space prefix)
		regexp.MustCompile(` -e(?:$|\s)| -ec(?:$|\s)| -enc(?:$|\s)| -en(?:$|\s)| -encodedcommand\b`),
		// .GetString called on byte array to decode commands.
		regexp.MustCompile(`\.getstring\s*\(\s*\[byte\[\]`),
		// FromBase64String used in command construction chain.
		regexp.MustCompile(`frombase64string\(`),
		// PowerShell variable holding byte array used in GetString.
		regexp.MustCompile(`\$[a-zA-Z_]\w*\s*=\s*\[byte\[\]`),
		// Unicode escape sequences that could be used to construct commands.
		// Matches \uXXXX format used to represent characters like i = "i"
		regexp.MustCompile(`\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}`),
	}

	// absolutePathPattern matches absolute file paths in commands (Unix and Windows).
	absolutePathPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[A-Za-z]:\\[^\\\"']+|/[^\s\"']+`)

	// safePaths are kernel pseudo-devices that are always safe to reference in
	// commands, regardless of workspace restriction. They contain no user data
	// and cannot cause destructive writes.
	safePaths = map[string]bool{
		"/dev/null":    true,
		"/dev/zero":    true,
		"/dev/random":  true,
		"/dev/urandom": true,
		"/dev/stdin":   true,
		"/dev/stdout":  true,
		"/dev/stderr":  true,
	}
)

func NewExecTool(workingDir string, restrict bool, allowPaths ...[]*regexp.Regexp) (*ExecTool, error) {
	return NewExecToolWithConfig(workingDir, restrict, nil, allowPaths...)
}

func NewExecToolWithConfig(
	workingDir string,
	restrict bool,
	cfg *config.Config,
	allowPaths ...[]*regexp.Regexp,
) (*ExecTool, error) {
	denyPatterns := make([]*regexp.Regexp, 0)
	customAllowPatterns := make([]*regexp.Regexp, 0)
	var allowedPathPatterns []*regexp.Regexp
	allowRemote := true
	if len(allowPaths) > 0 {
		allowedPathPatterns = allowPaths[0]
	}

	if cfg != nil {
		execConfig := cfg.Tools.Exec
		enableDenyPatterns := execConfig.EnableDenyPatterns
		allowRemote = execConfig.AllowRemote
		if enableDenyPatterns {
			denyPatterns = append(denyPatterns, defaultDenyPatterns...)
			if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
				denyPatterns = append(denyPatterns, windowsDenyPatterns...)
			}
			if len(execConfig.CustomDenyPatterns) > 0 {
				logger.InfoCF("tools", "using custom deny patterns", map[string]any{
					"patterns": execConfig.CustomDenyPatterns,
				})
				for _, pattern := range execConfig.CustomDenyPatterns {
					re, err := regexp.Compile(pattern)
					if err != nil {
						return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid custom deny pattern %q: %w", pattern, err)
					}
					denyPatterns = append(denyPatterns, re)
				}
			}
		} else {
			// If deny patterns are disabled, we won't add any patterns, allowing all commands.
			logger.WarnCF("tools", "deny patterns are disabled, all commands will be allowed", nil)
		}
		for _, pattern := range execConfig.CustomAllowPatterns {
			re, err := regexp.Compile(pattern)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid custom allow pattern %q: %w", pattern, err)
			}
			customAllowPatterns = append(customAllowPatterns, re)
		}
	} else {
		denyPatterns = append(denyPatterns, defaultDenyPatterns...)
		if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
			denyPatterns = append(denyPatterns, windowsDenyPatterns...)
		}
	}

	var timeout time.Duration
	if cfg != nil && cfg.Tools.Exec.TimeoutSeconds > 0 {
		timeout = time.Duration(cfg.Tools.Exec.TimeoutSeconds) * time.Second
	}

	return &ExecTool{
		workingDir:          workingDir,
		timeout:             timeout,
		denyPatterns:        denyPatterns,
		allowPatterns:       nil,
		customAllowPatterns: customAllowPatterns,
		allowedPathPatterns: allowedPathPatterns,
		restrictToWorkspace: restrict,
		allowRemote:         allowRemote,
		sessionManager:      getSessionManager(),
	}, nil
}

func (t *ExecTool) Name() string {
	return "exec"
}

func (t *ExecTool) Description() string {
	return `Execute shell commands. Use background=true for long-running commands (returns sessionId). Use pty=true for interactive commands (can combine with background=true). Use poll/read/write/send-keys/kill with sessionId to manage background sessions. Sessions auto-cleanup 30 minutes after process exits; use kill to terminate early. Output buffer limit: 1MB.`
}

