Merge branch 'main' into feat/markdown-output-format-web-fetch

pkg/agent/context.go

@@ -458,7 +458,23 @@ func (cb *ContextBuilder) LoadBootstrapFiles() string {
 //
 // See: https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/build-with-claude/prompt-caching
 // See: https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/prompt-caching
-func (cb *ContextBuilder) buildDynamicContext(channel, chatID string) string {
+func formatCurrentSenderLine(senderID, senderDisplayName string) string {
+	senderID = strings.TrimSpace(senderID)
+	senderDisplayName = strings.TrimSpace(senderDisplayName)
+
+	switch {
+	case senderDisplayName != "" && senderID != "":
+		return fmt.Sprintf("Current sender: %s (ID: %s)", senderDisplayName, senderID)
+	case senderDisplayName != "":
+		return fmt.Sprintf("Current sender: %s", senderDisplayName)
+	case senderID != "":
+		return fmt.Sprintf("Current sender: %s", senderID)
+	default:
+		return ""
+	}
+}
+
+func (cb *ContextBuilder) buildDynamicContext(channel, chatID, senderID, senderDisplayName string) string {
 	now := time.Now().Format("2006-01-02 15:04 (Monday)")
 	rt := fmt.Sprintf("%s %s, Go %s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, runtime.Version())
 
@@ -468,6 +484,9 @@ func (cb *ContextBuilder) buildDynamicContext(channel, chatID string) string {
 	if channel != "" && chatID != "" {
 		fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "\n\n## Current Session\nChannel: %s\nChat ID: %s", channel, chatID)
 	}
+	if senderLine := formatCurrentSenderLine(senderID, senderDisplayName); senderLine != "" {
+		fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "\n\n## Current Sender\n%s", senderLine)
+	}
 
 	return sb.String()
 }
@@ -477,7 +496,7 @@ func (cb *ContextBuilder) BuildMessages(
 	summary string,
 	currentMessage string,
 	media []string,
-	channel, chatID string,
+	channel, chatID, senderID, senderDisplayName string,
 ) []providers.Message {
 	messages := []providers.Message{}
 
@@ -493,7 +512,7 @@ func (cb *ContextBuilder) BuildMessages(
 	staticPrompt := cb.BuildSystemPromptWithCache()
 
 	// Build short dynamic context (time, runtime, session) — changes per request
-	dynamicCtx := cb.buildDynamicContext(channel, chatID)
+	dynamicCtx := cb.buildDynamicContext(channel, chatID, senderID, senderDisplayName)
 
 	// Compose a single system message: static (cached) + dynamic + optional summary.
 	// Keeping all system content in one message ensures every provider adapter can

pkg/agent/context_cache_test.go

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func TestSingleSystemMessage(t *testing.T) {
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			msgs := cb.BuildMessages(tt.history, tt.summary, tt.message, nil, "test", "chat1")
+			msgs := cb.BuildMessages(tt.history, tt.summary, tt.message, nil, "test", "chat1", "", "")
 
 			systemCount := 0
 			for _, m := range msgs {
@@ -126,6 +126,68 @@ func TestSingleSystemMessage(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestBuildMessages_CurrentSenderDynamicContext(t *testing.T) {
+	tmpDir := setupWorkspace(t, map[string]string{
+		"IDENTITY.md": "# Identity\nTest agent.",
+	})
+	defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
+
+	cb := NewContextBuilder(tmpDir)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name              string
+		senderID          string
+		senderDisplayName string
+		wantLine          string
+		wantSection       bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:              "both id and display name",
+			senderID:          "feishu:ou_xxx",
+			senderDisplayName: "Zhang San",
+			wantLine:          "Current sender: Zhang San (ID: feishu:ou_xxx)",
+			wantSection:       true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:              "display name only",
+			senderDisplayName: "Alice",
+			wantLine:          "Current sender: Alice",
+			wantSection:       true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "id only",
+			senderID:    "discord:123",
+			wantLine:    "Current sender: discord:123",
+			wantSection: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "no sender info",
+			wantSection: false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			msgs := cb.BuildMessages(nil, "", "hello", nil, "discord", "chat1", tt.senderID, tt.senderDisplayName)
+			sys := msgs[0].Content
+
+			if tt.wantSection {
+				if !strings.Contains(sys, "## Current Sender") {
+					t.Fatalf("system prompt missing Current Sender section:\n%s", sys)
+				}
+				if !strings.Contains(sys, tt.wantLine) {
+					t.Fatalf("system prompt missing sender line %q:\n%s", tt.wantLine, sys)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+
+			if strings.Contains(sys, "## Current Sender") {
+				t.Fatalf("system prompt should omit Current Sender section:\n%s", sys)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // TestMtimeAutoInvalidation verifies that the cache detects source file changes
 // via mtime without requiring explicit InvalidateCache().
 // Fix: original implementation had no auto-invalidation — edits to bootstrap files,
@@ -576,7 +638,7 @@ func TestConcurrentBuildSystemPromptWithCache(t *testing.T) {
 				}
 
 				// Also exercise BuildMessages concurrently
-				msgs := cb.BuildMessages(nil, "", "hello", nil, "test", "chat")
+				msgs := cb.BuildMessages(nil, "", "hello", nil, "test", "chat", "", "")
 				if len(msgs) < 2 {
 					errs <- "BuildMessages returned fewer than 2 messages"
 					return
@@ -664,6 +726,6 @@ func BenchmarkBuildMessagesWithCache(b *testing.B) {
 
 	b.ResetTimer()
 	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		_ = cb.BuildMessages(history, "summary", "new message", nil, "cli", "test")
+		_ = cb.BuildMessages(history, "summary", "new message", nil, "cli", "test", "", "")
 	}
 }

pkg/agent/instance.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/media"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/memory"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/providers"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/routing"
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ func NewAgentInstance(
 	readRestrict := restrict && !defaults.AllowReadOutsideWorkspace
 
 	// Compile path whitelist patterns from config.
-	allowReadPaths := compilePatterns(cfg.Tools.AllowReadPaths)
+	allowReadPaths := buildAllowReadPatterns(cfg)
 	allowWritePaths := compilePatterns(cfg.Tools.AllowWritePaths)
 
 	toolsRegistry := tools.NewToolRegistry()
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ func NewAgentInstance(
 		toolsRegistry.Register(tools.NewListDirTool(workspace, readRestrict, allowReadPaths))
 	}
 	if cfg.Tools.IsToolEnabled("exec") {
-		execTool, err := tools.NewExecToolWithConfig(workspace, restrict, cfg)
+		execTool, err := tools.NewExecToolWithConfig(workspace, restrict, cfg, allowReadPaths)
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Fatalf("Critical error: unable to initialize exec tool: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -282,6 +283,28 @@ func compilePatterns(patterns []string) []*regexp.Regexp {
 	return compiled
 }
 
+func buildAllowReadPatterns(cfg *config.Config) []*regexp.Regexp {
+	var configured []string
+	if cfg != nil {
+		configured = cfg.Tools.AllowReadPaths
+	}
+
+	compiled := compilePatterns(configured)
+	mediaDirPattern := regexp.MustCompile(mediaTempDirPattern())
+	for _, pattern := range compiled {
+		if pattern.String() == mediaDirPattern.String() {
+			return compiled
+		}
+	}
+
+	return append(compiled, mediaDirPattern)
+}
+
+func mediaTempDirPattern() string {
+	sep := regexp.QuoteMeta(string(os.PathSeparator))
+	return "^" + regexp.QuoteMeta(filepath.Clean(media.TempDir())) + "(?:" + sep + "|$)"
+}
+
 // Close releases resources held by the agent's session store.
 func (a *AgentInstance) Close() error {
 	if a.Sessions != nil {

pkg/agent/instance_test.go

@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
 package agent
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/media"
 )
 
 func TestNewAgentInstance_UsesDefaultsTemperatureAndMaxTokens(t *testing.T) {
@@ -160,3 +164,85 @@ func TestNewAgentInstance_ResolveCandidatesFromModelListAlias(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestNewAgentInstance_AllowsMediaTempDirForReadListAndExec(t *testing.T) {
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	mediaDir := media.TempDir()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(mediaDir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("MkdirAll(mediaDir) error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	mediaFile, err := os.CreateTemp(mediaDir, "instance-tool-*.txt")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTemp(mediaDir) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	mediaPath := mediaFile.Name()
+	if _, err := mediaFile.WriteString("attachment content"); err != nil {
+		mediaFile.Close()
+		t.Fatalf("WriteString(mediaFile) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := mediaFile.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Close(mediaFile) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Remove(mediaPath) })
+
+	cfg := &config.Config{
+		Agents: config.AgentsConfig{
+			Defaults: config.AgentDefaults{
+				Workspace:           workspace,
+				ModelName:           "test-model",
+				RestrictToWorkspace: true,
+			},
+		},
+		Tools: config.ToolsConfig{
+			ReadFile: config.ReadFileToolConfig{Enabled: true},
+			ListDir:  config.ToolConfig{Enabled: true},
+			Exec: config.ExecConfig{
+				ToolConfig:         config.ToolConfig{Enabled: true},
+				EnableDenyPatterns: true,
+				AllowRemote:        true,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	agent := NewAgentInstance(nil, &cfg.Agents.Defaults, cfg, &mockProvider{})
+
+	readTool, ok := agent.Tools.Get("read_file")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("read_file tool not registered")
+	}
+	readResult := readTool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"path": mediaPath})
+	if readResult.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("read_file should allow media temp dir, got: %s", readResult.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(readResult.ForLLM, "attachment content") {
+		t.Fatalf("read_file output missing media content: %s", readResult.ForLLM)
+	}
+
+	listTool, ok := agent.Tools.Get("list_dir")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("list_dir tool not registered")
+	}
+	listResult := listTool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"path": mediaDir})
+	if listResult.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("list_dir should allow media temp dir, got: %s", listResult.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(listResult.ForLLM, filepath.Base(mediaPath)) {
+		t.Fatalf("list_dir output missing media file: %s", listResult.ForLLM)
+	}
+
+	execTool, ok := agent.Tools.Get("exec")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("exec tool not registered")
+	}
+	execResult := execTool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{
+		"command":     "cat " + filepath.Base(mediaPath),
+		"working_dir": mediaDir,
+	})
+	if execResult.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("exec should allow media temp dir, got: %s", execResult.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(execResult.ForLLM, "attachment content") {
+		t.Fatalf("exec output missing media content: %s", execResult.ForLLM)
+	}
+}

pkg/agent/loop.go

@@ -55,15 +55,17 @@ type AgentLoop struct {
 
 // processOptions configures how a message is processed
 type processOptions struct {
-	SessionKey      string   // Session identifier for history/context
-	Channel         string   // Target channel for tool execution
-	ChatID          string   // Target chat ID for tool execution
-	UserMessage     string   // User message content (may include prefix)
-	Media           []string // media:// refs from inbound message
-	DefaultResponse string   // Response when LLM returns empty
-	EnableSummary   bool     // Whether to trigger summarization
-	SendResponse    bool     // Whether to send response via bus
-	NoHistory       bool     // If true, don't load session history (for heartbeat)
+	SessionKey        string   // Session identifier for history/context
+	Channel           string   // Target channel for tool execution
+	ChatID            string   // Target chat ID for tool execution
+	SenderID          string   // Current sender ID for dynamic context
+	SenderDisplayName string   // Current sender display name for dynamic context
+	UserMessage       string   // User message content (may include prefix)
+	Media             []string // media:// refs from inbound message
+	DefaultResponse   string   // Response when LLM returns empty
+	EnableSummary     bool     // Whether to trigger summarization
+	SendResponse      bool     // Whether to send response via bus
+	NoHistory         bool     // If true, don't load session history (for heartbeat)
 }
 
 const (
@@ -117,6 +119,8 @@ func registerSharedTools(
 	registry *AgentRegistry,
 	provider providers.LLMProvider,
 ) {
+	allowReadPaths := buildAllowReadPatterns(cfg)
+
 	for _, agentID := range registry.ListAgentIDs() {
 		agent, ok := registry.GetAgent(agentID)
 		if !ok {
@@ -161,7 +165,8 @@ func registerSharedTools(
 				50000,
 				cfg.Tools.Web.Proxy,
 				cfg.Tools.Web.Format,
-				cfg.Tools.Web.FetchLimitBytes)
+				cfg.Tools.Web.FetchLimitBytes,
+        cfg.Tools.Web.PrivateHostWhitelist)
 			if err != nil {
 				logger.ErrorCF("agent", "Failed to create web fetch tool", map[string]any{"error": err.Error()})
 			} else {
@@ -199,6 +204,7 @@ func registerSharedTools(
 				cfg.Agents.Defaults.RestrictToWorkspace,
 				cfg.Agents.Defaults.GetMaxMediaSize(),
 				nil,
+				allowReadPaths,
 			)
 			agent.Tools.Register(sendFileTool)
 		}
@@ -226,20 +232,26 @@ func registerSharedTools(
 			}
 		}
 
-		// Spawn tool with allowlist checker
-		if cfg.Tools.IsToolEnabled("spawn") {
-			if cfg.Tools.IsToolEnabled("subagent") {
-				subagentManager := tools.NewSubagentManager(provider, agent.Model, agent.Workspace)
-				subagentManager.SetLLMOptions(agent.MaxTokens, agent.Temperature)
+		// Spawn and spawn_status tools share a SubagentManager.
+		// Construct it when either tool is enabled (both require subagent).
+		spawnEnabled := cfg.Tools.IsToolEnabled("spawn")
+		spawnStatusEnabled := cfg.Tools.IsToolEnabled("spawn_status")
+		if (spawnEnabled || spawnStatusEnabled) && cfg.Tools.IsToolEnabled("subagent") {
+			subagentManager := tools.NewSubagentManager(provider, agent.Model, agent.Workspace)
+			subagentManager.SetLLMOptions(agent.MaxTokens, agent.Temperature)
+			if spawnEnabled {
 				spawnTool := tools.NewSpawnTool(subagentManager)
 				currentAgentID := agentID
 				spawnTool.SetAllowlistChecker(func(targetAgentID string) bool {
 					return registry.CanSpawnSubagent(currentAgentID, targetAgentID)
 				})
 				agent.Tools.Register(spawnTool)
-			} else {
-				logger.WarnCF("agent", "spawn tool requires subagent to be enabled", nil)
 			}
+			if spawnStatusEnabled {
+				agent.Tools.Register(tools.NewSpawnStatusTool(subagentManager))
+			}
+		} else if (spawnEnabled || spawnStatusEnabled) && !cfg.Tools.IsToolEnabled("subagent") {
+			logger.WarnCF("agent", "spawn/spawn_status tools require subagent to be enabled", nil)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -736,14 +748,16 @@ func (al *AgentLoop) processMessage(ctx context.Context, msg bus.InboundMessage)
 		})
 
 	opts := processOptions{
-		SessionKey:      sessionKey,
-		Channel:         msg.Channel,
-		ChatID:          msg.ChatID,
-		UserMessage:     msg.Content,
-		Media:           msg.Media,
-		DefaultResponse: defaultResponse,
-		EnableSummary:   true,
-		SendResponse:    false,
+		SessionKey:        sessionKey,
+		Channel:           msg.Channel,
+		ChatID:            msg.ChatID,
+		SenderID:          msg.SenderID,
+		SenderDisplayName: msg.Sender.DisplayName,
+		UserMessage:       msg.Content,
+		Media:             msg.Media,
+		DefaultResponse:   defaultResponse,
+		EnableSummary:     true,
+		SendResponse:      false,
 	}
 
 	// context-dependent commands check their own Runtime fields and report
@@ -883,6 +897,8 @@ func (al *AgentLoop) runAgentLoop(
 		opts.Media,
 		opts.Channel,
 		opts.ChatID,
+		opts.SenderID,
+		opts.SenderDisplayName,
 	)
 
 	// Resolve media:// refs: images→base64 data URLs, non-images→local paths in content
@@ -1154,7 +1170,7 @@ func (al *AgentLoop) runLLMIteration(
 				newSummary := agent.Sessions.GetSummary(opts.SessionKey)
 				messages = agent.ContextBuilder.BuildMessages(
 					newHistory, newSummary, "",
-					nil, opts.Channel, opts.ChatID,
+					nil, opts.Channel, opts.ChatID, opts.SenderID, opts.SenderDisplayName,
 				)
 				continue
 			}

pkg/agent/loop_test.go

@@ -30,6 +30,28 @@ func (f *fakeChannel) IsAllowed(string) bool                                   {
 func (f *fakeChannel) IsAllowedSender(sender bus.SenderInfo) bool              { return true }
 func (f *fakeChannel) ReasoningChannelID() string                              { return f.id }
 
+type recordingProvider struct {
+	lastMessages []providers.Message
+}
+
+func (r *recordingProvider) Chat(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	messages []providers.Message,
+	tools []providers.ToolDefinition,
+	model string,
+	opts map[string]any,
+) (*providers.LLMResponse, error) {
+	r.lastMessages = append([]providers.Message(nil), messages...)
+	return &providers.LLMResponse{
+		Content:   "Mock response",
+		ToolCalls: []providers.ToolCall{},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (r *recordingProvider) GetDefaultModel() string {
+	return "mock-model"
+}
+
 func newTestAgentLoop(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) (al *AgentLoop, cfg *config.Config, msgBus *bus.MessageBus, provider *mockProvider, cleanup func()) {
@@ -54,6 +76,59 @@ func newTestAgentLoop(
 	return al, cfg, msgBus, provider, func() { os.RemoveAll(tmpDir) }
 }
 