//nolint:dupl // Tool parameter schemas intentionally use similar JSON-schema map literals.
func (t *ExecTool) Parameters() map[string]any {
	return map[string]any{
		"type": "object",
		"properties": map[string]any{
			"action": map[string]any{
				"type":        "string",
				"enum":        []string{"run", "list", "poll", "read", "write", "kill", "send-keys"},
				"description": "Action: run (execute command), list (show sessions), poll (check status), read (get output), write (send input), kill (terminate), send-keys (send keys to PTY)",
			},
			"command": map[string]any{
				"type":        "string",
				"description": "Shell command to execute (required for run)",
			},
			"sessionId": map[string]any{
				"type":        "string",
				"description": "Session ID (required for poll/read/write/kill/send-keys)",
			},
			"keys": map[string]any{
				"type":        "string",
				"description": "Key names for send-keys: up, down, left, right, enter, tab, escape, backspace, ctrl-c, ctrl-d, home, end, pageup, pagedown, f1-f12",
			},
			"data": map[string]any{
				"type":        "string",
				"description": "Data to write to stdin (required for write)",
			},
			"background": map[string]any{
				"type":        "string",
				"description": "Run in background immediately",
			},
			"pty": map[string]any{
				"type":        "string",
				"description": "Run in a pseudo-terminal (PTY) when available",
			},
			"cwd": map[string]any{
				"type":        "string",
				"description": "Working directory for the command",
			},
			"timeout": map[string]any{
				"type":        "integer",
				"description": "Timeout in seconds (0 = no timeout)",
			},
		},
		"required": []string{"action"},
	}
}

func (t *ExecTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
	action, _ := args["action"].(string)
	if action == "" {
		return ErrorResult("action is required")
	}

	switch action {
	case "run":
		return t.executeRun(ctx, args)
	case "list":
		return t.executeList()
	case "poll":
		return t.executePoll(args)
	case "read":
		return t.executeRead(args)
	case "write":
		return t.executeWrite(args)
	case "kill":
		return t.executeKill(args)
	case "send-keys":
		return t.executeSendKeys(args)
	default:
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("unknown action: %s", action))
	}
}

func (t *ExecTool) executeRun(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
	command, ok := args["command"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return ErrorResult("command is required")
	}

	// GHSA-pv8c-p6jf-3fpp: block exec from remote channels (e.g. Telegram webhooks)
	// unless explicitly opted-in via config. Fail-closed: empty channel = blocked.
	if !t.allowRemote {
		channel := ToolChannel(ctx)
		if channel == "" {
			channel, _ = args["__channel"].(string)
		}
		channel = strings.TrimSpace(channel)
		if channel == "" || !constants.IsInternalChannel(channel) {
			return ErrorResult("exec is restricted to internal channels")
		}
	}

	getBoolArg := func(key string) bool {
		switch v := args[key].(type) {
		case bool:
			return v
		case string:
			return v == "true"
		}
		return false
	}
	isPty := getBoolArg("pty")
	isBackground := getBoolArg("background")

	if isPty {
		if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
			return ErrorResult("PTY is not supported on Windows. Use background=true without pty.")
		}
	}

	cwd := t.workingDir
	if wd, ok := args["cwd"].(string); ok && wd != "" {
		if t.restrictToWorkspace && t.workingDir != "" {
			resolvedWD, err := validatePathWithAllowPaths(wd, t.workingDir, true, t.allowedPathPatterns)
			if err != nil {
				return ErrorResult("Command blocked by safety guard (" + err.Error() + ")")
			}
			cwd = resolvedWD
		} else {
			cwd = wd
		}
	}

	if cwd == "" {
		wd, err := os.Getwd()
		if err == nil {
			cwd = wd
		}
	}

	if guardError := t.guardCommand(command, cwd); guardError != "" {
		return ErrorResult(guardError)
	}

	// Re-resolve symlinks immediately before execution to shrink the TOCTOU window
	// between validation and cmd.Dir assignment.
	if t.restrictToWorkspace && t.workingDir != "" && cwd != t.workingDir {
		resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(cwd)
		if err != nil {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("Command blocked by safety guard (path resolution failed: %v)", err))
		}
		if isAllowedPath(resolved, t.allowedPathPatterns) {
			cwd = resolved
		} else {
			absWorkspace, _ := filepath.Abs(t.workingDir)
			wsResolved, _ := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absWorkspace)
			if wsResolved == "" {
				wsResolved = absWorkspace
			}
			rel, err := filepath.Rel(wsResolved, resolved)
			if err != nil || !filepath.IsLocal(rel) {
				return ErrorResult("Command blocked by safety guard (working directory escaped workspace)")
			}
			cwd = resolved
		}
	}

	if isBackground {
		return t.runBackground(ctx, command, cwd, isPty)
	}

	return t.runSync(ctx, command, cwd)
}

func (t *ExecTool) runSync(ctx context.Context, command, cwd string) *ToolResult {
	// timeout == 0 means no timeout
	var cmdCtx context.Context
	var cancel context.CancelFunc
	if t.timeout > 0 {
		cmdCtx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, t.timeout)
	} else {
		cmdCtx, cancel = context.WithCancel(ctx)
	}
	defer cancel()

	var cmd *exec.Cmd
	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
		cmd = exec.CommandContext(cmdCtx, "powershell", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", command)
	} else {
		cmd = exec.CommandContext(cmdCtx, "sh", "-c", command)
	}
	if cwd != "" {
		cmd.Dir = cwd
	}

	prepareCommandForTermination(cmd)