+func TestProcessMessage_IncludesCurrentSenderInDynamicContext(t *testing.T) {
+	tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "agent-test-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create temp dir: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
+
+	cfg := &config.Config{
+		Agents: config.AgentsConfig{
+			Defaults: config.AgentDefaults{
+				Workspace:         tmpDir,
+				Model:             "test-model",
+				MaxTokens:         4096,
+				MaxToolIterations: 10,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	msgBus := bus.NewMessageBus()
+	provider := &recordingProvider{}
+	al := NewAgentLoop(cfg, msgBus, provider)
+
+	response, err := al.processMessage(context.Background(), bus.InboundMessage{
+		Channel:  "discord",
+		SenderID: "discord:123",
+		Sender: bus.SenderInfo{
+			DisplayName: "Alice",
+		},
+		ChatID:  "group-1",
+		Content: "hello",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("processMessage() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if response != "Mock response" {
+		t.Fatalf("processMessage() response = %q, want %q", response, "Mock response")
+	}
+	if len(provider.lastMessages) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("provider did not receive any messages")
+	}
+
+	systemPrompt := provider.lastMessages[0].Content
+	wantSender := "## Current Sender\nCurrent sender: Alice (ID: discord:123)"
+	if !strings.Contains(systemPrompt, wantSender) {
+		t.Fatalf("system prompt missing sender context %q:\n%s", wantSender, systemPrompt)
+	}
+
+	lastMessage := provider.lastMessages[len(provider.lastMessages)-1]
+	if lastMessage.Role != "user" || lastMessage.Content != "hello" {
+		t.Fatalf("last provider message = %+v, want unchanged user message", lastMessage)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRecordLastChannel(t *testing.T) {
 	al, cfg, msgBus, provider, cleanup := newTestAgentLoop(t)
 	defer cleanup()

pkg/channels/feishu/feishu_64.go

@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ func (c *FeishuChannel) downloadResource(
 	}
 
 	// Write to the shared picoclaw_media directory using a unique name to avoid collisions.
-	mediaDir := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "picoclaw_media")
+	mediaDir := media.TempDir()
 	if mkdirErr := os.MkdirAll(mediaDir, 0o700); mkdirErr != nil {
 		logger.ErrorCF("feishu", "Failed to create media directory", map[string]any{
 			"error": mkdirErr.Error(),

pkg/channels/manager.go

@@ -357,7 +357,6 @@ func (m *Manager) StartAll(ctx context.Context) error {
 
 	if len(m.channels) == 0 {
 		logger.WarnC("channels", "No channels enabled")
-		return errors.New("no channels enabled")
 	}
 
 	logger.InfoC("channels", "Starting all channels")
@@ -397,7 +396,7 @@ func (m *Manager) StartAll(ctx context.Context) error {
 				"addr": m.httpServer.Addr,
 			})
 			if err := m.httpServer.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
-				logger.ErrorCF("channels", "Shared HTTP server error", map[string]any{
+				logger.FatalCF("channels", "Shared HTTP server error", map[string]any{
 					"error": err.Error(),
 				})
 			}

pkg/channels/matrix/matrix.go

@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ const (
 	roomKindCacheTTL           = 5 * time.Minute
 	roomKindCacheCleanupPeriod = 1 * time.Minute
 	roomKindCacheMaxEntries    = 2048
-
-	matrixMediaTempDirName = "picoclaw_media"
 )
 
 var matrixMentionHrefRegexp = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)<a[^>]+href=["']([^"']+)["']`)
@@ -1105,7 +1103,7 @@ func (c *MatrixChannel) stripSelfMention(text string) string {
 }
 
 func matrixMediaTempDir() (string, error) {
-	mediaDir := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), matrixMediaTempDirName)
+	mediaDir := media.TempDir()
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(mediaDir, 0o700); err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}

pkg/channels/matrix/matrix_test.go

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 	"maunium.net/go/mautrix/id"
 
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/media"
 )
 
 func TestMatrixLocalpartMentionRegexp(t *testing.T) {
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ func TestMatrixMediaTempDir(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("matrixMediaTempDir failed: %v", err)
 	}
-	if filepath.Base(dir) != matrixMediaTempDirName {
+	if filepath.Base(dir) != media.TempDirName {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected media dir base: %q", filepath.Base(dir))
 	}
 

pkg/channels/pico/pico.go

@@ -251,7 +251,13 @@ func (c *PicoChannel) handleWebSocket(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	conn, err := c.upgrader.Upgrade(w, r, nil)
+	// Echo the matched subprotocol back so the browser accepts the upgrade.
+	var responseHeader http.Header
+	if proto := c.matchedSubprotocol(r); proto != "" {
+		responseHeader = http.Header{"Sec-WebSocket-Protocol": {proto}}
+	}
+
+	conn, err := c.upgrader.Upgrade(w, r, responseHeader)
 	if err != nil {
 		logger.ErrorCF("pico", "WebSocket upgrade failed", map[string]any{
 			"error": err.Error(),
@@ -282,8 +288,10 @@ func (c *PicoChannel) handleWebSocket(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	go c.readLoop(pc)
 }
 
-// authenticate checks the Bearer token from the Authorization header.
-// Query parameter authentication is only allowed when AllowTokenQuery is explicitly enabled.
+// authenticate checks the request for a valid token:
+//  1. Authorization: Bearer <token> header
+//  2. Sec-WebSocket-Protocol "token.<value>" (for browsers that can't set headers)
+//  3. Query parameter "token" (only when AllowTokenQuery is on)
 func (c *PicoChannel) authenticate(r *http.Request) bool {
 	token := c.config.Token
 	if token == "" {
@@ -298,6 +306,11 @@ func (c *PicoChannel) authenticate(r *http.Request) bool {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Check Sec-WebSocket-Protocol subprotocol ("token.<value>")
+	if c.matchedSubprotocol(r) != "" {
+		return true
+	}
+
 	// Check query parameter only when explicitly allowed
 	if c.config.AllowTokenQuery {
 		if r.URL.Query().Get("token") == token {
@@ -308,6 +321,18 @@ func (c *PicoChannel) authenticate(r *http.Request) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
+// matchedSubprotocol returns the "token.<value>" subprotocol that matches
+// the configured token, or "" if none do.
+func (c *PicoChannel) matchedSubprotocol(r *http.Request) string {
+	token := c.config.Token
+	for _, proto := range websocket.Subprotocols(r) {
+		if after, ok := strings.CutPrefix(proto, "token."); ok && after == token {
+			return proto
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
 // readLoop reads messages from a WebSocket connection.
 func (c *PicoChannel) readLoop(pc *picoConn) {
 	defer func() {

pkg/config/config.go

@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 
 	"github.com/caarlos0/env/v11"
 
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/credential"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/fileutil"
 )
 
@@ -623,8 +625,9 @@ func (c *ModelConfig) Validate() error {
 }
 
 type GatewayConfig struct {
-	Host string `json:"host" env:"PICOCLAW_GATEWAY_HOST"`
-	Port int    `json:"port" env:"PICOCLAW_GATEWAY_PORT"`
+	Host      string `json:"host"       env:"PICOCLAW_GATEWAY_HOST"`
+	Port      int    `json:"port"       env:"PICOCLAW_GATEWAY_PORT"`
+	HotReload bool   `json:"hot_reload" env:"PICOCLAW_GATEWAY_HOT_RELOAD"`
 }
 
 type ToolDiscoveryConfig struct {
@@ -695,11 +698,13 @@ type WebToolsConfig struct {
 	Proxy           string `json:"proxy,omitempty"             env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_WEB_PROXY"`
 	FetchLimitBytes int64  `json:"fetch_limit_bytes,omitempty" env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_WEB_FETCH_LIMIT_BYTES"`
 	Format          string `json:"format,omitempty"            env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_WEB_FORMAT"`
+  PrivateHostWhitelist FlexibleStringSlice `json:"private_host_whitelist,omitempty" env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_WEB_PRIVATE_HOST_WHITELIST"`
 }
 
 type CronToolsConfig struct {
-	ToolConfig         `    envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_CRON_"`
-	ExecTimeoutMinutes int `                                 env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_CRON_EXEC_TIMEOUT_MINUTES" json:"exec_timeout_minutes"` // 0 means no timeout
+	ToolConfig         `     envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_CRON_"`
+	ExecTimeoutMinutes int  `                                 env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_CRON_EXEC_TIMEOUT_MINUTES" json:"exec_timeout_minutes"` // 0 means no timeout
+	AllowCommand       bool `                                 env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_CRON_ALLOW_COMMAND"        json:"allow_command"`
 }
 
 type ExecConfig struct {
@@ -749,6 +754,7 @@ type ToolsConfig struct {
 	ReadFile        ReadFileToolConfig `json:"read_file"                                                envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_READ_FILE_"`
 	SendFile        ToolConfig         `json:"send_file"                                                envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_SEND_FILE_"`
 	Spawn           ToolConfig         `json:"spawn"                                                    envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_SPAWN_"`
+	SpawnStatus     ToolConfig         `json:"spawn_status"                                             envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_SPAWN_STATUS_"`
 	SPI             ToolConfig         `json:"spi"                                                      envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_SPI_"`
 	Subagent        ToolConfig         `json:"subagent"                                                 envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_SUBAGENT_"`
 	WebFetch        ToolConfig         `json:"web_fetch"                                                envPrefix:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_WEB_FETCH_"`
@@ -838,10 +844,24 @@ func LoadConfig(path string) (*Config, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
+	if passphrase := credential.PassphraseProvider(); passphrase != "" {
+		for _, m := range cfg.ModelList {
+			if m.APIKey != "" && !strings.HasPrefix(m.APIKey, "enc://") && !strings.HasPrefix(m.APIKey, "file://") {
+				fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr,
+					"picoclaw: warning: model %q has a plaintext api_key; call SaveConfig to encrypt it\n",
+					m.ModelName)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	if err := env.Parse(cfg); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
+	if err := resolveAPIKeys(cfg.ModelList, filepath.Dir(path)); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	// Migrate legacy channel config fields to new unified structures
 	cfg.migrateChannelConfigs()
 
@@ -858,6 +878,48 @@ func LoadConfig(path string) (*Config, error) {
 	return cfg, nil
 }
 
+// encryptPlaintextAPIKeys returns a copy of models with plaintext api_key values
+// encrypted. Returns (nil, nil) when nothing changed (all keys already sealed or
+// empty). Returns (nil, error) if any key fails to encrypt — callers must treat
+// this as a hard failure to prevent a mixed plaintext/ciphertext state on disk.
+// Symmetric counterpart of resolveAPIKeys: both operate purely on []ModelConfig
+// and leave JSON marshaling to the caller.
+func encryptPlaintextAPIKeys(models []ModelConfig, passphrase string) ([]ModelConfig, error) {
+	sealed := make([]ModelConfig, len(models))
+	copy(sealed, models)
+	changed := false
+	for i := range sealed {
+		m := &sealed[i]
+		if m.APIKey == "" || strings.HasPrefix(m.APIKey, "enc://") || strings.HasPrefix(m.APIKey, "file://") {
+			continue
+		}
+		encrypted, err := credential.Encrypt(passphrase, "", m.APIKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot seal api_key for model %q: %w", m.ModelName, err)
+		}
+		m.APIKey = encrypted
+		changed = true
+	}
+	if !changed {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return sealed, nil
+}
+
+// resolveAPIKeys decrypts or dereferences each api_key in models in-place.
+// Supports plaintext (no-op), file:// (read from configDir), and enc:// (AES-GCM decrypt).
+func resolveAPIKeys(models []ModelConfig, configDir string) error {
+	cr := credential.NewResolver(configDir)
+	for i := range models {
+		resolved, err := cr.Resolve(models[i].APIKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("model_list[%d] (%s): %w", i, models[i].ModelName, err)
+		}
+		models[i].APIKey = resolved
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (c *Config) migrateChannelConfigs() {
 	// Discord: mention_only -> group_trigger.mention_only
 	if c.Channels.Discord.MentionOnly && !c.Channels.Discord.GroupTrigger.MentionOnly {
@@ -872,12 +934,22 @@ func (c *Config) migrateChannelConfigs() {
 }
 
 func SaveConfig(path string, cfg *Config) error {
+	if passphrase := credential.PassphraseProvider(); passphrase != "" {
+		sealed, err := encryptPlaintextAPIKeys(cfg.ModelList, passphrase)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if sealed != nil {
+			tmp := *cfg
+			tmp.ModelList = sealed
+			cfg = &tmp
+		}
+	}
+
 	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(cfg, "", "  ")
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-
-	// Use unified atomic write utility with explicit sync for flash storage reliability.
 	return fileutil.WriteFileAtomic(path, data, 0o600)
 }
 
@@ -1044,6 +1116,8 @@ func (t *ToolsConfig) IsToolEnabled(name string) bool {
 		return t.ReadFile.Enabled
 	case "spawn":
 		return t.Spawn.Enabled
+	case "spawn_status":
+		return t.SpawnStatus.Enabled
 	case "spi":
 		return t.SPI.Enabled
 	case "subagent":

pkg/config/config_test.go

@@ -7,8 +7,22 @@ import (
 	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/credential"
 )
 
+// mustSetupSSHKey generates a temporary Ed25519 SSH key in t.TempDir() and sets
+// PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH to its path for the duration of the test. This is required
+// whenever a test exercises encryption/decryption via credential.Encrypt or SaveConfig.
+func mustSetupSSHKey(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
+	if err := credential.GenerateSSHKey(keyPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mustSetupSSHKey: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", keyPath)
+}
+
 func TestAgentModelConfig_UnmarshalString(t *testing.T) {
 	var m AgentModelConfig
 	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(`"gpt-4"`), &m); err != nil {
@@ -253,6 +267,9 @@ func TestDefaultConfig_Gateway(t *testing.T) {
 	if cfg.Gateway.Port == 0 {
 		t.Error("Gateway port should have default value")
 	}
+	if cfg.Gateway.HotReload {
+		t.Error("Gateway hot reload should be disabled by default")
+	}
 }
 
 // TestDefaultConfig_Providers verifies provider structure
@@ -391,6 +408,13 @@ func TestDefaultConfig_ExecAllowRemoteEnabled(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestDefaultConfig_CronAllowCommandEnabled(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+	if !cfg.Tools.Cron.AllowCommand {
+		t.Fatal("DefaultConfig().Tools.Cron.AllowCommand should be true")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestLoadConfig_OpenAIWebSearchDefaultsTrueWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
@@ -423,6 +447,22 @@ func TestLoadConfig_ExecAllowRemoteDefaultsTrueWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestLoadConfig_CronAllowCommandDefaultsTrueWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(`{"tools":{"cron":{"exec_timeout_minutes":5}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("WriteFile() error: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadConfig() error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !cfg.Tools.Cron.AllowCommand {
+		t.Fatal("tools.cron.allow_command should remain true when unset in config file")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestLoadConfig_OpenAIWebSearchCanBeDisabled(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
@@ -482,13 +522,19 @@ func TestDefaultConfig_DMScope(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestDefaultConfig_WorkspacePath_Default(t *testing.T) {
-	// Unset to ensure we test the default
 	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_HOME", "")
-	// Set a known home for consistent test results
-	t.Setenv("HOME", "/tmp/home")
+
+	var fakeHome string
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		fakeHome = `C:\tmp\home`
+		t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", fakeHome)
+	} else {
+		fakeHome = "/tmp/home"
+		t.Setenv("HOME", fakeHome)
+	}
 
 	cfg := DefaultConfig()
-	want := filepath.Join("/tmp/home", ".picoclaw", "workspace")
+	want := filepath.Join(fakeHome, ".picoclaw", "workspace")
 
 	if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace != want {
 		t.Errorf("Default workspace path = %q, want %q", cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace, want)
@@ -499,7 +545,7 @@ func TestDefaultConfig_WorkspacePath_WithPicoclawHome(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_HOME", "/custom/picoclaw/home")
 
 	cfg := DefaultConfig()
-	want := "/custom/picoclaw/home/workspace"
+	want := filepath.Join("/custom/picoclaw/home", "workspace")
 
 	if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace != want {
 		t.Errorf("Workspace path with PICOCLAW_HOME = %q, want %q", cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace, want)
@@ -621,3 +667,338 @@ func TestFlexibleStringSlice_UnmarshalText_EmptySliceConsistency(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 }
+
+// TestLoadConfig_WarnsForPlaintextAPIKey verifies that LoadConfig resolves a plaintext
+// api_key into memory but does NOT rewrite the config file. File writes are the sole
+// responsibility of SaveConfig.
+func TestLoadConfig_WarnsForPlaintextAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+	const original = `{"model_list":[{"model_name":"test","model":"openai/gpt-4","api_key":"sk-plaintext"}]}`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(original), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
+
+	cfg, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	// In-memory value must be the resolved plaintext.
+	if cfg.ModelList[0].APIKey != "sk-plaintext" {
+		t.Errorf("in-memory api_key = %q, want %q", cfg.ModelList[0].APIKey, "sk-plaintext")
+	}
+	// The file on disk must remain unchanged — LoadConfig must not write anything.
+	raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	if string(raw) != original {
+		t.Errorf("LoadConfig must not modify the config file; got:\n%s", string(raw))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSaveConfig_EncryptsPlaintextAPIKey verifies that SaveConfig writes enc:// ciphertext
+// to disk and that a subsequent LoadConfig decrypts it back to the original plaintext.
+func TestSaveConfig_EncryptsPlaintextAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
+	mustSetupSSHKey(t)
+
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+	cfg.ModelList = []ModelConfig{
+		{ModelName: "test", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-plaintext"},
+	}
+	if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, cfg); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SaveConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Disk must contain enc://, not the raw key.
+	raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	if !strings.Contains(string(raw), "enc://") {
+		t.Errorf("saved file should contain enc://, got:\n%s", string(raw))
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(raw), "sk-plaintext") {
+		t.Errorf("saved file must not contain the plaintext key")
+	}
+
+	// A fresh load must decrypt back to the original plaintext.
+	cfg2, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadConfig after SaveConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg2.ModelList[0].APIKey != "sk-plaintext" {
+		t.Errorf("loaded api_key = %q, want %q", cfg2.ModelList[0].APIKey, "sk-plaintext")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoadConfig_NoSealWithoutPassphrase verifies that api_key values are left
+// unchanged when PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE is not set.
+func TestLoadConfig_NoSealWithoutPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+	data := `{"model_list":[{"model_name":"test","model":"openai/gpt-4","api_key":"sk-plaintext"}]}`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(data), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
+
+	if _, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	if strings.Contains(string(raw), "enc://") {
+		t.Error("config file must not be modified when no passphrase is set")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoadConfig_FileRefNotSealed verifies that file:// api_key references are not
+// converted to enc:// values (they are resolved at runtime by the Resolver).
+func TestLoadConfig_FileRefNotSealed(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+	keyFile := filepath.Join(dir, "openai.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(keyFile, []byte("sk-from-file"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+	data := `{"model_list":[{"model_name":"test","model":"openai/gpt-4","api_key":"file://openai.key"}]}`
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(data), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
+
+	if _, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	if !strings.Contains(string(raw), "file://openai.key") {
+		t.Error("file:// reference should be preserved unchanged in the config file")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(raw), "enc://") {
+		t.Error("file:// reference must not be converted to enc://")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSaveConfig_MixedKeys verifies that SaveConfig encrypts only plaintext api_keys
+// and leaves already-encrypted (enc://) and file:// entries unchanged.
+func TestSaveConfig_MixedKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
+	mustSetupSSHKey(t)
+
+	// Pre-encrypt one key so we have a genuine enc:// value to put in the config.
+	if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, &Config{
+		ModelList: []ModelConfig{
+			{ModelName: "pre", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-already-plain"},
+		},
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup SaveConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	// Extract the enc:// value from the saved file.
+	var tmp struct {
+		ModelList []struct {
+			APIKey string `json:"api_key"`
+		} `json:"model_list"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &tmp); err != nil || len(tmp.ModelList) == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: could not parse saved config: %v", err)
+	}
+	alreadyEncrypted := tmp.ModelList[0].APIKey
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(alreadyEncrypted, "enc://") {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: expected enc:// key, got %q", alreadyEncrypted)
+	}
+
+	// Build a config with three models:
+	//   1. plaintext   → must be encrypted by SaveConfig
+	//   2. enc://      → must be left unchanged (already encrypted)
+	//   3. file://     → must be left unchanged (file reference)
+	keyFile := filepath.Join(dir, "api.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(keyFile, []byte("sk-from-file"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+	cfg := &Config{
+		ModelList: []ModelConfig{
+			{ModelName: "plain", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-new-plaintext"},
+			{ModelName: "enc", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: alreadyEncrypted},
+			{ModelName: "file", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "file://api.key"},
+		},
+	}
+	if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, cfg); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SaveConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	raw, _ = os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	s := string(raw)
+
+	// 1. Plaintext must be encrypted.
+	if strings.Contains(s, "sk-new-plaintext") {
+		t.Error("plaintext key must not appear in saved file")
+	}
+	// 2. The pre-existing enc:// value must still be present (byte-for-byte unchanged).
+	if !strings.Contains(s, alreadyEncrypted) {
+		t.Error("pre-existing enc:// entry must be preserved unchanged")
+	}
+	// 3. file:// must be preserved.
+	if !strings.Contains(s, "file://api.key") {
+		t.Error("file:// reference must be preserved unchanged")
+	}
+
+	// Now load and verify all three decrypt/resolve correctly.
+	cfg2, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadConfig after SaveConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	byName := make(map[string]string)
+	for _, m := range cfg2.ModelList {
+		byName[m.ModelName] = m.APIKey
+	}
+	if byName["plain"] != "sk-new-plaintext" {
+		t.Errorf("plain model api_key = %q, want %q", byName["plain"], "sk-new-plaintext")
+	}
+	if byName["enc"] != "sk-already-plain" {
+		t.Errorf("enc model api_key = %q, want %q", byName["enc"], "sk-already-plain")
+	}
+	if byName["file"] != "sk-from-file" {
+		t.Errorf("file model api_key = %q, want %q", byName["file"], "sk-from-file")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoadConfig_MixedKeys_NoPassphrase verifies that when PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE
+// is not set, enc:// entries cause LoadConfig to return an error, while plaintext
+// and file:// entries in the same config are not affected.
+func TestLoadConfig_MixedKeys_NoPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+
+	// First encrypt a key so we have a real enc:// value.
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
+	mustSetupSSHKey(t)
+	if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, &Config{
+		ModelList: []ModelConfig{
+			{ModelName: "m", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-secret"},
+		},
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup SaveConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	var tmp struct {
+		ModelList []struct {
+			APIKey string `json:"api_key"`
+		} `json:"model_list"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &tmp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup parse: %v", err)
+	}
+	encValue := tmp.ModelList[0].APIKey
+
+	// Write a mixed config: enc:// + plaintext + file://
+	keyFile := filepath.Join(dir, "api.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(keyFile, []byte("sk-from-file"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+	mixed, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
+		"model_list": []map[string]any{
+			{"model_name": "enc", "model": "openai/gpt-4", "api_key": encValue},
+			{"model_name": "plain", "model": "openai/gpt-4", "api_key": "sk-plain"},
+			{"model_name": "file", "model": "openai/gpt-4", "api_key": "file://api.key"},
+		},
+	})
+	if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, mixed, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup write: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Now clear the passphrase — LoadConfig must fail because enc:// cannot be decrypted.
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
+
+	_, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("LoadConfig should fail when enc:// key is present and no passphrase is set")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "passphrase required") {
+		t.Errorf("error should mention passphrase required, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSaveConfig_UsesPassphraseProvider verifies that SaveConfig encrypts plaintext
+// api_keys using credential.PassphraseProvider() rather than os.Getenv directly.
+// This matters for the launcher, which clears the environment variable and redirects
+// PassphraseProvider to an in-memory SecureStore.
+func TestSaveConfig_UsesPassphraseProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+
+	// Ensure the env var is empty — passphrase must come from PassphraseProvider only.
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
+	mustSetupSSHKey(t)
+
+	// Replace PassphraseProvider with an in-memory function (simulating SecureStore).
+	const testPassphrase = "provider-passphrase"
+	orig := credential.PassphraseProvider
+	credential.PassphraseProvider = func() string { return testPassphrase }
+	t.Cleanup(func() { credential.PassphraseProvider = orig })
+
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+	cfg.ModelList = []ModelConfig{
+		{ModelName: "test", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-plaintext"},
+	}
+	if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, cfg); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SaveConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	if !strings.Contains(string(raw), "enc://") {
+		t.Errorf("SaveConfig should have encrypted plaintext key via PassphraseProvider; got:\n%s", raw)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoadConfig_UsesPassphraseProvider verifies that LoadConfig decrypts enc:// keys
+// using credential.PassphraseProvider() rather than os.Getenv directly.
+func TestLoadConfig_UsesPassphraseProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+
+	// Ensure the env var is empty throughout.
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
+	mustSetupSSHKey(t)
+
+	const testPassphrase = "provider-passphrase"
+	const plainKey = "sk-secret"
+
+	// First, encrypt the key using the same passphrase.
+	encrypted, err := credential.Encrypt(testPassphrase, "", plainKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Encrypt: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	raw, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
+		"model_list": []map[string]any{
+			{"model_name": "test", "model": "openai/gpt-4", "api_key": encrypted},
+		},
+	})
+	if err = os.WriteFile(cfgPath, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Redirect PassphraseProvider — env var is empty, so without this the load would fail.
+	orig := credential.PassphraseProvider
+	credential.PassphraseProvider = func() string { return testPassphrase }
+	t.Cleanup(func() { credential.PassphraseProvider = orig })
+
+	cfg, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.ModelList[0].APIKey != plainKey {
+		t.Errorf("api_key = %q, want %q", cfg.ModelList[0].APIKey, plainKey)
+	}
+}

pkg/config/defaults.go

@@ -395,8 +395,9 @@ func DefaultConfig() *Config {
 			},
 		},
 		Gateway: GatewayConfig{
-			Host: "127.0.0.1",
-			Port: 18790,
+			Host:      "127.0.0.1",
+			Port:      18790,
+			HotReload: false,
 		},
 		Tools: ToolsConfig{
 			MediaCleanup: MediaCleanupConfig{
@@ -453,6 +454,7 @@ func DefaultConfig() *Config {
 					Enabled: true,
 				},
 				ExecTimeoutMinutes: 5,
+				AllowCommand:       true,
 			},
 			Exec: ExecConfig{
 				ToolConfig: ToolConfig{
@@ -522,6 +524,9 @@ func DefaultConfig() *Config {
 			Spawn: ToolConfig{
 				Enabled: true,
 			},
+			SpawnStatus: ToolConfig{
+				Enabled: false,
+			},
 			SPI: ToolConfig{
 				Enabled: false, // Hardware tool - Linux only
 			},

pkg/credential/credential.go

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+// Package credential resolves API credential values for model_list entries.
+//
+// An API key is a form of authorization credential. This package centralizes
+// how raw credential strings—plaintext or file references—are resolved into
+// their actual values, keeping that logic out of the config loader.
+//
+// Supported formats for the api_key field:
+//
+//   - Plaintext:   "sk-abc123"          → returned as-is
+//   - File ref:    "file://filename.key" → content read from configDir/filename.key
+//   - Encrypted:   "enc://<base64>"     → AES-256-GCM decrypt via PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE
+//   - Empty:       ""                   → returned as-is (auth_method=oauth etc.)
+//
+// Encryption uses AES-256-GCM with HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (< 1ms, safe for embedded Linux).
+// An SSH private key is required for both encryption and decryption.
+// Key derivation:
+//
+//	HKDF-SHA256(ikm=HMAC-SHA256(SHA256(sshKeyBytes), passphrase), salt, info)
+//
+// SSH key path resolution priority:
+//
+//  1. sshKeyPath argument to Encrypt (explicit)
+//  2. PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH env var
+//  3. ~/.ssh/picoclaw_ed25519.key (os.UserHomeDir is cross-platform)
+package credential
+
+import (
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/hkdf"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// PassphraseEnvVar is the environment variable that holds the encryption passphrase.
+// Other packages (e.g. config) reference this constant to avoid duplicating the string.
+const PassphraseEnvVar = "PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE"
+
+// PassphraseProvider is the function used to retrieve the passphrase for enc://
+// credential decryption. It defaults to reading PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE from the
+// process environment. Replace it at startup to use a different source, such as
+// an in-memory SecureStore, so that all LoadConfig() calls everywhere share the
+// same passphrase source without needing os.Environ.
+//
+// Example (launcher main.go):
+//
+//	credential.PassphraseProvider = apiHandler.passphraseStore.Get
+var PassphraseProvider func() string = func() string {
+	return os.Getenv(PassphraseEnvVar)
+}
+
+// ErrPassphraseRequired is returned when an enc:// credential is encountered but
+// no passphrase is available from PassphraseProvider. Callers can detect this
+// with errors.Is to distinguish a missing-passphrase condition from other errors.
+var ErrPassphraseRequired = errors.New("credential: enc:// passphrase required")
+
+// ErrDecryptionFailed is returned when an enc:// credential cannot be decrypted,
+// indicating a wrong passphrase or SSH key. Callers can detect this with errors.Is.
+var ErrDecryptionFailed = errors.New("credential: enc:// decryption failed (wrong passphrase or SSH key?)")
+
+const (
+	fileScheme = "file://"
+	encScheme  = "enc://"
+	hkdfInfo   = "picoclaw-credential-v1"
+	saltLen    = 16
+	nonceLen   = 12
+	keyLen     = 32
+	sshKeyEnv  = "PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH"
+)
+
+// Resolver resolves raw credential strings for model_list api_key fields.
+// File references are resolved relative to the directory of the config file.
+type Resolver struct {
+	configDir         string
+	resolvedConfigDir string // symlink-resolved form of configDir
+}
+
+// NewResolver returns a Resolver that resolves file:// references relative to
+// configDir (typically filepath.Dir of the config file path).
+func NewResolver(configDir string) *Resolver {
+	resolved := configDir
+	if configDir != "" {
+		if linkedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(configDir); err == nil {
+			resolved = linkedPath
+		}
+	}
+	return &Resolver{configDir: configDir, resolvedConfigDir: resolved}
+}
+
+// Resolve returns the actual credential value for raw:
+//
+//   - ""                → "" (no error; auth_method=oauth needs no key)
+//   - "file://name.key" → trimmed content of configDir/name.key
+//   - anything else     → raw unchanged (plaintext credential)
+func (r *Resolver) Resolve(raw string) (string, error) {
+	if raw == "" {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+
+	if strings.HasPrefix(raw, fileScheme) {
+		fileName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(raw, fileScheme))
+		if fileName == "" {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: file:// reference has no filename")
+		}
+
+		baseDir := r.resolvedConfigDir
+		if baseDir == "" {
+			baseDir = r.configDir
+		}
+		keyPath := filepath.Join(baseDir, fileName)
+		// Resolve symlinks before enforcing containment to prevent escaping via symlinks.
+		realKeyPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(keyPath)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: failed to resolve credential file path %q: %w", keyPath, err)
+		}
+		if !isWithinDir(realKeyPath, baseDir) {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: file:// path escapes config directory")
+		}
+		data, err := os.ReadFile(realKeyPath)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: failed to read credential file %q: %w", realKeyPath, err)
+		}
+
+		value := strings.TrimSpace(string(data))
+		if value == "" {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: credential file %q is empty", realKeyPath)
+		}
+
+		return value, nil
+	}
+
+	if strings.HasPrefix(raw, encScheme) {
+		return resolveEncrypted(raw)
+	}
+
+	// Plaintext credential — return unchanged.
+	return raw, nil
+}
+
+// resolveEncrypted decrypts an enc:// credential using PassphraseProvider.
+func resolveEncrypted(raw string) (string, error) {
+	passphrase := PassphraseProvider()
+	if passphrase == "" {
+		return "", ErrPassphraseRequired
+	}
+
+	sshKeyPath := pickSSHKeyPath("") // override="": consult env then auto-detect
+
+	b64 := strings.TrimPrefix(raw, encScheme)
+	blob, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(b64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: enc:// invalid base64: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(blob) < saltLen+nonceLen+1 {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: enc:// payload too short")
+	}
+
+	salt := blob[:saltLen]
+	nonce := blob[saltLen : saltLen+nonceLen]
+	ciphertext := blob[saltLen+nonceLen:]
+
+	key, err := deriveKey(passphrase, sshKeyPath, salt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: enc:// cipher init: %w", err)
+	}
+	gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: enc:// gcm init: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	plaintext, err := gcm.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrDecryptionFailed, err)
+	}
+	return string(plaintext), nil
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts plaintext and returns an enc:// credential string.
+//
+// passphrase is required (PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE value).
+// sshKeyPath is the SSH private key file to use; pass "" to auto-detect via
+// PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH env var or ~/.ssh/picoclaw_ed25519.key.
+// An SSH private key must be resolvable or Encrypt returns an error.
+func Encrypt(passphrase, sshKeyPath, plaintext string) (string, error) {
+	if passphrase == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: passphrase must not be empty")
+	}
+	sshKeyPath = pickSSHKeyPath(sshKeyPath)
+
+	salt := make([]byte, saltLen)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, salt); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: failed to generate salt: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	key, err := deriveKey(passphrase, sshKeyPath, salt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: cipher init: %w", err)
+	}
+	gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: gcm init: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	nonce := make([]byte, nonceLen)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, nonce); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: failed to generate nonce: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	ciphertext := gcm.Seal(nil, nonce, []byte(plaintext), nil)
+	blob := make([]byte, 0, saltLen+nonceLen+len(ciphertext))
+	blob = append(blob, salt...)
+	blob = append(blob, nonce...)
+	blob = append(blob, ciphertext...)
+	return encScheme + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(blob), nil
+}
+
+// isWithinDir reports whether path is contained within (or equal to) dir.
+// Uses filepath.IsLocal on the relative path for robust cross-platform traversal detection.
+func isWithinDir(path, dir string) bool {
+	rel, err := filepath.Rel(filepath.Clean(dir), filepath.Clean(path))
+	return err == nil && filepath.IsLocal(rel)
+}
+
+// allowedSSHKeyPath reports whether path is in a permitted location for SSH key files:
+//   - exact match with PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH env var
+//   - within the PICOCLAW_HOME env var directory
+//   - within ~/.ssh/
+func allowedSSHKeyPath(path string) bool {
+	if path == "" {
+		return true // passphrase-only mode; no file will be read
+	}
+	clean := filepath.Clean(path)
+
+	// Exact match with PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH.
+	if envPath, ok := os.LookupEnv(sshKeyEnv); ok && envPath != "" {
+		if clean == filepath.Clean(envPath) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Within PICOCLAW_HOME.
+	if picoHome := os.Getenv("PICOCLAW_HOME"); picoHome != "" {
+		if isWithinDir(clean, picoHome) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Within ~/.ssh/.
+	if userHome, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil {
+		if isWithinDir(clean, filepath.Join(userHome, ".ssh")) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false
+}
+
+// deriveKey derives a 32-byte AES-256 key from passphrase and SSH private key.
+//
+// ikm = HMAC-SHA256(key=SHA256(sshKeyBytes), msg=passphrase)
+// Final key: HKDF-SHA256(ikm, salt, info="picoclaw-credential-v1", 32 bytes)
+// sshKeyPath must be non-empty; returns an error otherwise.
+func deriveKey(passphrase, sshKeyPath string, salt []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if sshKeyPath == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"credential: SSH private key is required but not found" +
+				" (set PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH or place key at ~/.ssh/picoclaw_ed25519.key)")
+	}
+	if !allowedSSHKeyPath(sshKeyPath) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
+			"credential: SSH key path %q is not in an allowed location (PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH, PICOCLAW_HOME, or ~/.ssh/)",
+			sshKeyPath,
+		)
+	}
+	sshBytes, err := os.ReadFile(sshKeyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("credential: cannot read SSH key %q: %w", sshKeyPath, err)
+	}
+	sshHash := sha256.Sum256(sshBytes)
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, sshHash[:])
+	mac.Write([]byte(passphrase))
+	ikm := mac.Sum(nil)
+
+	key, err := hkdf.Key(sha256.New, ikm, salt, hkdfInfo, keyLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("credential: HKDF expand failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	return key, nil
+}
+
+// pickSSHKeyPath returns the SSH private key path to use for encryption/decryption.
+//
+// Priority:
+//  1. override (non-empty explicit argument)
+//  2. PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH env var
+//  3. ~/.ssh/picoclaw_ed25519.key (auto-detection)
+//
+// Returns "" when no key is found; deriveKey will return an error in that case.
+func pickSSHKeyPath(override string) string {
+	if override != "" {
+		return override
+	}
+	if p, ok := os.LookupEnv(sshKeyEnv); ok {
+		return p // respect explicit setting, even if ""
+	}
+	return findDefaultSSHKey()
+}
+
+// findDefaultSSHKey returns the picoclaw-specific SSH key path if it exists.
+func findDefaultSSHKey() string {
+	p, err := DefaultSSHKeyPath()
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(p); err == nil {
+		return p
+	}
+	return ""
+}