	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
	cmd.Stdout = &stdout
	cmd.Stderr = &stderr

	// Route shell execution through the shared isolation entry point so exec tool
	// subprocesses receive the same isolation policy as other integrations.
	if err := isolation.Start(cmd); err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to start command: %v", err))
	}

	done := make(chan error, 1)
	go func() {
		done <- cmd.Wait()
	}()

	var err error
	select {
	case err = <-done:
	case <-cmdCtx.Done():
		_ = terminateProcessTree(cmd)
		select {
		case err = <-done:
		case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
			if cmd.Process != nil {
				_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
			}
			err = <-done
		}
	}

	output := stdout.String()
	if stderr.Len() > 0 {
		output += "\nSTDERR:\n" + stderr.String()
	}

	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(cmdCtx.Err(), context.DeadlineExceeded) {
			msg := fmt.Sprintf("Command timed out after %v", t.timeout)
			if output != "" {
				msg += "\n\nPartial output before timeout:\n" + output
			}
			return &ToolResult{
				ForLLM:  msg,
				ForUser: msg,
				IsError: true,
				Err:     fmt.Errorf("command timeout: %w", err),
			}
		}

		// Extract detailed exit information
		var exitErr *exec.ExitError
		if errors.As(err, &exitErr) {
			exitCode := exitErr.ExitCode()
			output += fmt.Sprintf("\n\n[Command exited with code %d]", exitCode)

			// Add signal information if killed by signal (Unix)
			if exitCode == -1 {
				output += " (killed by signal)"
			}
		} else {
			output += fmt.Sprintf("\n\n[Command failed: %v]", err)
		}
	}

	if output == "" {
		output = "(no output)"
	}

	maxLen := 10000
	if len(output) > maxLen {
		output = output[:maxLen] + fmt.Sprintf("\n... (truncated, %d more chars)", len(output)-maxLen)
	}

	if err != nil {
		return &ToolResult{
			ForLLM:  output,
			ForUser: output,
			IsError: true,
		}
	}

	return &ToolResult{
		ForLLM:  output,
		ForUser: output,
		IsError: false,
	}
}

func (t *ExecTool) runBackground(ctx context.Context, command, cwd string, ptyEnabled bool) *ToolResult {
	sessionID := generateSessionID()
	session := &ProcessSession{
		ID:         sessionID,
		Command:    command,
		PTY:        ptyEnabled,
		Background: true,
		StartTime:  time.Now().Unix(),
		Status:     "running",
		ptyKeyMode: PtyKeyModeCSI,
	}

	var cmd *exec.Cmd
	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
		cmd = exec.Command("powershell", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", command)
	} else {
		cmd = exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)
	}
	if cwd != "" {
		cmd.Dir = cwd
	}

	prepareCommandForTermination(cmd)

	var stdoutReader io.ReadCloser
	var stderrReader io.ReadCloser
	var stdinWriter io.WriteCloser

	if ptyEnabled {
		ptmx, tty, err := pty.Open()
		if err != nil {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to create PTY: %v", err))
		}

		cmd.Stdin = tty
		cmd.Stdout = tty
		cmd.Stderr = tty

		// For PTY, we need Setsid to create a new session.
		// Note: Setsid and Setpgid conflict, so we must replace SysProcAttr entirely.
		setSysProcAttrForPty(cmd)

		session.ptyMaster = ptmx
	} else {
		var err error
		stdoutReader, err = cmd.StdoutPipe()
		if err != nil {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to create stdout pipe: %v", err))
		}
		stderrReader, err = cmd.StderrPipe()
		if err != nil {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to create stderr pipe: %v", err))
		}
		stdinWriter, err = cmd.StdinPipe()
		if err != nil {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to create stdin pipe: %v", err))
		}
		session.stdoutPipe = io.MultiReader(stdoutReader, stderrReader)
		session.stdinWriter = stdinWriter
	}