pkg/credential/credential_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+package credential_test
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/credential"
+)
+
+func TestResolve_PlainKey(t *testing.T) {
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	got, err := r.Resolve("sk-plaintext-key")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != "sk-plaintext-key" {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", got, "sk-plaintext-key")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_FileKey_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	keyFile := "openai_plain.key"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, keyFile), []byte("sk-from-file\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(dir)
+	got, err := r.Resolve("file://" + keyFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != "sk-from-file" {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", got, "sk-from-file")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_FileKey_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	_, err := r.Resolve("file://missing.key")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for missing file, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_FileKey_Empty(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	keyFile := "empty.key"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, keyFile), []byte("   \n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(dir)
+	_, err := r.Resolve("file://" + keyFile)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for empty credential file, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestResolve_EncKey_RoundTrip tests basic encryption/decryption round-trip with an SSH key.
+func TestResolve_EncKey_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	sshKeyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(sshKeyPath, []byte("fake-ssh-key-material\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	const passphrase = "test-passphrase-32bytes-long-ok!"
+	const plaintext = "sk-encrypted-secret"
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", sshKeyPath)
+
+	enc, err := credential.Encrypt(passphrase, "", plaintext)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Encrypt: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", passphrase)
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	got, err := r.Resolve(enc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != plaintext {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", got, plaintext)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestResolve_EncKey_WithSSHKey tests that the SSH key file is incorporated into key derivation.
+func TestResolve_EncKey_WithSSHKey(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	sshKeyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(sshKeyPath, []byte("fake-ssh-private-key-material\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	const passphrase = "test-passphrase"
+	const plaintext = "sk-ssh-protected-secret"
+
+	// Set PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH before Encrypt so the path passes allowedSSHKeyPath validation.
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", passphrase)
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", sshKeyPath)
+
+	enc, err := credential.Encrypt(passphrase, sshKeyPath, plaintext)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Encrypt: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	got, err := r.Resolve(enc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != plaintext {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", got, plaintext)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_EncKey_NoPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	sshKeyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(sshKeyPath, []byte("fake-ssh-key\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", sshKeyPath)
+
+	enc, err := credential.Encrypt("some-passphrase", "", "sk-secret")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Encrypt: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	_, err = r.Resolve(enc)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error when PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE is unset, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_EncKey_BadCiphertext(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "some-passphrase")
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	_, err := r.Resolve("enc://!!not-valid-base64!!")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for invalid enc:// payload, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_EncKey_PayloadTooShort(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "some-passphrase")
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
+
+	// Valid base64 but fewer bytes than salt(16)+nonce(12)+1 minimum.
+	import64 := "dG9vc2hvcnQ=" // "tooshort" = 8 bytes
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	_, err := r.Resolve("enc://" + import64)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for too-short enc:// payload, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolve_EncKey_WrongPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	sshKeyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(sshKeyPath, []byte("fake-ssh-key\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", sshKeyPath)
+
+	enc, err := credential.Encrypt("correct-passphrase", "", "sk-secret")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Encrypt: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "wrong-passphrase")
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	_, err = r.Resolve(enc)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected decryption error for wrong passphrase, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncrypt_EmptyPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := credential.Encrypt("", "", "sk-secret")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for empty passphrase, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeriveKey_SSHKeyNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	// Encrypt with a real SSH key path, then try to decrypt with a missing path.
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	sshKeyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(sshKeyPath, []byte("fake-key\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Register the real key path so allowedSSHKeyPath validation passes for Encrypt.
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", sshKeyPath)
+
+	enc, err := credential.Encrypt("passphrase", sshKeyPath, "sk-secret")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Encrypt: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Point to a non-existent SSH key so deriveKey's ReadFile fails.
+	// The path is still under the same dir, so allowedSSHKeyPath passes (exact env match).
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "passphrase")
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", filepath.Join(dir, "nonexistent_key"))
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(t.TempDir())
+	_, err = r.Resolve(enc)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error when SSH key file is missing, got nil")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestResolve_FileRef_PathTraversal verifies that file:// references cannot escape configDir
+// via relative traversal ("../../etc/passwd") or absolute paths ("/abs/path").
+func TestResolve_FileRef_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+	// Create a file outside configDir that the traversal would point to.
+	outsideFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(outsideFile, []byte("stolen"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	r := credential.NewResolver(filepath.Dir(cfgPath))
+
+	cases := []string{
+		"file://../../secret.key",
+		"file://../secret.key",
+		"file://" + outsideFile, // absolute path
+	}
+	for _, raw := range cases {
+		_, err := r.Resolve(raw)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("Resolve(%q): expected path traversal error, got nil", raw)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestResolve_FileRef_withinConfigDir verifies that a legitimate relative file:// ref works.
+func TestResolve_FileRef_withinConfigDir(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "my.key"), []byte("sk-valid\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+	r := credential.NewResolver(dir)
+	got, err := r.Resolve("file://my.key")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != "sk-valid" {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", got, "sk-valid")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestEncrypt_SSHKeyOutsideAllowedDirs verifies that Encrypt rejects SSH key paths
+// that are not under PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH, PICOCLAW_HOME, or ~/.ssh/.
+func TestEncrypt_SSHKeyOutsideAllowedDirs(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	sshKeyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(sshKeyPath, []byte("fake-key\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Make sure none of the allowed env vars point here.
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
+	t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_HOME", "")
+
+	_, err := credential.Encrypt("passphrase", sshKeyPath, "sk-secret")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for SSH key outside allowed directories, got nil")
+	}
+}

pkg/credential/keygen.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package credential
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+)
+
+// DefaultSSHKeyPath returns the canonical path for the picoclaw-specific SSH key.
+// The path is always ~/.ssh/picoclaw_ed25519.key (os.UserHomeDir is cross-platform).
+func DefaultSSHKeyPath() (string, error) {
+	home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("credential: cannot determine home directory: %w", err)
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(home, ".ssh", "picoclaw_ed25519.key"), nil
+}
+
+// GenerateSSHKey generates an Ed25519 SSH key pair and writes the private key
+// to path (permissions 0600) and the public key to path+".pub" (permissions 0644).
+// The ~/.ssh/ directory is created with 0700 if it does not exist.
+// If the files already exist they are overwritten.
+func GenerateSSHKey(path string) error {
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("credential: keygen: cannot create directory %q: %w", filepath.Dir(path), err)
+	}
+
+	pubRaw, privRaw, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("credential: keygen: ed25519 key generation failed: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Marshal private key as OpenSSH PEM.
+	block, err := ssh.MarshalPrivateKey(privRaw, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("credential: keygen: marshal private key: %w", err)
+	}
+	privPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(block)
+
+	if err = os.WriteFile(path, privPEM, 0o600); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("credential: keygen: write private key %q: %w", path, err)
+	}
+
+	// Marshal public key as authorized_keys line.
+	sshPub, err := ssh.NewPublicKey(pubRaw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("credential: keygen: marshal public key: %w", err)
+	}
+	pubLine := ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(sshPub)
+
+	pubPath := path + ".pub"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(pubPath, pubLine, 0o644); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("credential: keygen: write public key %q: %w", pubPath, err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

pkg/credential/keygen_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+package credential
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+)
+
+func TestGenerateSSHKey_CreatesFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "test_ed25519.key")
+
+	if err := GenerateSSHKey(keyPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GenerateSSHKey() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Private key must exist.
+	privInfo, err := os.Stat(keyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("private key file missing: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Check permissions on non-Windows (Windows does not support Unix permission bits).
+	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
+		if got := privInfo.Mode().Perm(); got != 0o600 {
+			t.Errorf("private key permissions = %04o, want 0600", got)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Public key must exist.
+	pubPath := keyPath + ".pub"
+	pubInfo, err := os.Stat(pubPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("public key file missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
+		if got := pubInfo.Mode().Perm(); got != 0o644 {
+			t.Errorf("public key permissions = %04o, want 0644", got)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Private key must be parseable as an OpenSSH ed25519 key.
+	privPEM, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read private key: %v", err)
+	}
+	privKey, err := ssh.ParseRawPrivateKey(privPEM)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse private key: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, ok := privKey.(*ed25519.PrivateKey); !ok {
+		t.Errorf("private key type = %T, want *ed25519.PrivateKey", privKey)
+	}
+
+	// Public key must be parseable as authorized_keys line.
+	pubBytes, err := os.ReadFile(pubPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read public key: %v", err)
+	}
+	pubKey, _, _, rest, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(pubBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse public key: %v", err)
+	}
+	if pubKey == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected non-nil public key")
+	}
+	if len(rest) > 0 {
+		t.Errorf("unexpected trailing bytes after public key: %d bytes", len(rest))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGenerateSSHKey_OverwritesExisting(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "test_ed25519.key")
+
+	// Generate twice; second call must not error and must produce a different key.
+	if err := GenerateSSHKey(keyPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first GenerateSSHKey() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	first, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read first key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if err = GenerateSSHKey(keyPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second GenerateSSHKey() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	second, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read second key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Two independently generated Ed25519 keys must differ.
+	if string(first) == string(second) {
+		t.Error("expected overwritten key to differ from original")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGenerateSSHKey_CreatesDirectory(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	// Nested directory that does not yet exist.
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "subdir", ".ssh", "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
+
+	if err := GenerateSSHKey(keyPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GenerateSSHKey() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := os.Stat(keyPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("private key not created: %v", err)
+	}
+}

pkg/credential/store.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+package credential
+
+import "sync/atomic"
+
+// SecureStore holds a passphrase in memory.
+//
+// Uses atomic.Pointer so reads and writes are lock-free.
+// The passphrase is never written to disk; callers decide how to
+// transport it outside this store (e.g., via cmd.Env or os.Environ).
+type SecureStore struct {
+	val atomic.Pointer[string]
+}
+
+// NewSecureStore creates an empty SecureStore.
+func NewSecureStore() *SecureStore {
+	return &SecureStore{}
+}
+
+// SetString stores the passphrase. An empty string clears the store.
+func (s *SecureStore) SetString(passphrase string) {
+	if passphrase == "" {
+		s.val.Store(nil)
+		return
+	}
+	s.val.Store(&passphrase)
+}
+
+// Get returns the stored passphrase, or "" if not set.
+func (s *SecureStore) Get() string {
+	if p := s.val.Load(); p != nil {
+		return *p
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// IsSet reports whether a passphrase is currently stored.
+func (s *SecureStore) IsSet() bool {
+	return s.val.Load() != nil
+}
+
+// Clear removes the stored passphrase.
+func (s *SecureStore) Clear() {
+	s.val.Store(nil)
+}

pkg/credential/store_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+package credential
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestSecureStore_SetGet(t *testing.T) {
+	s := NewSecureStore()
+	if s.IsSet() {
+		t.Error("expected empty store")
+	}
+
+	s.SetString("hunter2")
+	if !s.IsSet() {
+		t.Error("expected store to be set")
+	}
+	if got := s.Get(); got != "hunter2" {
+		t.Errorf("Get() = %q, want %q", got, "hunter2")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSecureStore_Clear(t *testing.T) {
+	s := NewSecureStore()
+	s.SetString("secret")
+	s.Clear()
+
+	if s.IsSet() {
+		t.Error("expected store to be empty after Clear()")
+	}
+	if got := s.Get(); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("Get() after Clear() = %q, want empty", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSecureStore_SetOverwrites(t *testing.T) {
+	s := NewSecureStore()
+	s.SetString("first")
+	s.SetString("second")
+
+	if got := s.Get(); got != "second" {
+		t.Errorf("Get() = %q, want %q", got, "second")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSecureStore_EmptyPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
+	s := NewSecureStore()
+	s.SetString("") // empty → should not mark as set
+
+	if s.IsSet() {
+		t.Error("empty passphrase should not mark store as set")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSecureStore_ConcurrentSetGet(t *testing.T) {
+	s := NewSecureStore()
+	const goroutines = 10
+	const iterations = 1000
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	wg.Add(goroutines)
+	for i := 0; i < goroutines; i++ {
+		go func(id int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			for j := 0; j < iterations; j++ {
+				if id%2 == 0 {
+					s.SetString("even")
+				} else {
+					s.SetString("odd")
+				}
+				_ = s.Get()
+			}
+		}(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	final := s.Get()
+	if final != "" && final != "even" && final != "odd" {
+		t.Errorf("Get() returned unexpected value %q after concurrent Set/Get", final)
+	}
+}

pkg/gateway/gateway.go

@@ -0,0 +1,594 @@
+package gateway
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync"
+	"syscall"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/agent"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/bus"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/dingtalk"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/discord"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/feishu"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/irc"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/line"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/maixcam"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/matrix"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/onebot"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/pico"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/qq"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/slack"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/telegram"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/wecom"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/whatsapp"
+	_ "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels/whatsapp_native"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/cron"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/devices"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/health"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/heartbeat"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/logger"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/media"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/providers"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/state"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/tools"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/voice"
+)
+
+const (
+	serviceShutdownTimeout  = 30 * time.Second
+	providerReloadTimeout   = 30 * time.Second
+	gracefulShutdownTimeout = 15 * time.Second
+)
+
+type services struct {
+	CronService      *cron.CronService
+	HeartbeatService *heartbeat.HeartbeatService
+	MediaStore       media.MediaStore
+	ChannelManager   *channels.Manager
+	DeviceService    *devices.Service
+	HealthServer     *health.Server
+}
+
+type startupBlockedProvider struct {
+	reason string
+}
+
+func (p *startupBlockedProvider) Chat(
+	_ context.Context,
+	_ []providers.Message,
+	_ []providers.ToolDefinition,
+	_ string,
+	_ map[string]any,
+) (*providers.LLMResponse, error) {
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s", p.reason)
+}
+
+func (p *startupBlockedProvider) GetDefaultModel() string {
+	return ""
+}
+
+// Run starts the gateway runtime using the configuration loaded from configPath.
+func Run(debug bool, configPath string, allowEmptyStartup bool) error {
+	if debug {
+		logger.SetLevel(logger.DEBUG)
+		fmt.Println("🔍 Debug mode enabled")
+	}
+
+	cfg, err := config.LoadConfig(configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error loading config: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	provider, modelID, err := createStartupProvider(cfg, allowEmptyStartup)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error creating provider: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if modelID != "" {
+		cfg.Agents.Defaults.ModelName = modelID
+	}
+
+	msgBus := bus.NewMessageBus()
+	agentLoop := agent.NewAgentLoop(cfg, msgBus, provider)
+
+	fmt.Println("\n📦 Agent Status:")
+	startupInfo := agentLoop.GetStartupInfo()
+	toolsInfo := startupInfo["tools"].(map[string]any)
+	skillsInfo := startupInfo["skills"].(map[string]any)
+	fmt.Printf("  • Tools: %d loaded\n", toolsInfo["count"])
+	fmt.Printf("  • Skills: %d/%d available\n", skillsInfo["available"], skillsInfo["total"])
+
+	logger.InfoCF("agent", "Agent initialized",
+		map[string]any{
+			"tools_count":      toolsInfo["count"],
+			"skills_total":     skillsInfo["total"],
+			"skills_available": skillsInfo["available"],
+		})
+
+	runningServices, err := setupAndStartServices(cfg, agentLoop, msgBus)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	fmt.Printf("✓ Gateway started on %s:%d\n", cfg.Gateway.Host, cfg.Gateway.Port)
+	fmt.Println("Press Ctrl+C to stop")
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	go agentLoop.Run(ctx)
+
+	var configReloadChan <-chan *config.Config
+	stopWatch := func() {}
+	if cfg.Gateway.HotReload {
+		configReloadChan, stopWatch = setupConfigWatcherPolling(configPath, debug)
+		logger.Info("Config hot reload enabled")
+	}
+	defer stopWatch()
+
+	sigChan := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
+	signal.Notify(sigChan, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-sigChan:
+			logger.Info("Shutting down...")
+			shutdownGateway(runningServices, agentLoop, provider, true)
+			return nil
+		case newCfg := <-configReloadChan:
+			err := handleConfigReload(ctx, agentLoop, newCfg, &provider, runningServices, msgBus, allowEmptyStartup)
+			if err != nil {
+				logger.Errorf("Config reload failed: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func createStartupProvider(
+	cfg *config.Config,
+	allowEmptyStartup bool,
+) (providers.LLMProvider, string, error) {
+	modelName := cfg.Agents.Defaults.GetModelName()
+	if modelName == "" && allowEmptyStartup {
+		reason := "no default model configured; gateway started in limited mode"
+		fmt.Printf("⚠ Warning: %s\n", reason)
+		logger.WarnCF("gateway", "Gateway started without default model", map[string]any{
+			"limited_mode": true,
+		})
+		return &startupBlockedProvider{reason: reason}, "", nil
+	}
+
+	return providers.CreateProvider(cfg)
+}
+
+func setupAndStartServices(
+	cfg *config.Config,
+	agentLoop *agent.AgentLoop,
+	msgBus *bus.MessageBus,
+) (*services, error) {
+	runningServices := &services{}
+
+	execTimeout := time.Duration(cfg.Tools.Cron.ExecTimeoutMinutes) * time.Minute
+	var err error
+	runningServices.CronService, err = setupCronTool(
+		agentLoop,
+		msgBus,
+		cfg.WorkspacePath(),
+		cfg.Agents.Defaults.RestrictToWorkspace,
+		execTimeout,
+		cfg,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error setting up cron service: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err = runningServices.CronService.Start(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error starting cron service: %w", err)
+	}
+	fmt.Println("✓ Cron service started")
+
+	runningServices.HeartbeatService = heartbeat.NewHeartbeatService(
+		cfg.WorkspacePath(),
+		cfg.Heartbeat.Interval,
+		cfg.Heartbeat.Enabled,
+	)
+	runningServices.HeartbeatService.SetBus(msgBus)
+	runningServices.HeartbeatService.SetHandler(createHeartbeatHandler(agentLoop))
+	if err = runningServices.HeartbeatService.Start(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error starting heartbeat service: %w", err)
+	}
+	fmt.Println("✓ Heartbeat service started")
+
+	runningServices.MediaStore = media.NewFileMediaStoreWithCleanup(media.MediaCleanerConfig{
+		Enabled:  cfg.Tools.MediaCleanup.Enabled,
+		MaxAge:   time.Duration(cfg.Tools.MediaCleanup.MaxAge) * time.Minute,
+		Interval: time.Duration(cfg.Tools.MediaCleanup.Interval) * time.Minute,
+	})
+	if fms, ok := runningServices.MediaStore.(*media.FileMediaStore); ok {
+		fms.Start()
+	}
+
+	runningServices.ChannelManager, err = channels.NewManager(cfg, msgBus, runningServices.MediaStore)
+	if err != nil {
+		if fms, ok := runningServices.MediaStore.(*media.FileMediaStore); ok {
+			fms.Stop()
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error creating channel manager: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	agentLoop.SetChannelManager(runningServices.ChannelManager)
+	agentLoop.SetMediaStore(runningServices.MediaStore)
+
+	if transcriber := voice.DetectTranscriber(cfg); transcriber != nil {
+		agentLoop.SetTranscriber(transcriber)
+		logger.InfoCF("voice", "Transcription enabled (agent-level)", map[string]any{"provider": transcriber.Name()})
+	}
+
+	enabledChannels := runningServices.ChannelManager.GetEnabledChannels()
+	if len(enabledChannels) > 0 {
+		fmt.Printf("✓ Channels enabled: %s\n", enabledChannels)
+	} else {
+		fmt.Println("⚠ Warning: No channels enabled")
+	}
+
+	addr := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", cfg.Gateway.Host, cfg.Gateway.Port)
+	runningServices.HealthServer = health.NewServer(cfg.Gateway.Host, cfg.Gateway.Port)
+	runningServices.ChannelManager.SetupHTTPServer(addr, runningServices.HealthServer)
+
+	if err = runningServices.ChannelManager.StartAll(context.Background()); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error starting channels: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	fmt.Printf("✓ Health endpoints available at http://%s:%d/health and /ready\n", cfg.Gateway.Host, cfg.Gateway.Port)
+
+	stateManager := state.NewManager(cfg.WorkspacePath())
+	runningServices.DeviceService = devices.NewService(devices.Config{
+		Enabled:    cfg.Devices.Enabled,
+		MonitorUSB: cfg.Devices.MonitorUSB,
+	}, stateManager)
+	runningServices.DeviceService.SetBus(msgBus)
+	if err = runningServices.DeviceService.Start(context.Background()); err != nil {
+		logger.ErrorCF("device", "Error starting device service", map[string]any{"error": err.Error()})
+	} else if cfg.Devices.Enabled {
+		fmt.Println("✓ Device event service started")
+	}
+
+	return runningServices, nil
+}
+
+func stopAndCleanupServices(runningServices *services, shutdownTimeout time.Duration) {
+	shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), shutdownTimeout)
+	defer shutdownCancel()
+
+	if runningServices.ChannelManager != nil {
+		runningServices.ChannelManager.StopAll(shutdownCtx)
+	}
+	if runningServices.DeviceService != nil {
+		runningServices.DeviceService.Stop()
+	}
+	if runningServices.HeartbeatService != nil {
+		runningServices.HeartbeatService.Stop()
+	}
+	if runningServices.CronService != nil {
+		runningServices.CronService.Stop()
+	}
+	if runningServices.MediaStore != nil {
+		if fms, ok := runningServices.MediaStore.(*media.FileMediaStore); ok {
+			fms.Stop()
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func shutdownGateway(
+	runningServices *services,
+	agentLoop *agent.AgentLoop,
+	provider providers.LLMProvider,
+	fullShutdown bool,
+) {
+	if cp, ok := provider.(providers.StatefulProvider); ok && fullShutdown {
+		cp.Close()
+	}
+
+	stopAndCleanupServices(runningServices, gracefulShutdownTimeout)
+
+	agentLoop.Stop()
+	agentLoop.Close()
+
+	logger.Info("✓ Gateway stopped")
+}
+
+func handleConfigReload(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	al *agent.AgentLoop,
+	newCfg *config.Config,
+	providerRef *providers.LLMProvider,
+	runningServices *services,
+	msgBus *bus.MessageBus,
+	allowEmptyStartup bool,
+) error {
+	logger.Info("🔄 Config file changed, reloading...")
+
+	newModel := newCfg.Agents.Defaults.ModelName
+	if newModel == "" {
+		newModel = newCfg.Agents.Defaults.Model
+	}
+
+	logger.Infof(" New model is '%s', recreating provider...", newModel)
+
+	logger.Info("  Stopping all services...")
+	stopAndCleanupServices(runningServices, serviceShutdownTimeout)
+
+	newProvider, newModelID, err := createStartupProvider(newCfg, allowEmptyStartup)
+	if err != nil {
+		logger.Errorf("  ⚠ Error creating new provider: %v", err)
+		logger.Warn("  Attempting to restart services with old provider and config...")
+		if restartErr := restartServices(al, runningServices, msgBus); restartErr != nil {
+			logger.Errorf("  ⚠ Failed to restart services: %v", restartErr)
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("error creating new provider: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if newModelID != "" {
+		newCfg.Agents.Defaults.ModelName = newModelID
+	}
+
+	reloadCtx, reloadCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), providerReloadTimeout)
+	defer reloadCancel()
+
+	if err := al.ReloadProviderAndConfig(reloadCtx, newProvider, newCfg); err != nil {
+		logger.Errorf("  ⚠ Error reloading agent loop: %v", err)
+		if cp, ok := newProvider.(providers.StatefulProvider); ok {
+			cp.Close()
+		}
+		logger.Warn("  Attempting to restart services with old provider and config...")
+		if restartErr := restartServices(al, runningServices, msgBus); restartErr != nil {
+			logger.Errorf("  ⚠ Failed to restart services: %v", restartErr)
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("error reloading agent loop: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	*providerRef = newProvider
+
+	logger.Info("  Restarting all services with new configuration...")
+	if err := restartServices(al, runningServices, msgBus); err != nil {
+		logger.Errorf("  ⚠ Error restarting services: %v", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("error restarting services: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	logger.Info("  ✓ Provider, configuration, and services reloaded successfully (thread-safe)")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func restartServices(
+	al *agent.AgentLoop,
+	runningServices *services,
+	msgBus *bus.MessageBus,
+) error {
+	cfg := al.GetConfig()
+
+	execTimeout := time.Duration(cfg.Tools.Cron.ExecTimeoutMinutes) * time.Minute
+	var err error
+	runningServices.CronService, err = setupCronTool(
+		al,
+		msgBus,
+		cfg.WorkspacePath(),
+		cfg.Agents.Defaults.RestrictToWorkspace,
+		execTimeout,
+		cfg,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error restarting cron service: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err = runningServices.CronService.Start(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error restarting cron service: %w", err)
+	}
+	fmt.Println("  ✓ Cron service restarted")
+
+	runningServices.HeartbeatService = heartbeat.NewHeartbeatService(
+		cfg.WorkspacePath(),
+		cfg.Heartbeat.Interval,
+		cfg.Heartbeat.Enabled,
+	)
+	runningServices.HeartbeatService.SetBus(msgBus)
+	runningServices.HeartbeatService.SetHandler(createHeartbeatHandler(al))
+	if err = runningServices.HeartbeatService.Start(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error restarting heartbeat service: %w", err)
+	}
+	fmt.Println("  ✓ Heartbeat service restarted")
+
+	runningServices.MediaStore = media.NewFileMediaStoreWithCleanup(media.MediaCleanerConfig{
+		Enabled:  cfg.Tools.MediaCleanup.Enabled,
+		MaxAge:   time.Duration(cfg.Tools.MediaCleanup.MaxAge) * time.Minute,
+		Interval: time.Duration(cfg.Tools.MediaCleanup.Interval) * time.Minute,
+	})
+	if fms, ok := runningServices.MediaStore.(*media.FileMediaStore); ok {
+		fms.Start()
+	}
+	al.SetMediaStore(runningServices.MediaStore)
+
+	runningServices.ChannelManager, err = channels.NewManager(cfg, msgBus, runningServices.MediaStore)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error recreating channel manager: %w", err)
+	}
+	al.SetChannelManager(runningServices.ChannelManager)
+
+	enabledChannels := runningServices.ChannelManager.GetEnabledChannels()
+	if len(enabledChannels) > 0 {
+		fmt.Printf("  ✓ Channels enabled: %s\n", enabledChannels)
+	} else {
+		fmt.Println("  ⚠ Warning: No channels enabled")
+	}
+
+	addr := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", cfg.Gateway.Host, cfg.Gateway.Port)
+	runningServices.HealthServer = health.NewServer(cfg.Gateway.Host, cfg.Gateway.Port)
+	runningServices.ChannelManager.SetupHTTPServer(addr, runningServices.HealthServer)
+
+	if err = runningServices.ChannelManager.StartAll(context.Background()); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("error restarting channels: %w", err)
+	}
+	fmt.Printf(
+		"  ✓ Channels restarted, health endpoints at http://%s:%d/health and ready\n",
+		cfg.Gateway.Host,
+		cfg.Gateway.Port,
+	)
+
+	stateManager := state.NewManager(cfg.WorkspacePath())
+	runningServices.DeviceService = devices.NewService(devices.Config{
+		Enabled:    cfg.Devices.Enabled,
+		MonitorUSB: cfg.Devices.MonitorUSB,
+	}, stateManager)
+	runningServices.DeviceService.SetBus(msgBus)
+	if err := runningServices.DeviceService.Start(context.Background()); err != nil {
+		logger.WarnCF("device", "Failed to restart device service", map[string]any{"error": err.Error()})
+	} else if cfg.Devices.Enabled {
+		fmt.Println("  ✓ Device event service restarted")
+	}
+
+	transcriber := voice.DetectTranscriber(cfg)
+	al.SetTranscriber(transcriber)
+	if transcriber != nil {
+		logger.InfoCF("voice", "Transcription re-enabled (agent-level)", map[string]any{"provider": transcriber.Name()})
+	} else {
+		logger.InfoCF("voice", "Transcription disabled", nil)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func setupConfigWatcherPolling(configPath string, debug bool) (chan *config.Config, func()) {
+	configChan := make(chan *config.Config, 1)
+	stop := make(chan struct{})
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
+	wg.Add(1)
+	go func() {
+		defer wg.Done()
+
+		lastModTime := getFileModTime(configPath)
+		lastSize := getFileSize(configPath)
+
+		ticker := time.NewTicker(2 * time.Second)
+		defer ticker.Stop()
+
+		for {
+			select {
+			case <-ticker.C:
+				currentModTime := getFileModTime(configPath)
+				currentSize := getFileSize(configPath)
+
+				if currentModTime.After(lastModTime) || currentSize != lastSize {
+					if debug {
+						logger.Debugf("🔍 Config file change detected")
+					}
+
+					time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
+
+					lastModTime = currentModTime
+					lastSize = currentSize
+
+					newCfg, err := config.LoadConfig(configPath)
+					if err != nil {
+						logger.Errorf("⚠ Error loading new config: %v", err)
+						logger.Warn("  Using previous valid config")
+						continue
+					}
+
+					if err := newCfg.ValidateModelList(); err != nil {
+						logger.Errorf("  ⚠ New config validation failed: %v", err)
+						logger.Warn("  Using previous valid config")
+						continue
+					}
+
+					logger.Info("✓ Config file validated and loaded")
+
+					select {
+					case configChan <- newCfg:
+					default:
+						logger.Warn("⚠ Previous config reload still in progress, skipping")
+					}
+				}
+			case <-stop:
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	stopFunc := func() {
+		close(stop)
+		wg.Wait()
+	}
+
+	return configChan, stopFunc
+}
+
+func getFileModTime(path string) time.Time {
+	info, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return time.Time{}
+	}
+	return info.ModTime()
+}
+
+func getFileSize(path string) int64 {
+	info, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return info.Size()
+}
+
+func setupCronTool(
+	agentLoop *agent.AgentLoop,
+	msgBus *bus.MessageBus,
+	workspace string,
+	restrict bool,
+	execTimeout time.Duration,
+	cfg *config.Config,
+) (*cron.CronService, error) {
+	cronStorePath := filepath.Join(workspace, "cron", "jobs.json")
+
+	cronService := cron.NewCronService(cronStorePath, nil)
+
+	var cronTool *tools.CronTool
+	if cfg.Tools.IsToolEnabled("cron") {
+		var err error
+		cronTool, err = tools.NewCronTool(cronService, agentLoop, msgBus, workspace, restrict, execTimeout, cfg)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("critical error during CronTool initialization: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		agentLoop.RegisterTool(cronTool)
+	}
+
+	if cronTool != nil {
+		cronService.SetOnJob(func(job *cron.CronJob) (string, error) {
+			result := cronTool.ExecuteJob(context.Background(), job)
+			return result, nil
+		})
+	}
+
+	return cronService, nil
+}
+
+func createHeartbeatHandler(agentLoop *agent.AgentLoop) func(prompt, channel, chatID string) *tools.ToolResult {
+	return func(prompt, channel, chatID string) *tools.ToolResult {
+		if channel == "" || chatID == "" {
+			channel, chatID = "cli", "direct"
+		}
+
+		response, err := agentLoop.ProcessHeartbeat(context.Background(), prompt, channel, chatID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return tools.ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("Heartbeat error: %v", err))
+		}
+		if response == "HEARTBEAT_OK" {
+			return tools.SilentResult("Heartbeat OK")
+		}
+		return tools.SilentResult(response)
+	}
+}

pkg/health/server.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"maps"
 	"net/http"
+	"os"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ type StatusResponse struct {
 	Status string           `json:"status"`
 	Uptime string           `json:"uptime"`
 	Checks map[string]Check `json:"checks,omitempty"`
+	Pid    int              `json:"pid"`
 }
 
 func NewServer(host string, port int) *Server {
@@ -112,6 +114,7 @@ func (s *Server) healthHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	resp := StatusResponse{
 		Status: "ok",
 		Uptime: uptime.String(),
+		Pid:    os.Getpid(),
 	}
 
 	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)

pkg/logger/logger_3rd_party.go

@@ -2,7 +2,20 @@
 
 package logger
 
-import "fmt"
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"regexp"
+)
+
+// botTokenRe matches the bot ID prefix and the secret part of a Telegram bot token.
+// Groups: 1 = "bot<id>:", 2 = first 4 chars of secret, 3 = middle, 4 = last 4 chars.
+var botTokenRe = regexp.MustCompile(`(bot\d+:)([A-Za-z0-9_-]{4})[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}([A-Za-z0-9_-]{4})`)
+
+// maskSecrets replaces any embedded bot tokens in s with a redacted placeholder
+// that keeps the first and last 4 characters of the secret for identification.
+func maskSecrets(s string) string {
+	return botTokenRe.ReplaceAllString(s, "${1}${2}****${3}")
+}
 
 // Logger implements common Logger interface
 type Logger struct {
@@ -12,52 +25,52 @@ type Logger struct {
 
 // Debug logs debug messages
 func (b *Logger) Debug(v ...any) {
-	logMessage(DEBUG, b.component, fmt.Sprint(v...), nil)
+	logMessage(DEBUG, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprint(v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Info logs info messages
 func (b *Logger) Info(v ...any) {
-	logMessage(INFO, b.component, fmt.Sprint(v...), nil)
+	logMessage(INFO, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprint(v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Warn logs warning messages
 func (b *Logger) Warn(v ...any) {
-	logMessage(WARN, b.component, fmt.Sprint(v...), nil)
+	logMessage(WARN, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprint(v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Error logs error messages
 func (b *Logger) Error(v ...any) {
-	logMessage(ERROR, b.component, fmt.Sprint(v...), nil)
+	logMessage(ERROR, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprint(v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Debugf logs formatted debug messages
 func (b *Logger) Debugf(format string, v ...any) {
-	logMessage(DEBUG, b.component, fmt.Sprintf(format, v...), nil)
+	logMessage(DEBUG, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprintf(format, v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Infof logs formatted info messages
 func (b *Logger) Infof(format string, v ...any) {
-	logMessage(INFO, b.component, fmt.Sprintf(format, v...), nil)
+	logMessage(INFO, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprintf(format, v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Warnf logs formatted warning messages
 func (b *Logger) Warnf(format string, v ...any) {
-	logMessage(WARN, b.component, fmt.Sprintf(format, v...), nil)
+	logMessage(WARN, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprintf(format, v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Warningf logs formatted warning messages
 func (b *Logger) Warningf(format string, v ...any) {
-	logMessage(WARN, b.component, fmt.Sprintf(format, v...), nil)
+	logMessage(WARN, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprintf(format, v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Errorf logs formatted error messages
 func (b *Logger) Errorf(format string, v ...any) {
-	logMessage(ERROR, b.component, fmt.Sprintf(format, v...), nil)
+	logMessage(ERROR, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprintf(format, v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Fatalf logs formatted fatal messages and exits
 func (b *Logger) Fatalf(format string, v ...any) {
-	logMessage(FATAL, b.component, fmt.Sprintf(format, v...), nil)
+	logMessage(FATAL, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprintf(format, v...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Log logs a message at a given level with caller information
@@ -75,7 +88,7 @@ func (b *Logger) Log(msgL, caller int, format string, a ...any) {
 			level = lvl
 		}
 	}
-	logMessage(level, b.component, fmt.Sprintf(format, a...), nil)
+	logMessage(level, b.component, maskSecrets(fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)), nil)
 }
 