	// Background sessions use the same startup path so isolation stays consistent
	// with synchronous exec runs.
	if err := isolation.Start(cmd); err != nil {
		if session.ptyMaster != nil {
			session.ptyMaster.Close()
		}
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to start command: %v", err))
	}

	session.PID = cmd.Process.Pid
	t.sessionManager.Add(session)

	session.outputBuffer = &bytes.Buffer{}

	// PTY mode: read from ptyMaster and wait for process
	// Note: On Linux, closing ptyMaster doesn't interrupt blocking Read() calls,
	// so we need cmd.Wait() in a separate goroutine to detect process exit.
	if session.PTY && session.ptyMaster != nil {
		go func() {
			cmd.Wait() // Wait for process to exit
			session.mu.Lock()
			if cmd.ProcessState != nil {
				session.ExitCode = cmd.ProcessState.ExitCode()
			}
			session.Status = "done"
			session.mu.Unlock()
		}()

		go func() {
			buf := make([]byte, 4096)
			for {
				n, err := session.ptyMaster.Read(buf)
				if n > 0 {
					raw := string(buf[:n])
					if mode := detectPtyKeyMode(raw); mode != PtyKeyModeNotFound && mode != session.GetPtyKeyMode() {
						session.SetPtyKeyMode(mode)
					}

					session.mu.Lock()
					if session.outputBuffer.Len() >= maxOutputBufferSize {
						if !session.outputTruncated {
							session.outputBuffer.WriteString(outputTruncateMarker)
							session.outputTruncated = true
						}
					} else {
						session.outputBuffer.Write(buf[:n])
					}
					session.mu.Unlock()
				}
				if err != nil {
					break
				}
			}
		}()
	} else {
		// Non-PTY mode: single goroutine reads pipes.
		// When Read() returns EOF (pipe closed), we break.
		// When process exits, OS closes pipe write end → Read() returns EOF → we exit.
		go func() {
			buf := make([]byte, 4096)

			// Read stdout
			for {
				n, err := stdoutReader.Read(buf)
				if n > 0 {
					session.mu.Lock()
					if session.outputBuffer.Len() >= maxOutputBufferSize {
						if !session.outputTruncated {
							session.outputBuffer.WriteString(outputTruncateMarker)
							session.outputTruncated = true
						}
					} else {
						session.outputBuffer.Write(buf[:n])
					}
					session.mu.Unlock()
				}
				if err != nil {
					break
				}
			}

			// Read stderr
			for {
				n, err := stderrReader.Read(buf)
				if n > 0 {
					session.mu.Lock()
					if session.outputBuffer.Len() >= maxOutputBufferSize {
						if !session.outputTruncated {
							session.outputBuffer.WriteString(outputTruncateMarker)
							session.outputTruncated = true
						}
					} else {
						session.outputBuffer.Write(buf[:n])
					}
					session.mu.Unlock()
				}
				if err != nil {
					break
				}
			}

			// All pipes closed, get exit status
			if stdinWriter != nil {
				stdinWriter.Close()
			}
			cmd.Wait()

			session.mu.Lock()
			if cmd.ProcessState != nil {
				session.ExitCode = cmd.ProcessState.ExitCode()
			}
			session.Status = "done"
			session.mu.Unlock()
		}()
	}

	resp := ExecResponse{
		SessionID: sessionID,
		Status:    "running",
	}
	data, err := json.Marshal(resp)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}
	return &ToolResult{
		ForLLM:  string(data),
		ForUser: fmt.Sprintf("Session %s started", sessionID),
		IsError: false,
	}
}

func (t *ExecTool) executeList() *ToolResult {
	sessions := t.sessionManager.List()
	resp := ExecResponse{
		Sessions: sessions,
	}
	data, err := json.Marshal(resp)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}
	return &ToolResult{
		ForLLM:  string(data),
		ForUser: fmt.Sprintf("%d active sessions", len(sessions)),
		IsError: false,
	}
}

func (t *ExecTool) executePoll(args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
	sessionID, ok := args["sessionId"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return ErrorResult("sessionId is required")
	}

	session, err := t.sessionManager.Get(sessionID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, ErrSessionNotFound) {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("session not found: %s", sessionID))
		}
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}

	resp := ExecResponse{
		SessionID: sessionID,
		Status:    session.GetStatus(),
		ExitCode:  session.GetExitCode(),
	}
	data, err := json.Marshal(resp)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}
	return &ToolResult{
		ForLLM:  string(data),
		IsError: false,
	}
}

func (t *ExecTool) executeRead(args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
	sessionID, ok := args["sessionId"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return ErrorResult("sessionId is required")
	}

	session, err := t.sessionManager.Get(sessionID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, ErrSessionNotFound) {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("session not found: %s", sessionID))
		}
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}

	output := session.Read()