 // Sync flushes log buffer (no-op for this implementation)

pkg/media/tempdir.go

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+package media
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+)
+
+const TempDirName = "picoclaw_media"
+
+// TempDir returns the shared temporary directory used for downloaded media.
+func TempDir() string {
+	return filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), TempDirName)
+}

pkg/providers/anthropic_messages/provider.go

@@ -221,11 +221,17 @@ func buildRequestBody(
 
 			// Add tool_use blocks
 			for _, tc := range msg.ToolCalls {
+				// Handle nil Arguments (GLM-4 may return null input)
+				input := tc.Arguments
+				if input == nil {
+					input = map[string]any{}
+				}
+
 				toolUse := map[string]any{
 					"type":  "tool_use",
 					"id":    tc.ID,
 					"name":  tc.Name,
-					"input": tc.Arguments,
+					"input": input,
 				}
 				content = append(content, toolUse)
 			}

pkg/tools/cron.go

@@ -20,10 +20,12 @@ type JobExecutor interface {
 
 // CronTool provides scheduling capabilities for the agent
 type CronTool struct {
-	cronService *cron.CronService
-	executor    JobExecutor
-	msgBus      *bus.MessageBus
-	execTool    *ExecTool
+	cronService  *cron.CronService
+	executor     JobExecutor
+	msgBus       *bus.MessageBus
+	execTool     *ExecTool
+	allowCommand bool
+	execEnabled  bool
 }
 
 // NewCronTool creates a new CronTool
@@ -32,17 +34,32 @@ func NewCronTool(
 	cronService *cron.CronService, executor JobExecutor, msgBus *bus.MessageBus, workspace string, restrict bool,
 	execTimeout time.Duration, config *config.Config,
 ) (*CronTool, error) {
-	execTool, err := NewExecToolWithConfig(workspace, restrict, config)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to configure exec tool: %w", err)
+	allowCommand := true
+	execEnabled := true
+	if config != nil {
+		allowCommand = config.Tools.Cron.AllowCommand
+		execEnabled = config.Tools.Exec.Enabled
 	}
 
-	execTool.SetTimeout(execTimeout)
+	var execTool *ExecTool
+	if execEnabled {
+		var err error
+		execTool, err = NewExecToolWithConfig(workspace, restrict, config)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to configure exec tool: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if execTool != nil {
+		execTool.SetTimeout(execTimeout)
+	}
 	return &CronTool{
-		cronService: cronService,
-		executor:    executor,
-		msgBus:      msgBus,
-		execTool:    execTool,
+		cronService:  cronService,
+		executor:     executor,
+		msgBus:       msgBus,
+		execTool:     execTool,
+		allowCommand: allowCommand,
+		execEnabled:  execEnabled,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -76,7 +93,7 @@ func (t *CronTool) Parameters() map[string]any {
 			},
 			"command_confirm": map[string]any{
 				"type":        "boolean",
-				"description": "Required when using command=true. Must be true to explicitly confirm scheduling a shell command.",
+				"description": "Optional explicit confirmation flag for scheduling a shell command. Command execution must also be enabled via tools.cron.allow_command.",
 			},
 			"at_seconds": map[string]any{
 				"type":        "integer",
@@ -96,7 +113,7 @@ func (t *CronTool) Parameters() map[string]any {
 			},
 			"deliver": map[string]any{
 				"type":        "boolean",
-				"description": "If true, send message directly to channel. If false, let agent process message (for complex tasks). Default: true",
+				"description": "If true, send message directly to channel. If false, let agent process message (for complex tasks). Default: false",
 			},
 		},
 		"required": []string{"action"},
@@ -174,22 +191,26 @@ func (t *CronTool) addJob(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult
 		return ErrorResult("one of at_seconds, every_seconds, or cron_expr is required")
 	}
 
-	// Read deliver parameter, default to true
-	deliver := true
+	// Read deliver parameter, default to false so scheduled tasks execute through the agent
+	deliver := false
 	if d, ok := args["deliver"].(bool); ok {
 		deliver = d
 	}
 
-	// GHSA-pv8c-p6jf-3fpp: command scheduling requires internal channel + explicit confirm.
-	// Non-command reminders (plain messages) remain open to all channels.
+	// GHSA-pv8c-p6jf-3fpp: command scheduling requires internal channel. When
+	// allow_command is disabled, explicit confirmation is required as an override.
+	// Non-command reminders remain open to all channels.
 	command, _ := args["command"].(string)
 	commandConfirm, _ := args["command_confirm"].(bool)
 	if command != "" {
+		if !t.execEnabled {
+			return ErrorResult("command execution is disabled")
+		}
 		if !constants.IsInternalChannel(channel) {
 			return ErrorResult("scheduling command execution is restricted to internal channels")
 		}
-		if !commandConfirm {
-			return ErrorResult("command_confirm=true is required to schedule command execution")
+		if !t.allowCommand && !commandConfirm {
+			return ErrorResult("command_confirm=true is required when allow_command is disabled")
 		}
 		deliver = false
 	}
@@ -290,6 +311,18 @@ func (t *CronTool) ExecuteJob(ctx context.Context, job *cron.CronJob) string {
 
 	// Execute command if present
 	if job.Payload.Command != "" {
+		if !t.execEnabled || t.execTool == nil {
+			output := "Error executing scheduled command: command execution is disabled"
+			pubCtx, pubCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+			defer pubCancel()
+			t.msgBus.PublishOutbound(pubCtx, bus.OutboundMessage{
+				Channel: channel,
+				ChatID:  chatID,
+				Content: output,
+			})
+			return "ok"
+		}
+
 		args := map[string]any{
 			"command":   job.Payload.Command,
 			"__channel": channel,

pkg/tools/cron_test.go

@@ -5,18 +5,18 @@ import (
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/bus"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/cron"
 )
 
-func newTestCronTool(t *testing.T) *CronTool {
+func newTestCronToolWithConfig(t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config) *CronTool {
 	t.Helper()
 	storePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "cron.json")
 	cronService := cron.NewCronService(storePath, nil)
 	msgBus := bus.NewMessageBus()
-	cfg := config.DefaultConfig()
 	tool, err := NewCronTool(cronService, nil, msgBus, t.TempDir(), true, 0, cfg)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("NewCronTool() error: %v", err)
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ func newTestCronTool(t *testing.T) *CronTool {
 	return tool
 }
 
+func newTestCronTool(t *testing.T) *CronTool {
+	t.Helper()
+	return newTestCronToolWithConfig(t, config.DefaultConfig())
+}
+
 // TestCronTool_CommandBlockedFromRemoteChannel verifies command scheduling is restricted to internal channels
 func TestCronTool_CommandBlockedFromRemoteChannel(t *testing.T) {
 	tool := newTestCronTool(t)
@@ -44,8 +49,7 @@ func TestCronTool_CommandBlockedFromRemoteChannel(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestCronTool_CommandRequiresConfirm verifies command_confirm=true is required
-func TestCronTool_CommandRequiresConfirm(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCronTool_CommandDoesNotRequireConfirmByDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	tool := newTestCronTool(t)
 	ctx := WithToolContext(context.Background(), "cli", "direct")
 	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
@@ -55,11 +59,79 @@ func TestCronTool_CommandRequiresConfirm(t *testing.T) {
 		"at_seconds": float64(60),
 	})
 
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected command scheduling without confirm to succeed by default, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "Cron job added") {
+		t.Errorf("expected 'Cron job added', got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCronTool_CommandRequiresConfirmWhenAllowCommandDisabled(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := config.DefaultConfig()
+	cfg.Tools.Cron.AllowCommand = false
+
+	tool := newTestCronToolWithConfig(t, cfg)
+	ctx := WithToolContext(context.Background(), "cli", "direct")
+	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
+		"action":     "add",
+		"message":    "check disk",
+		"command":    "df -h",
+		"at_seconds": float64(60),
+	})
+
 	if !result.IsError {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when command_confirm is missing")
+		t.Fatal("expected command scheduling to require confirm when allow_command is disabled")
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "command_confirm=true") {
-		t.Errorf("expected 'command_confirm=true' message, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+		t.Errorf("expected command_confirm requirement message, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCronTool_CommandAllowedWithConfirmWhenAllowCommandDisabled(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := config.DefaultConfig()
+	cfg.Tools.Cron.AllowCommand = false
+
+	tool := newTestCronToolWithConfig(t, cfg)
+	ctx := WithToolContext(context.Background(), "cli", "direct")
+	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
+		"action":          "add",
+		"message":         "check disk",
+		"command":         "df -h",
+		"command_confirm": true,
+		"at_seconds":      float64(60),
+	})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf(
+			"expected command scheduling with confirm to succeed when allow_command is disabled, got: %s",
+			result.ForLLM,
+		)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "Cron job added") {
+		t.Errorf("expected 'Cron job added', got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCronTool_CommandBlockedWhenExecDisabled(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := config.DefaultConfig()
+	cfg.Tools.Exec.Enabled = false
+
+	tool := newTestCronToolWithConfig(t, cfg)
+	ctx := WithToolContext(context.Background(), "cli", "direct")
+	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
+		"action":          "add",
+		"message":         "check disk",
+		"command":         "df -h",
+		"command_confirm": true,
+		"at_seconds":      float64(60),
+	})
+
+	if !result.IsError {
+		t.Fatal("expected command scheduling to be blocked when exec is disabled")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "command execution is disabled") {
+		t.Errorf("expected exec disabled message, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -114,3 +186,51 @@ func TestCronTool_NonCommandJobAllowedFromRemoteChannel(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected non-command reminder to succeed from remote channel, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestCronTool_NonCommandJobDefaultsDeliverToFalse(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := newTestCronTool(t)
+	ctx := WithToolContext(context.Background(), "telegram", "chat-1")
+	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
+		"action":     "add",
+		"message":    "send me a poem",
+		"at_seconds": float64(600),
+	})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected non-command reminder to succeed, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+
+	jobs := tool.cronService.ListJobs(false)
+	if len(jobs) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 1 job, got %d", len(jobs))
+	}
+	if jobs[0].Payload.Deliver {
+		t.Fatal("expected deliver=false by default for non-command jobs")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCronTool_ExecuteJobPublishesErrorWhenExecDisabled(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := config.DefaultConfig()
+	cfg.Tools.Exec.Enabled = false
+
+	tool := newTestCronToolWithConfig(t, cfg)
+	job := &cron.CronJob{}
+	job.Payload.Channel = "cli"
+	job.Payload.To = "direct"
+	job.Payload.Command = "df -h"
+
+	if got := tool.ExecuteJob(context.Background(), job); got != "ok" {
+		t.Fatalf("ExecuteJob() = %q, want ok", got)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	msg, ok := tool.msgBus.SubscribeOutbound(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected outbound message")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(msg.Content, "command execution is disabled") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exec disabled message, got: %s", msg.Content)
+	}
+}

pkg/tools/filesystem.go

@@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ import (
 
 const MaxReadFileSize = 64 * 1024 // 64KB limit to avoid context overflow
 
-// validatePath ensures the given path is within the workspace if restrict is true.
-func validatePath(path, workspace string, restrict bool) (string, error) {
+func validatePathWithAllowPaths(path, workspace string, restrict bool, patterns []*regexp.Regexp) (string, error) {
 	if workspace == "" {
 		return path, fmt.Errorf("workspace is not defined")
 	}
@@ -42,6 +41,10 @@ func validatePath(path, workspace string, restrict bool) (string, error) {
 	}
 
 	if restrict {
+		if isAllowedPath(absPath, patterns) {
+			return absPath, nil
+		}
+
 		if !isWithinWorkspace(absPath, absWorkspace) {
 			return "", fmt.Errorf("access denied: path is outside the workspace")
 		}
@@ -73,6 +76,137 @@ func validatePath(path, workspace string, restrict bool) (string, error) {
 	return absPath, nil
 }
 
+func isAllowedPath(path string, patterns []*regexp.Regexp) bool {
+	if len(patterns) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	cleaned := filepath.Clean(path)
+	if !filepath.IsAbs(cleaned) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !matchesAllowedPath(cleaned, patterns) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	resolved, err := resolvePathAgainstExistingAncestor(cleaned)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return matchesAllowedPath(resolved, patterns)
+}
+
+func matchesAllowedPath(path string, patterns []*regexp.Regexp) bool {
+	cleaned := filepath.Clean(path)
+	for _, pattern := range patterns {
+		if pattern.MatchString(cleaned) {
+			return true
+		}
+		if root, ok := extractAllowedPathRoot(pattern); ok && isWithinAllowedRoot(cleaned, root) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func extractAllowedPathRoot(pattern *regexp.Regexp) (string, bool) {
+	raw := pattern.String()
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(raw, "^") {
+		return "", false
+	}
+
+	literal := strings.TrimPrefix(raw, "^")
+
+	// Recognize the common "directory prefix" form: ^<literal>(?:/|$)
+	literal = strings.TrimSuffix(literal, "(?:/|$)")
+	literal = strings.TrimSuffix(literal, `(?:\\|$)`)
+
+	// Reject patterns that still contain regex operators after removing the
+	// optional anchored-directory suffix. That keeps arbitrary regex behavior
+	// unchanged and only enables normalized prefix matching for literal paths.
+	if containsUnescapedRegexMeta(literal) {
+		return "", false
+	}
+
+	unescaped, ok := unescapeRegexLiteral(literal)
+	if !ok || unescaped == "" {
+		return "", false
+	}
+
+	return filepath.Clean(unescaped), filepath.IsAbs(unescaped)
+}
+
+func appendUniquePath(paths []string, path string) []string {
+	for _, existing := range paths {
+		if existing == path {
+			return paths
+		}
+	}
+	return append(paths, path)
+}
+
+func containsUnescapedRegexMeta(s string) bool {
+	escaped := false
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if escaped {
+			escaped = false
+			continue
+		}
+		if r == '\\' {
+			escaped = true
+			continue
+		}
+		switch r {
+		case '.', '+', '*', '?', '(', ')', '[', ']', '{', '}', '|':
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return escaped
+}
+
+func unescapeRegexLiteral(s string) (string, bool) {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	b.Grow(len(s))
+
+	escaped := false
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if escaped {
+			b.WriteRune(r)
+			escaped = false
+			continue
+		}
+		if r == '\\' {
+			escaped = true
+			continue
+		}
+		b.WriteRune(r)
+	}
+
+	if escaped {
+		return "", false
+	}
+
+	return b.String(), true
+}
+
+func isWithinAllowedRoot(path, root string) bool {
+	candidate := filepath.Clean(path)
+	allowedVariants := []string{filepath.Clean(root)}
+
+	if resolvedRoot, err := resolvePathAgainstExistingAncestor(root); err == nil {
+		allowedVariants = appendUniquePath(allowedVariants, filepath.Clean(resolvedRoot))
+	}
+
+	for _, allowedRoot := range allowedVariants {
+		if isWithinWorkspace(candidate, allowedRoot) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false
+}
+
 func resolveExistingAncestor(path string) (string, error) {
 	for current := filepath.Clean(path); ; current = filepath.Dir(current) {
 		if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(current); err == nil {
@@ -86,9 +220,32 @@ func resolveExistingAncestor(path string) (string, error) {
 	}
 }
 
+func resolvePathAgainstExistingAncestor(path string) (string, error) {
+	cleaned := filepath.Clean(path)
+	for current := cleaned; ; current = filepath.Dir(current) {
+		resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(current)
+		if err == nil {
+			suffix, relErr := filepath.Rel(current, cleaned)
+			if relErr != nil {
+				return "", relErr
+			}
+			if suffix == "." {
+				return filepath.Clean(resolved), nil
+			}
+			return filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(resolved, suffix)), nil
+		}
+		if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		if filepath.Dir(current) == current {
+			return "", os.ErrNotExist
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func isWithinWorkspace(candidate, workspace string) bool {
 	rel, err := filepath.Rel(filepath.Clean(workspace), filepath.Clean(candidate))
-	return err == nil && filepath.IsLocal(rel)
+	return err == nil && (rel == "." || filepath.IsLocal(rel))
 }
 
 type ReadFileTool struct {
@@ -625,12 +782,7 @@ type whitelistFs struct {
 }
 
 func (w *whitelistFs) matches(path string) bool {
-	for _, p := range w.patterns {
-		if p.MatchString(path) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
+	return isAllowedPath(path, w.patterns)
 }
 
 func (w *whitelistFs) ReadFile(path string) ([]byte, error) {

pkg/tools/filesystem_test.go

@@ -521,6 +521,90 @@ func TestWhitelistFs_AllowsMatchingPaths(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestWhitelistFs_BlocksSymlinkEscapeInAllowedDir(t *testing.T) {
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	allowedDir := t.TempDir()
+	secretDir := t.TempDir()
+	secretFile := filepath.Join(secretDir, "secret.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(secretFile, []byte("top secret"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("WriteFile(secretFile) error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	linkPath := filepath.Join(allowedDir, "link_out")
+	if err := os.Symlink(secretDir, linkPath); err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("symlink not supported in this environment: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	patterns := []*regexp.Regexp{regexp.MustCompile(`^` + regexp.QuoteMeta(allowedDir))}
+	tool := NewReadFileTool(workspace, true, MaxReadFileSize, patterns)
+
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"path": filepath.Join(linkPath, "secret.txt")})
+	if !result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected symlink escape from allowed dir to be blocked, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWhitelistFs_WriteAllowsNewFileUnderAllowedDir(t *testing.T) {
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	rootDir := t.TempDir()
+	allowedDir := filepath.Join(rootDir, "allowed")
+	targetFile := filepath.Join(allowedDir, "nested", "file.txt")
+
+	patterns := []*regexp.Regexp{regexp.MustCompile(`^` + regexp.QuoteMeta(allowedDir))}
+	tool := NewWriteFileTool(workspace, true, patterns)
+
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{
+		"path":    targetFile,
+		"content": "outside write",
+	})
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected whitelisted write to succeed, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(targetFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ReadFile(targetFile) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if string(data) != "outside write" {
+		t.Fatalf("target file content = %q, want %q", string(data), "outside write")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWhitelistFs_AllowsResolvedAllowedRootAlias(t *testing.T) {
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	realDir := t.TempDir()
+	linkParent := t.TempDir()
+	allowedAlias := filepath.Join(linkParent, "allowed-link")
+
+	if err := os.Symlink(realDir, allowedAlias); err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("symlink not supported in this environment: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	targetFile := filepath.Join(allowedAlias, "nested", "alias.txt")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(targetFile), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("MkdirAll(targetFile dir) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(targetFile, []byte("through alias"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("WriteFile(targetFile) error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	patterns := []*regexp.Regexp{
+		regexp.MustCompile(
+			"^" + regexp.QuoteMeta(filepath.Clean(allowedAlias)) +
+				"(?:" + regexp.QuoteMeta(string(os.PathSeparator)) + "|$)",
+		),
+	}
+	tool := NewReadFileTool(workspace, true, MaxReadFileSize, patterns)
+
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"path": targetFile})
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected symlink-backed allowed root to be readable, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "through alias") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected file content, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestReadFileTool_ChunkedReading verifies the pagination logic of the tool
 // by reading a file in multiple chunks using 'offset' and 'length'.
 func TestReadFileTool_ChunkedReading(t *testing.T) {

pkg/tools/send_file.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"mime"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/h2non/filetype"
@@ -21,20 +22,32 @@ type SendFileTool struct {
 	restrict    bool
 	maxFileSize int
 	mediaStore  media.MediaStore
+	allowPaths  []*regexp.Regexp
 
 	defaultChannel string
 	defaultChatID  string
 }
 
-func NewSendFileTool(workspace string, restrict bool, maxFileSize int, store media.MediaStore) *SendFileTool {
+func NewSendFileTool(
+	workspace string,
+	restrict bool,
+	maxFileSize int,
+	store media.MediaStore,
+	allowPaths ...[]*regexp.Regexp,
+) *SendFileTool {
 	if maxFileSize <= 0 {
 		maxFileSize = config.DefaultMaxMediaSize
 	}
+	var patterns []*regexp.Regexp
+	if len(allowPaths) > 0 {
+		patterns = allowPaths[0]
+	}
 	return &SendFileTool{
 		workspace:   workspace,
 		restrict:    restrict,
 		maxFileSize: maxFileSize,
 		mediaStore:  store,
+		allowPaths:  patterns,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -92,7 +105,7 @@ func (t *SendFileTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolRe
 		return ErrorResult("media store not configured")
 	}
 
-	resolved, err := validatePath(path, t.workspace, t.restrict)
+	resolved, err := validatePathWithAllowPaths(path, t.workspace, t.restrict, t.allowPaths)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("invalid path: %v", err))
 	}

pkg/tools/send_file_test.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -128,6 +129,44 @@ func TestSendFileTool_CustomFilename(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestSendFileTool_AllowsWhitelistedMediaTempPath(t *testing.T) {
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	mediaDir := media.TempDir()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(mediaDir, 0o700); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("MkdirAll(mediaDir) error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	testFile, err := os.CreateTemp(mediaDir, "send-file-*.txt")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTemp(mediaDir) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	testPath := testFile.Name()
+	if _, err := testFile.WriteString("forward me"); err != nil {
+		testFile.Close()
+		t.Fatalf("WriteString(testFile) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := testFile.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Close(testFile) error = %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Remove(testPath) })
+
+	pattern := regexp.MustCompile(
+		"^" + regexp.QuoteMeta(filepath.Clean(mediaDir)) + "(?:" + regexp.QuoteMeta(string(os.PathSeparator)) + "|$)",
+	)
+
+	store := media.NewFileMediaStore()
+	tool := NewSendFileTool(workspace, true, 0, store, []*regexp.Regexp{pattern})
+	tool.SetContext("feishu", "chat123")
+
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"path": testPath})
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected whitelisted temp media file to be sendable, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if len(result.Media) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 1 media ref, got %d", len(result.Media))
+	}
+}
+
 func TestDetectMediaType_MagicBytes(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 

pkg/tools/shell.go

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ type ExecTool struct {
 	denyPatterns        []*regexp.Regexp
 	allowPatterns       []*regexp.Regexp
 	customAllowPatterns []*regexp.Regexp
+	allowedPathPatterns []*regexp.Regexp
 	restrictToWorkspace bool
 	allowRemote         bool
 }
@@ -95,14 +96,23 @@ var (
 	}
 )
 
-func NewExecTool(workingDir string, restrict bool) (*ExecTool, error) {
-	return NewExecToolWithConfig(workingDir, restrict, nil)
+func NewExecTool(workingDir string, restrict bool, allowPaths ...[]*regexp.Regexp) (*ExecTool, error) {
+	return NewExecToolWithConfig(workingDir, restrict, nil, allowPaths...)
 }
 
-func NewExecToolWithConfig(workingDir string, restrict bool, config *config.Config) (*ExecTool, error) {
+func NewExecToolWithConfig(
+	workingDir string,
+	restrict bool,
+	config *config.Config,
+	allowPaths ...[]*regexp.Regexp,
+) (*ExecTool, error) {
 	denyPatterns := make([]*regexp.Regexp, 0)
 	customAllowPatterns := make([]*regexp.Regexp, 0)
+	var allowedPathPatterns []*regexp.Regexp
 	allowRemote := true
+	if len(allowPaths) > 0 {
+		allowedPathPatterns = allowPaths[0]
+	}
 
 	if config != nil {
 		execConfig := config.Tools.Exec
@@ -146,6 +156,7 @@ func NewExecToolWithConfig(workingDir string, restrict bool, config *config.Conf
 		denyPatterns:        denyPatterns,
 		allowPatterns:       nil,
 		customAllowPatterns: customAllowPatterns,
+		allowedPathPatterns: allowedPathPatterns,
 		restrictToWorkspace: restrict,
 		allowRemote:         allowRemote,
 	}, nil
@@ -198,7 +209,7 @@ func (t *ExecTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult
 	cwd := t.workingDir
 	if wd, ok := args["working_dir"].(string); ok && wd != "" {
 		if t.restrictToWorkspace && t.workingDir != "" {
-			resolvedWD, err := validatePath(wd, t.workingDir, true)
+			resolvedWD, err := validatePathWithAllowPaths(wd, t.workingDir, true, t.allowedPathPatterns)
 			if err != nil {
 				return ErrorResult("Command blocked by safety guard (" + err.Error() + ")")
 			}
@@ -226,16 +237,20 @@ func (t *ExecTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult
 		if err != nil {
 			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("Command blocked by safety guard (path resolution failed: %v)", err))
 		}
-		absWorkspace, _ := filepath.Abs(t.workingDir)
-		wsResolved, _ := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absWorkspace)
-		if wsResolved == "" {
-			wsResolved = absWorkspace
+		if isAllowedPath(resolved, t.allowedPathPatterns) {
+			cwd = resolved
+		} else {
+			absWorkspace, _ := filepath.Abs(t.workingDir)
+			wsResolved, _ := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absWorkspace)
+			if wsResolved == "" {
+				wsResolved = absWorkspace
+			}
+			rel, err := filepath.Rel(wsResolved, resolved)
+			if err != nil || !filepath.IsLocal(rel) {
+				return ErrorResult("Command blocked by safety guard (working directory escaped workspace)")
+			}
+			cwd = resolved
 		}
-		rel, err := filepath.Rel(wsResolved, resolved)
-		if err != nil || !filepath.IsLocal(rel) {
-			return ErrorResult("Command blocked by safety guard (working directory escaped workspace)")
-		}
-		cwd = resolved
 	}
 
 	// timeout == 0 means no timeout
@@ -412,6 +427,9 @@ func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
 			if safePaths[p] {
 				continue
 			}
+			if isAllowedPath(p, t.allowedPathPatterns) {
+				continue
+			}
 
 			rel, err := filepath.Rel(cwdPath, p)
 			if err != nil {

pkg/tools/spawn_status.go

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+package tools
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// SpawnStatusTool reports the status of subagents that were spawned via the
+// spawn tool. It can query a specific task by ID, or list every known task with
+// a summary count broken-down by status.
+type SpawnStatusTool struct {
+	manager *SubagentManager
+}
+
+// NewSpawnStatusTool creates a SpawnStatusTool backed by the given manager.
+func NewSpawnStatusTool(manager *SubagentManager) *SpawnStatusTool {
+	return &SpawnStatusTool{manager: manager}
+}
+
+func (t *SpawnStatusTool) Name() string {
+	return "spawn_status"
+}
+
+func (t *SpawnStatusTool) Description() string {
+	return "Get the status of spawned subagents. " +
+		"Returns a list of all subagents and their current state " +
+		"(running, completed, failed, or canceled), or retrieves details " +
+		"for a specific subagent task when task_id is provided. " +
+		"Results are scoped to the current conversation's channel and chat ID; " +
+		"all tasks are listed only when no channel/chat context is injected " +
+		"(e.g. direct programmatic calls via Execute)."
+}
+
+func (t *SpawnStatusTool) Parameters() map[string]any {
+	return map[string]any{
+		"type": "object",
+		"properties": map[string]any{
+			"task_id": map[string]any{
+				"type": "string",
+				"description": "Optional task ID (e.g. \"subagent-1\") to inspect a specific " +
+					"subagent. When omitted, all visible subagents are listed.",
+			},
+		},
+		"required": []string{},
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *SpawnStatusTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
+	if t.manager == nil {
+		return ErrorResult("Subagent manager not configured")
+	}
+
+	// Derive the calling conversation's identity so we can scope results to the
+	// current chat only — preventing cross-conversation task leakage in
+	// multi-user deployments.
+	callerChannel := ToolChannel(ctx)
+	callerChatID := ToolChatID(ctx)
+
+	var taskID string
+	if rawTaskID, ok := args["task_id"]; ok && rawTaskID != nil {
+		taskIDStr, ok := rawTaskID.(string)
+		if !ok {
+			return ErrorResult("task_id must be a string")
+		}
+		taskID = strings.TrimSpace(taskIDStr)
+	}
+
+	if taskID != "" {
+		// GetTaskCopy returns a consistent snapshot under the manager lock,
+		// eliminating any data race with the concurrent subagent goroutine.
+		taskCopy, ok := t.manager.GetTaskCopy(taskID)
+		if !ok {
+			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("No subagent found with task ID: %s", taskID))
+		}
+
+		// Restrict lookup to tasks that belong to this conversation.
+		if callerChannel != "" && taskCopy.OriginChannel != "" && taskCopy.OriginChannel != callerChannel {
+			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("No subagent found with task ID: %s", taskID))
+		}
+		if callerChatID != "" && taskCopy.OriginChatID != "" && taskCopy.OriginChatID != callerChatID {
+			return ErrorResult(fmt.Sprintf("No subagent found with task ID: %s", taskID))
+		}
+
+		return NewToolResult(spawnStatusFormatTask(&taskCopy))
+	}
+
+	// ListTaskCopies returns consistent snapshots under the manager lock.
+	origTasks := t.manager.ListTaskCopies()
+	if len(origTasks) == 0 {
+		return NewToolResult("No subagents have been spawned yet.")
+	}
+
+	tasks := make([]*SubagentTask, 0, len(origTasks))
+	for i := range origTasks {
+		cpy := &origTasks[i]
+
+		// Filter to tasks that originate from the current conversation only.
+		if callerChannel != "" && cpy.OriginChannel != "" && cpy.OriginChannel != callerChannel {
+			continue
+		}
+		if callerChatID != "" && cpy.OriginChatID != "" && cpy.OriginChatID != callerChatID {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		tasks = append(tasks, cpy)
+	}
+
+	if len(tasks) == 0 {
+		return NewToolResult("No subagents found for this conversation.")
+	}
+
+	// Order by creation time (ascending) so spawning order is preserved.
+	// Fall back to ID string for tasks created in the same millisecond.
+	sort.Slice(tasks, func(i, j int) bool {
+		if tasks[i].Created != tasks[j].Created {
+			return tasks[i].Created < tasks[j].Created
+		}
+		return tasks[i].ID < tasks[j].ID
+	})
+
+	counts := map[string]int{}
+	for _, task := range tasks {
+		counts[task.Status]++
+	}
+
+	var sb strings.Builder
+	sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Subagent status report (%d total):\n", len(tasks)))
+	for _, status := range []string{"running", "completed", "failed", "canceled"} {
+		if n := counts[status]; n > 0 {
+			label := strings.ToUpper(status[:1]) + status[1:] + ":"
+			sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("  %-10s %d\n", label, n))
+		}
+	}
+	sb.WriteString("\n")
+
+	for _, task := range tasks {
+		sb.WriteString(spawnStatusFormatTask(task))
+		sb.WriteString("\n\n")
+	}
+
+	return NewToolResult(strings.TrimRight(sb.String(), "\n"))
+}
+
+// spawnStatusFormatTask renders a single SubagentTask as a human-readable block.
+func spawnStatusFormatTask(task *SubagentTask) string {
+	var sb strings.Builder
+
+	header := fmt.Sprintf("[%s] status=%s", task.ID, task.Status)
+	if task.Label != "" {
+		header += fmt.Sprintf("  label=%q", task.Label)
+	}
+	if task.AgentID != "" {
+		header += fmt.Sprintf("  agent=%s", task.AgentID)
+	}
+	if task.Created > 0 {
+		created := time.UnixMilli(task.Created).UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 UTC")
+		header += fmt.Sprintf("  created=%s", created)
+	}
+	sb.WriteString(header)
+
+	if task.Task != "" {
+		sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\n  task:   %s", task.Task))
+	}
+	if task.Result != "" {
+		result := task.Result
+		const maxResultLen = 300
+		runes := []rune(result)
+		if len(runes) > maxResultLen {
+			result = string(runes[:maxResultLen]) + "…"
+		}
+		sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\n  result: %s", result))
+	}
+
+	return sb.String()
+}