	resp := ExecResponse{
		SessionID: sessionID,
		Output:    output,
		Status:    session.GetStatus(),
	}
	data, err := json.Marshal(resp)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}
	return &ToolResult{
		ForLLM:  string(data),
		IsError: false,
	}
}

func (t *ExecTool) executeWrite(args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
	sessionID, ok := args["sessionId"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return ErrorResult("sessionId is required")
	}

	data, ok := args["data"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return ErrorResult("data is required")
	}

	session, err := t.sessionManager.Get(sessionID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, ErrSessionNotFound) {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("session not found: %s", sessionID))
		}
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}

	if session.IsDone() {
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("process already exited with code %d", session.GetExitCode()))
	}

	if err = session.Write(data); err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, ErrSessionDone) {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("process already exited with code %d", session.GetExitCode()))
		}
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to write to session: %v", err))
	}

	resp := ExecResponse{
		SessionID: sessionID,
		Status:    session.GetStatus(),
	}
	respData, err := json.Marshal(resp)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}
	return &ToolResult{
		ForLLM:  string(respData),
		IsError: false,
	}
}

func (t *ExecTool) executeKill(args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
	sessionID, ok := args["sessionId"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return ErrorResult("sessionId is required")
	}

	session, err := t.sessionManager.Get(sessionID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, ErrSessionNotFound) {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("session not found: %s", sessionID))
		}
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}

	if session.IsDone() {
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("process already exited with code %d", session.GetExitCode()))
	}

	if err = session.Kill(); err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to kill session: %v", err))
	}

	t.sessionManager.Remove(sessionID)

	resp := ExecResponse{
		SessionID: sessionID,
		Status:    "done",
	}
	data, err := json.Marshal(resp)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}
	return &ToolResult{
		ForLLM:  string(data),
		ForUser: fmt.Sprintf("Session %s killed", sessionID),
		IsError: false,
	}
}

// keyMap maps key names to their escape sequences.
var keyMap = map[string]string{
	"enter":     "\r",
	"return":    "\r",
	"tab":       "\t",
	"escape":    "\x1b",
	"esc":       "\x1b",
	"space":     " ",
	"backspace": "\x7f",
	"bspace":    "\x7f",
	"up":        "\x1b[A",
	"down":      "\x1b[B",
	"right":     "\x1b[C",
	"left":      "\x1b[D",
	"home":      "\x1b[1~",
	"end":       "\x1b[4~",
	"pageup":    "\x1b[5~",
	"pagedown":  "\x1b[6~",
	"pgup":      "\x1b[5~",
	"pgdn":      "\x1b[6~",
	"insert":    "\x1b[2~",
	"ic":        "\x1b[2~",
	"delete":    "\x1b[3~",
	"del":       "\x1b[3~",
	"dc":        "\x1b[3~",
	"btab":      "\x1b[Z",
	"f1":        "\x1bOP",
	"f2":        "\x1bOQ",
	"f3":        "\x1bOR",
	"f4":        "\x1bOS",
	"f5":        "\x1b[15~",
	"f6":        "\x1b[17~",
	"f7":        "\x1b[18~",
	"f8":        "\x1b[19~",
	"f9":        "\x1b[20~",
	"f10":       "\x1b[21~",
	"f11":       "\x1b[23~",
	"f12":       "\x1b[24~",
}

// ss3KeysMap maps key names to SS3 escape sequences
var ss3KeysMap = map[string]string{
	"up":    "\x1bOA",
	"down":  "\x1bOB",
	"right": "\x1bOC",
	"left":  "\x1bOD",
	"home":  "\x1bOH",
	"end":   "\x1bOF",
}

func detectPtyKeyMode(raw string) PtyKeyMode {
	const SMKX = "\x1b[?1h"
	const RMKX = "\x1b[?1l"

	lastSmkx := strings.LastIndex(raw, SMKX)
	lastRmkx := strings.LastIndex(raw, RMKX)

	if lastSmkx == -1 && lastRmkx == -1 {
		return PtyKeyModeNotFound
	}

	if lastSmkx > lastRmkx {
		return PtyKeyModeSS3
	}
	return PtyKeyModeCSI
}

// encodeKeyToken encodes a single key token into its escape sequence.
// Supports:
//   - Named keys: "enter", "tab", "up", "ctrl-c", "alt-x", etc.
//   - Ctrl modifier: "ctrl-c" or "c-c" (sends Ctrl+char)
//   - Alt modifier: "alt-x" or "m-x" (sends ESC+char)
func encodeKeyToken(token string, ptyKeyMode PtyKeyMode) (string, error) {
	token = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(token))
	if token == "" {
		return "", nil
	}

	// Handle ctrl-X format (c-x)
	if strings.HasPrefix(token, "c-") {
		char := token[2]
		if char >= 'a' && char <= 'z' {
			return string(rune(char) & 0x1f), nil // ctrl-a through ctrl-z
		}
		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid ctrl key: %s", token)
	}