pkg/tools/spawn_status_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+package tools
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_Name(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", workspace)
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	if tool.Name() != "spawn_status" {
+		t.Errorf("Expected name 'spawn_status', got '%s'", tool.Name())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_Description(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", workspace)
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	desc := tool.Description()
+	if desc == "" {
+		t.Error("Description should not be empty")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(desc), "subagent") {
+		t.Errorf("Description should mention 'subagent', got: %s", desc)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_Parameters(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", workspace)
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	params := tool.Parameters()
+	if params["type"] != "object" {
+		t.Errorf("Expected type 'object', got: %v", params["type"])
+	}
+	props, ok := params["properties"].(map[string]any)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("Expected 'properties' to be a map")
+	}
+	if _, hasTaskID := props["task_id"]; !hasTaskID {
+		t.Error("Expected 'task_id' parameter in properties")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_NilManager(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &SpawnStatusTool{manager: nil}
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{})
+	if !result.IsError {
+		t.Error("Expected error result when manager is nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_Empty(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", workspace)
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{})
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Expected success, got error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "No subagents") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected 'No subagents' message, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_ListAll(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", workspace)
+
+	now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	manager.tasks["subagent-1"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID:      "subagent-1",
+		Task:    "Do task A",
+		Label:   "task-a",
+		Status:  "running",
+		Created: now,
+	}
+	manager.tasks["subagent-2"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID:      "subagent-2",
+		Task:    "Do task B",
+		Label:   "task-b",
+		Status:  "completed",
+		Result:  "Done successfully",
+		Created: now,
+	}
+	manager.tasks["subagent-3"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID:     "subagent-3",
+		Task:   "Do task C",
+		Status: "failed",
+		Result: "Error: something went wrong",
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Expected success, got error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+
+	// Summary header
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "3 total") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected total count in header, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+
+	// Individual task IDs
+	for _, id := range []string{"subagent-1", "subagent-2", "subagent-3"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, id) {
+			t.Errorf("Expected task %s in output, got:\n%s", id, result.ForLLM)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Status values
+	for _, status := range []string{"running", "completed", "failed"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, status) {
+			t.Errorf("Expected status '%s' in output, got:\n%s", status, result.ForLLM)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Result content
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "Done successfully") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected result text in output, got:\n%s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_GetByID(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	manager.tasks["subagent-42"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID:      "subagent-42",
+		Task:    "Specific task",
+		Label:   "my-task",
+		Status:  "failed",
+		Result:  "Something went wrong",
+		Created: time.Now().UnixMilli(),
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"task_id": "subagent-42"})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Expected success, got error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "subagent-42") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected task ID in output, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "failed") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected status 'failed' in output, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "Something went wrong") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected result text in output, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "my-task") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected label in output, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_GetByID_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"task_id": "nonexistent-999"})
+	if !result.IsError {
+		t.Errorf("Expected error for nonexistent task, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "nonexistent-999") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected task ID in error message, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_TaskID_NonString(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	for _, badVal := range []any{42, 3.14, true, map[string]any{"x": 1}, []string{"a"}} {
+		result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"task_id": badVal})
+		if !result.IsError {
+			t.Errorf("Expected error for task_id=%T(%v), got success: %s", badVal, badVal, result.ForLLM)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "task_id must be a string") {
+			t.Errorf("Expected type-error message, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_ResultTruncation(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+
+	longResult := strings.Repeat("X", 500)
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	manager.tasks["subagent-1"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID:     "subagent-1",
+		Task:   "Long task",
+		Status: "completed",
+		Result: longResult,
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"task_id": "subagent-1"})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	// Output should be shorter than the raw result due to truncation
+	if len(result.ForLLM) >= len(longResult) {
+		t.Errorf("Expected result to be truncated, but ForLLM is %d chars", len(result.ForLLM))
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "…") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected truncation indicator '…' in output, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_ResultTruncation_Unicode(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+
+	// Each CJK rune is 3 bytes; 400 runes = 1200 bytes — well over the 300-rune limit.
+	cjkChar := string(rune(0x5b57))
+	longResult := strings.Repeat(cjkChar, 400)
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	manager.tasks["subagent-1"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID:     "subagent-1",
+		Task:   "Unicode task",
+		Status: "completed",
+		Result: longResult,
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{"task_id": "subagent-1"})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "…") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected truncation indicator in output")
+	}
+	// The truncated result must be valid UTF-8 (no split rune boundaries).
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, cjkChar) {
+		t.Errorf("Expected CJK runes to appear intact in output")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_StatusCounts(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	for i, status := range []string{"running", "running", "completed", "failed", "canceled"} {
+		id := fmt.Sprintf("subagent-%d", i+1)
+		manager.tasks[id] = &SubagentTask{ID: id, Task: "t", Status: status}
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	// The summary line should mention all statuses that have counts
+	for _, want := range []string{"Running:", "Completed:", "Failed:", "Canceled:"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, want) {
+			t.Errorf("Expected %q in summary, got:\n%s", want, result.ForLLM)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_SortByCreatedTimestamp(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+
+	now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	// Intentionally insert with out-of-order IDs and timestamps that reflect
+	// true spawn order: subagent-2 was spawned first, subagent-10 second.
+	manager.tasks["subagent-10"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID: "subagent-10", Task: "second", Status: "running",
+		Created: now + 1,
+	}
+	manager.tasks["subagent-2"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID: "subagent-2", Task: "first", Status: "running",
+		Created: now,
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+
+	pos2 := strings.Index(result.ForLLM, "subagent-2")
+	pos10 := strings.Index(result.ForLLM, "subagent-10")
+	if pos2 < 0 || pos10 < 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("Both task IDs should appear in output:\n%s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if pos2 > pos10 {
+		t.Errorf("Expected subagent-2 (created first) to appear before subagent-10, but got:\n%s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_ChannelFiltering_ListAll(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	manager.tasks["subagent-1"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID: "subagent-1", Task: "mine", Status: "running",
+		OriginChannel: "telegram", OriginChatID: "chat-A",
+	}
+	manager.tasks["subagent-2"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID: "subagent-2", Task: "other user", Status: "running",
+		OriginChannel: "telegram", OriginChatID: "chat-B",
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	// Caller is chat-A — should only see subagent-1.
+	ctx := WithToolContext(context.Background(), "telegram", "chat-A")
+	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{})
+
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "subagent-1") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected own task in output, got:\n%s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "subagent-2") {
+		t.Errorf("Should NOT see other chat's task, got:\n%s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_ChannelFiltering_GetByID(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	manager.tasks["subagent-99"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID: "subagent-99", Task: "secret", Status: "completed", Result: "private data",
+		OriginChannel: "slack", OriginChatID: "room-Z",
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	// Different chat trying to look up subagent-99 by ID.
+	ctx := WithToolContext(context.Background(), "slack", "room-OTHER")
+	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{"task_id": "subagent-99"})
+
+	if !result.IsError {
+		t.Errorf("Expected error (cross-chat lookup blocked), got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSpawnStatusTool_ChannelFiltering_NoContext(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &MockLLMProvider{}
+	manager := NewSubagentManager(provider, "test-model", "/tmp/test")
+
+	manager.mu.Lock()
+	manager.tasks["subagent-1"] = &SubagentTask{
+		ID: "subagent-1", Task: "t", Status: "completed",
+		OriginChannel: "telegram", OriginChatID: "chat-A",
+	}
+	manager.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tool := NewSpawnStatusTool(manager)
+
+	// No ToolContext injected (e.g. a direct programmatic call that bypasses
+	// WithToolContext entirely) — callerChannel and callerChatID are both "".
+	// Note: the normal CLI path uses ProcessDirectWithChannel("cli", "direct"),
+	// which *does* inject a non-empty context; this test covers the case where
+	// no context injection happens at all.
+	// The filter conditions require a non-empty caller value, so all tasks pass through.
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{})
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "subagent-1") {
+		t.Errorf("Expected task visible from no-context caller, got:\n%s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}

pkg/tools/subagent.go

@@ -109,9 +109,6 @@ func (sm *SubagentManager) Spawn(
 }
 
 func (sm *SubagentManager) runTask(ctx context.Context, task *SubagentTask, callback AsyncCallback) {
-	task.Status = "running"
-	task.Created = time.Now().UnixMilli()
-
 	// Build system prompt for subagent
 	systemPrompt := `You are a subagent. Complete the given task independently and report the result.
 You have access to tools - use them as needed to complete your task.
@@ -219,6 +216,18 @@ func (sm *SubagentManager) GetTask(taskID string) (*SubagentTask, bool) {
 	return task, ok
 }
 
+// GetTaskCopy returns a copy of the task with the given ID, taken under the
+// read lock, so the caller receives a consistent snapshot with no data race.
+func (sm *SubagentManager) GetTaskCopy(taskID string) (SubagentTask, bool) {
+	sm.mu.RLock()
+	defer sm.mu.RUnlock()
+	task, ok := sm.tasks[taskID]
+	if !ok {
+		return SubagentTask{}, false
+	}
+	return *task, true
+}
+
 func (sm *SubagentManager) ListTasks() []*SubagentTask {
 	sm.mu.RLock()
 	defer sm.mu.RUnlock()
@@ -230,6 +239,19 @@ func (sm *SubagentManager) ListTasks() []*SubagentTask {
 	return tasks
 }
 
+// ListTaskCopies returns value copies of all tasks, taken under the read lock,
+// so callers receive consistent snapshots with no data race.
+func (sm *SubagentManager) ListTaskCopies() []SubagentTask {
+	sm.mu.RLock()
+	defer sm.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	copies := make([]SubagentTask, 0, len(sm.tasks))
+	for _, task := range sm.tasks {
+		copies = append(copies, *task)
+	}
+	return copies
+}
+
 // SubagentTool executes a subagent task synchronously and returns the result.
 // Unlike SpawnTool which runs tasks asynchronously, SubagentTool waits for completion
 // and returns the result directly in the ToolResult.

pkg/tools/web.go

@@ -780,11 +780,17 @@ type WebFetchTool struct {
 	client          *http.Client
 	format          string
 	fetchLimitBytes int64
+	whitelist       *privateHostWhitelist
+}
+
+type privateHostWhitelist struct {
+	exact map[string]struct{}
+	cidrs []*net.IPNet
 }
 
 func NewWebFetchTool(maxChars int, format string, fetchLimitBytes int64) (*WebFetchTool, error) {
 	// createHTTPClient cannot fail with an empty proxy string.
-	return NewWebFetchToolWithProxy(maxChars, "", format, fetchLimitBytes)
+	return NewWebFetchToolWithProxy(maxChars, "", format, fetchLimitBytes, nil)
 }
 
 // allowPrivateWebFetchHosts controls whether loopback/private hosts are allowed.
@@ -792,9 +798,22 @@ func NewWebFetchTool(maxChars int, format string, fetchLimitBytes int64) (*WebFe
 var allowPrivateWebFetchHosts atomic.Bool
 
 func NewWebFetchToolWithProxy(maxChars int, proxy string, format string, fetchLimitBytes int64) (*WebFetchTool, error) {
+	return NewWebFetchToolWithConfig(maxChars, proxy, fetchLimitBytes, nil)
+}
+
+func NewWebFetchToolWithConfig(
+	maxChars int,
+	proxy string,
+	fetchLimitBytes int64,
+	privateHostWhitelist []string,
+) (*WebFetchTool, error) {
 	if maxChars <= 0 {
 		maxChars = defaultMaxChars
 	}
+	whitelist, err := newPrivateHostWhitelist(privateHostWhitelist)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse web fetch private host whitelist: %w", err)
+	}
 	client, err := utils.CreateHTTPClient(proxy, fetchTimeout)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create HTTP client for web fetch: %w", err)
@@ -804,13 +823,13 @@ func NewWebFetchToolWithProxy(maxChars int, proxy string, format string, fetchLi
 			Timeout:   15 * time.Second,
 			KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
 		}
-		transport.DialContext = newSafeDialContext(dialer)
+		transport.DialContext = newSafeDialContext(dialer, whitelist)
 	}
 	client.CheckRedirect = func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
 		if len(via) >= maxRedirects {
 			return fmt.Errorf("stopped after %d redirects", maxRedirects)
 		}
-		if isObviousPrivateHost(req.URL.Hostname()) {
+		if isObviousPrivateHost(req.URL.Hostname(), whitelist) {
 			return fmt.Errorf("redirect target is private or local network host")
 		}
 		return nil
@@ -824,6 +843,7 @@ func NewWebFetchToolWithProxy(maxChars int, proxy string, format string, fetchLi
 		client:          client,
 		format:          format,
 		fetchLimitBytes: fetchLimitBytes,
+		whitelist:       whitelist,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -875,7 +895,7 @@ func (t *WebFetchTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolRe
 	// Lightweight pre-flight: block obvious localhost/literal-IP without DNS resolution.
 	// The real SSRF guard is newSafeDialContext at connect time.
 	hostname := parsedURL.Hostname()
-	if isObviousPrivateHost(hostname) {
+	if isObviousPrivateHost(hostname, t.whitelist) {
 		return ErrorResult("fetching private or local network hosts is not allowed")
 	}
 
@@ -1019,7 +1039,10 @@ func (t *WebFetchTool) extractText(htmlContent string) string {
 
 // newSafeDialContext re-resolves DNS at connect time to mitigate DNS rebinding (TOCTOU)
 // where a hostname resolves to a public IP during pre-flight but a private IP at connect time.
-func newSafeDialContext(dialer *net.Dialer) func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
+func newSafeDialContext(
+	dialer *net.Dialer,
+	whitelist *privateHostWhitelist,
+) func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
 	return func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {
 		if allowPrivateWebFetchHosts.Load() {
 			return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, address)
@@ -1034,7 +1057,7 @@ func newSafeDialContext(dialer *net.Dialer) func(context.Context, string, string
 		}
 
 		if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
-			if isPrivateOrRestrictedIP(ip) {
+			if shouldBlockPrivateIP(ip, whitelist) {
 				return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked private or local target: %s", host)
 			}
 			return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), port))
@@ -1048,7 +1071,7 @@ func newSafeDialContext(dialer *net.Dialer) func(context.Context, string, string
 		attempted := 0
 		var lastErr error
 		for _, ipAddr := range ipAddrs {
-			if isPrivateOrRestrictedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
+			if shouldBlockPrivateIP(ipAddr.IP, whitelist) {
 				continue
 			}
 			attempted++
@@ -1060,7 +1083,7 @@ func newSafeDialContext(dialer *net.Dialer) func(context.Context, string, string
 		}
 
 		if attempted == 0 {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("all resolved addresses for %s are private or restricted", host)
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("all resolved addresses for %s are private, restricted, or not whitelisted", host)
 		}
 		if lastErr != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed connecting to public addresses for %s: %w", host, lastErr)
@@ -1069,10 +1092,72 @@ func newSafeDialContext(dialer *net.Dialer) func(context.Context, string, string
 	}
 }
 
+func newPrivateHostWhitelist(entries []string) (*privateHostWhitelist, error) {
+	if len(entries) == 0 {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	whitelist := &privateHostWhitelist{
+		exact: make(map[string]struct{}),
+		cidrs: make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(entries)),
+	}
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
+		if entry == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if ip := net.ParseIP(entry); ip != nil {
+			whitelist.exact[normalizeWhitelistIP(ip).String()] = struct{}{}
+			continue
+		}
+		_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(entry)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid entry %q: expected IP or CIDR", entry)
+		}
+		whitelist.cidrs = append(whitelist.cidrs, network)
+	}
+
+	if len(whitelist.exact) == 0 && len(whitelist.cidrs) == 0 {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return whitelist, nil
+}
+
+func (w *privateHostWhitelist) Contains(ip net.IP) bool {
+	if w == nil || ip == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	normalized := normalizeWhitelistIP(ip)
+	if _, ok := w.exact[normalized.String()]; ok {
+		return true
+	}
+	for _, network := range w.cidrs {
+		if network.Contains(normalized) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func normalizeWhitelistIP(ip net.IP) net.IP {
+	if ip == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if ip4 := ip.To4(); ip4 != nil {
+		return ip4
+	}
+	return ip
+}
+
+func shouldBlockPrivateIP(ip net.IP, whitelist *privateHostWhitelist) bool {
+	return isPrivateOrRestrictedIP(ip) && !whitelist.Contains(ip)
+}
+
 // isObviousPrivateHost performs a lightweight, no-DNS check for obviously private hosts.
 // It catches localhost, literal private IPs, and empty hosts. It does NOT resolve DNS —
 // the real SSRF guard is newSafeDialContext which checks IPs at connect time.
-func isObviousPrivateHost(host string) bool {
+func isObviousPrivateHost(host string, whitelist *privateHostWhitelist) bool {
 	if allowPrivateWebFetchHosts.Load() {
 		return false
 	}
@@ -1088,7 +1173,7 @@ func isObviousPrivateHost(host string) bool {
 	}
 
 	if ip := net.ParseIP(h); ip != nil {
-		return isPrivateOrRestrictedIP(ip)
+		return shouldBlockPrivateIP(ip, whitelist)
 	}
 
 	return false

pkg/tools/web_test.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/logger"
 )
@@ -425,6 +426,29 @@ func withPrivateWebFetchHostsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
+func serverHostAndPort(t *testing.T, rawURL string) (string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	hostPort := strings.TrimPrefix(rawURL, "http://")
+	hostPort = strings.TrimPrefix(hostPort, "https://")
+	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostPort)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to split host/port from %q: %v", rawURL, err)
+	}
+	return host, port
+}
+
+func singleHostCIDR(t *testing.T, host string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	ip := net.ParseIP(host)
+	if ip == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", host)
+	}
+	if ip.To4() != nil {
+		return ip.String() + "/32"
+	}
+	return ip.String() + "/128"
+}
+
 func TestWebTool_WebFetch_PrivateHostBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 	tool, err := NewWebFetchTool(50000, format, testFetchLimit)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -443,6 +467,56 @@ func TestWebTool_WebFetch_PrivateHostBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestWebTool_WebFetch_PrivateHostAllowedByExactWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		w.Write([]byte("exact whitelist ok"))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	host, _ := serverHostAndPort(t, server.URL)
+	tool, err := NewWebFetchToolWithConfig(50000, "", testFetchLimit, []string{host})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create web fetch tool: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{
+		"url": server.URL,
+	})
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected success for exact whitelisted private IP, got %q", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "exact whitelist ok") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected fetched content, got %q", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWebTool_WebFetch_PrivateHostAllowedByCIDRWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		w.Write([]byte("cidr whitelist ok"))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	host, _ := serverHostAndPort(t, server.URL)
+	tool, err := NewWebFetchToolWithConfig(50000, "", testFetchLimit, []string{singleHostCIDR(t, host)})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create web fetch tool: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]any{
+		"url": server.URL,
+	})
+	if result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected success for CIDR-whitelisted private IP, got %q", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "cidr whitelist ok") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected fetched content, got %q", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestWebTool_WebFetch_PrivateHostAllowedForTests(t *testing.T) {
 	withPrivateWebFetchHostsAllowed(t)
 
@@ -572,6 +646,69 @@ func TestWebFetch_RedirectToPrivateBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestNewSafeDialContext_BlocksPrivateDNSResolutionWithoutWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to listen on loopback: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer listener.Close()
+
+	_, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(listener.Addr().String())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to split listener address: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	dialContext := newSafeDialContext(&net.Dialer{Timeout: time.Second}, nil)
+	_, err = dialContext(context.Background(), "tcp", net.JoinHostPort("localhost", port))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected localhost DNS resolution to be blocked without whitelist")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private") && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "whitelisted") {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewSafeDialContext_AllowsWhitelistedPrivateDNSResolution(t *testing.T) {
+	listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to listen on loopback: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer listener.Close()
+
+	accepted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
+	go func() {
+		conn, acceptErr := listener.Accept()
+		if acceptErr != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		conn.Close()
+		accepted <- struct{}{}
+	}()
+
+	_, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(listener.Addr().String())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to split listener address: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	whitelist, err := newPrivateHostWhitelist([]string{"127.0.0.0/8"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to parse whitelist: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	dialContext := newSafeDialContext(&net.Dialer{Timeout: time.Second}, whitelist)
+	conn, err := dialContext(context.Background(), "tcp", net.JoinHostPort("localhost", port))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected localhost DNS resolution to succeed with whitelist, got %v", err)
+	}
+	conn.Close()
+
+	select {
+	case <-accepted:
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("expected localhost listener to accept a connection")
+	}
+}
+
 // TestIsPrivateOrRestrictedIP_Table tests IP classification logic
 func TestIsPrivateOrRestrictedIP_Table(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
@@ -662,6 +799,16 @@ func TestNewWebFetchToolWithProxy(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestNewWebFetchToolWithConfig_InvalidPrivateHostWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := NewWebFetchToolWithConfig(1024, "", testFetchLimit, []string{"not-an-ip-or-cidr"})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected invalid whitelist entry to fail")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid entry") {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestNewWebSearchTool_PropagatesProxy(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Run("perplexity", func(t *testing.T) {
 		tool, err := NewWebSearchTool(WebSearchToolOptions{

pkg/utils/media.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/logger"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/media"
 )
 
 // IsAudioFile checks if a file is an audio file based on its filename extension and content type.
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ func DownloadFile(urlStr, filename string, opts DownloadOptions) string {
 		opts.LoggerPrefix = "utils"
 	}
 
-	mediaDir := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "picoclaw_media")
+	mediaDir := media.TempDir()
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(mediaDir, 0o700); err != nil {
 		logger.ErrorCF(opts.LoggerPrefix, "Failed to create media directory", map[string]any{
 			"error": err.Error(),