	// Handle ctrl-X format (ctrl-x)
	if strings.HasPrefix(token, "ctrl-") {
		char := token[5]
		if char >= 'a' && char <= 'z' {
			return string(rune(char) & 0x1f), nil
		}
		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid ctrl key: %s", token)
	}

	// Handle alt-X format (m-x or alt-x)
	if strings.HasPrefix(token, "m-") || strings.HasPrefix(token, "alt-") {
		var char string
		if strings.HasPrefix(token, "m-") {
			char = token[2:]
		} else {
			char = token[4:]
		}
		if len(char) == 1 {
			return "\x1b" + char, nil
		}
		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid alt key: %s", token)
	}

	// Handle shift modifier for special keys (shift-up, shift-down, etc.)
	if strings.HasPrefix(token, "s-") || strings.HasPrefix(token, "shift-") {
		var key string
		if strings.HasPrefix(token, "s-") {
			key = token[2:]
		} else {
			key = token[6:]
		}
		// Apply shift modifier: for single-char keys, return uppercase
		if seq, ok := keyMap[key]; ok {
			// For escape sequences, we can't easily add shift
			// For single-char keys (letters), return uppercase
			if len(seq) == 1 {
				return strings.ToUpper(seq), nil
			}
			return seq, nil
		}
		return "", fmt.Errorf("unknown key with shift: %s", key)
	}

	if ptyKeyMode == PtyKeyModeSS3 {
		if seq, ok := ss3KeysMap[token]; ok {
			return seq, nil
		}
	}

	if seq, ok := keyMap[token]; ok {
		return seq, nil
	}

	return "", fmt.Errorf("unknown key: %s (use write action for text input)", token)
}

// encodeKeySequence encodes a slice of key tokens into a single string.
func encodeKeySequence(tokens []string, ptyKeyMode PtyKeyMode) (string, error) {
	var result string
	for _, token := range tokens {
		seq, err := encodeKeyToken(token, ptyKeyMode)
		if err != nil {
			return "", err
		}
		result += seq
	}
	return result, nil
}

func (t *ExecTool) executeSendKeys(args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
	sessionID, ok := args["sessionId"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return ErrorResult("sessionId is required")
	}

	keysStr, ok := args["keys"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return ErrorResult("keys must be a string")
	}

	if keysStr == "" {
		return ErrorResult("keys cannot be empty")
	}

	// Parse comma-separated key names
	keyNames := strings.Split(keysStr, ",")
	var keys []string
	for _, k := range keyNames {
		k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
		if k != "" {
			keys = append(keys, k)
		}
	}

	if len(keys) == 0 {
		return ErrorResult("keys cannot be empty")
	}

	session, err := t.sessionManager.Get(sessionID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, ErrSessionNotFound) {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("session not found: %s", sessionID))
		}
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}

	ptyKeyMode := session.GetPtyKeyMode()

	data, err := encodeKeySequence(keys, ptyKeyMode)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("invalid key: %v", err))
	}

	if session.IsDone() {
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("process already exited with code %d", session.GetExitCode()))
	}

	if err = session.Write(data); err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, ErrSessionDone) {
			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("process already exited with code %d", session.GetExitCode()))
		}
		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("failed to send keys: %v", err))
	}

	resp := ExecResponse{
		SessionID: sessionID,
		Status:    "running",
		Output:    fmt.Sprintf("Sent keys: %v", keys),
	}
	respData, err := json.Marshal(resp)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
	}
	return &ToolResult{
		ForLLM:  string(respData),
		IsError: false,
	}
}

// expandPowerShellEnvVars expands environment variable syntax used by both
// PowerShell ($env:VAR) and CMD (%VAR%) to their actual values.
func expandPowerShellEnvVars(cmd string) string {
	// Handle PowerShell style: $env:VAR and ${env:VAR}
	rePs := regexp.MustCompile(`\$\{?env:(\w+)\}?`)
	cmd = rePs.ReplaceAllStringFunc(cmd, func(match string) string {
		varName := rePs.FindStringSubmatch(match)[1]
		if val := os.Getenv(varName); val != "" {
			return val
		}
		return match
	})

	// Handle CMD style: %VAR%
	reCmd := regexp.MustCompile(`%([^%]+)%`)
	return reCmd.ReplaceAllStringFunc(cmd, func(match string) string {
		varName := reCmd.FindStringSubmatch(match)[1]
		if val := os.Getenv(varName); val != "" {
			return val
		}
		return match
	})
}

func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
	cmd := strings.TrimSpace(command)
	lower := strings.ToLower(cmd)

	// Custom allow patterns exempt a command from deny checks.
	explicitlyAllowed := false
	for _, pattern := range t.customAllowPatterns {
		if pattern.MatchString(lower) {
			explicitlyAllowed = true
			break
		}
	}

	if !explicitlyAllowed {
		for _, pattern := range t.denyPatterns {
			if pattern.MatchString(lower) {
				return "Command blocked by safety guard (dangerous pattern detected)"
			}
		}
	}

	if len(t.allowPatterns) > 0 {
		allowed := false
		for _, pattern := range t.allowPatterns {
			if pattern.MatchString(lower) {
				allowed = true
				break
			}
		}
		if !allowed {
			return "Command blocked by safety guard (not in allowlist)"
		}
	}

	if t.restrictToWorkspace {
		// Block path traversal patterns including .../.../ variants
		if regexp.MustCompile(`\.\.(?:[\\/]\.\.)*[\\/]`).MatchString(cmd) {
			return "Command blocked by safety guard (path traversal detected)"
		}

		cwdPath, err := filepath.Abs(cwd)
		if err != nil {
			return ""
		}

		// Web URL schemes whose path components (starting with //) should be exempt
		// from workspace sandbox checks. file: is intentionally excluded so that
		// file:// URIs are still validated against the workspace boundary.
		webSchemes := []string{"http:", "https:", "ftp:", "ftps:", "sftp:", "ssh:", "git:"}

		// On Windows, expand ~ and PowerShell environment variables ($env:VAR) before path checking
		if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
			// Expand PowerShell environment variables ($env:VAR and ${env:VAR})
			cmd = expandPowerShellEnvVars(cmd)
			// Also expand ~ for completeness
			if home, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil {
				cmd = strings.ReplaceAll(cmd, "~", filepath.FromSlash(home))
			}
		}

		matchIndices := absolutePathPattern.FindAllStringIndex(cmd, -1)

		for _, loc := range matchIndices {
			raw := cmd[loc[0]:loc[1]]

			// Skip URL path components that look like they're from web URLs.
			// When a URL like "https://github.com" is parsed, the regex captures
			// "//github.com" as a match (the path portion after "https:").
			// Use the exact match position (loc[0]) so that duplicate //path substrings
			// in the same command are each evaluated at their own position.
			if strings.HasPrefix(raw, "//") && loc[0] > 0 {
				before := cmd[:loc[0]]
				isWebURL := false

				for _, scheme := range webSchemes {
					if strings.HasSuffix(before, scheme) {
						isWebURL = true
						break
					}
				}

				if isWebURL {
					continue
				}
			}

			// Skip scheme-less URL paths like "wttr.in/Beijing".
			// When a /path is immediately preceded by a token that looks
			// like a domain name and that token does NOT exist as a local
			// filesystem entry, treat the path as part of a URL and skip
			// workspace sandbox validation.
			//
			// The local-path-exists guard prevents symlink bypass: if
			// "foo.bar" exists as a local symlink or directory, the path
			// still undergoes full workspace validation (see #2965).
			if loc[0] > 0 && raw[0] == '/' {
				// Find the token immediately before the "/".
				j := loc[0] - 1
				for j >= 0 && !isShellTokenBoundary(cmd[j]) {
					j--
				}
				token := cmd[j+1 : loc[0]]
				if looksLikeDomain(token) && !localPathExists(cwd, token) {
					continue
				}
			}

			p, err := commandPathAbs(commandPathTextFromMatch(cmd, loc[0], loc[1]), cwdPath)
			if err != nil {
				continue
			}

			// Windows-specific: normalize paths to block ADS and extended-length paths
			if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
				// Strip \\?\ prefix (extended-length path)
				p = strings.TrimPrefix(p, `\\?\`)
				// Strip NTFS alternate data streams (only if colon is not at position 1 = drive letter)
				if idx := strings.Index(p, ":"); idx > 1 {
					p = p[:idx]
				}
			}

			// Check symlinks and junctions
			resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(p)
			if err == nil {
				p = resolved
			}

			if safePaths[p] {
				continue
			}
			if isAllowedPath(p, t.allowedPathPatterns) {
				continue
			}

			rel, err := filepath.Rel(cwdPath, p)
			if err != nil {
				continue
			}

			if strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") {
				return "Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"
			}
		}
	}

	return ""
}

func commandPathAbs(pathText, cwdPath string) (string, error) {
	if filepath.IsAbs(pathText) {
		return filepath.Abs(pathText)
	}
	return filepath.Abs(filepath.Join(cwdPath, pathText))
}

func commandPathTextFromMatch(cmd string, start, end int) string {
	raw := cmd[start:end]
	if !strings.HasPrefix(raw, "/") || isUnixAbsolutePathMatchStart(cmd, start) {
		return raw
	}

	tokenStart, tokenEnd := shellTokenBounds(cmd, start)
	prefix := cmd[tokenStart:start]
	// For --flag=rel/path, validate the value. For ambiguous attached option
	// forms like -isystem/path, keep the slash-starting path conservative.
	if eq := strings.IndexByte(prefix, '='); eq >= 0 {
		return cmd[tokenStart+eq+1 : tokenEnd]
	}
	if strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "-") {
		return raw
	}
	return cmd[tokenStart:tokenEnd]
}

func shellTokenBounds(cmd string, idx int) (int, int) {
	start := idx
	for start > 0 && !isShellTokenBoundary(cmd[start-1]) {
		start--
	}
	end := idx
	for end < len(cmd) && !isShellTokenBoundary(cmd[end]) {
		end++
	}
	return start, end
}

// isUnixAbsolutePathMatchStart returns true when a regex match beginning with
// "/" is actually an absolute path token, not the separator inside a relative
// path such as "skills/foo.py".
func isUnixAbsolutePathMatchStart(cmd string, idx int) bool {
	if idx <= 0 {
		return true
	}

	prev := cmd[idx-1]
	if isShellTokenBoundary(prev) || prev == '=' || prev == ',' || prev == '(' || prev == '[' || prev == '{' {
		return true
	}

	j := idx - 1
	for j >= 0 && !isShellTokenBoundary(cmd[j]) {
		j--
	}
	prefix := cmd[j+1 : idx]

	return strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "-") && !strings.Contains(prefix, "=")
}

// isShellTokenBoundary returns true when b is a byte that separates
// tokens in a shell command (space, tab, colon, semicolon, pipe, etc.).
func isShellTokenBoundary(b byte) bool {
	switch b {
	case ' ', '\t', ':', ';', '|', '&', '<', '>', '\'', '"', '`', '\n', '\r':
		return true
	}
	return false
}

// looksLikeDomain returns true when s looks like a DNS domain name:
// it contains at least one dot, starts with an alphanumeric character,
// and does not end with a common file extension.
func looksLikeDomain(s string) bool {
	if len(s) < 3 || !strings.ContainsRune(s, '.') {
		return false
	}
	first := s[0]
	if !((first >= 'a' && first <= 'z') || (first >= 'A' && first <= 'Z') || (first >= '0' && first <= '9')) {
		return false
	}
	// Exclude tokens ending with common file/programming extensions,
	// e.g. "script.py", "main.go", "app.exe".
	if idx := strings.LastIndexByte(s, '.'); idx >= 0 {
		ext := strings.ToLower(s[idx+1:])
		if commonFileExtension(ext) {
			return false
		}
	}
	return true
}

// commonFileExtension returns true when ext is a file extension that
// strongly indicates a local file rather than a domain TLD.
func commonFileExtension(ext string) bool {
	switch ext {
	case "py", "js", "ts", "tsx", "jsx", "go", "rs", "rb", "php",
		"java", "c", "cpp", "h", "hpp", "cs", "swift", "kt", "scala",
		"sh", "bash", "zsh", "fish", "ps1", "bat", "cmd",
		"txt", "md", "rst", "log", "json", "yaml", "yml", "toml",
		"xml", "html", "css", "scss", "ini", "cfg", "conf", "env",
		"exe", "dll", "so", "dylib", "lib", "a", "o", "obj",
		"zip", "tar", "gz", "bz2", "xz", "7z", "rar",
		"png", "jpg", "jpeg", "gif", "svg", "ico", "bmp", "webp",
		"mp3", "mp4", "wav", "avi", "mov", "mkv", "flac",
		"pdf", "doc", "docx", "xls", "xlsx", "ppt", "pptx",
		"pub", "pem", "key", "crt", "cer", "p12", "pfx",
		"bak", "tmp", "swp", "lock",
		"ttf", "otf", "woff", "woff2", "eot",
		"deb", "rpm", "apk", "msi", "dmg",
		"sql", "sqlite", "db":
		return true
	}
	return false
}

// localPathExists returns true when the given token resolves to an
// existing filesystem entry relative to cwd.
func localPathExists(cwd, token string) bool {
	info, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(cwd, token))
	return err == nil && info != nil
}

func (t *ExecTool) SetTimeout(timeout time.Duration) {
	t.timeout = timeout
}

func (t *ExecTool) SetRestrictToWorkspace(restrict bool) {
	t.restrictToWorkspace = restrict
}

func (t *ExecTool) SetAllowPatterns(patterns []string) error {
	t.allowPatterns = make([]*regexp.Regexp, 0, len(patterns))
	for _, p := range patterns {
		re, err := regexp.Compile(p)
		if err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("invalid allow pattern %q: %w", p, err)
		}
		t.allowPatterns = append(t.allowPatterns, re)
	}
	return nil
}